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1. Introduction 
 
 
"Now Main Street's whitewashed windows and vacant stores. Seems like there ain't nobody wants 
to come down here no more. They're closing down the textile mill across the railroad tracks. 
Foreman says these jobs are going boys and they ain't coming back to your hometown." 
 
-Bruce Springsteen My Hometown. 
 
In the last decades of the 20th century the labour market position of low-skilled people appears to 
have deteriorated substantially in most industrialised countries. 
This trend was first noticed in the United States were in the 1980s the skill premium (i.e. the wages 
of high-skilled workers relative to the wages of low-skilled workers) started to increase 
dramatically. 
In some EU countries, especially in the United Kingdom, wage inequality between high-skilled 
and low-skilled workers surged as well or stopped decreasing as it did in the previous decades. 
However, in a number of EU countries the poor labour market position of low-skilled workers is 
reflected in high unemployment rates rather than in a rising skill premium. 
  
As in most industrialised countries the relative supply of high-skilled workers generally increases, 
which other things equal should affect high-skilled workers instead of low-skilled workers, the 
retrogression of the low-skilled seems to hinge on a common structural shift in relative labour 
demand. 
Cross-country differences in (labour market) institutions are often instanced to elucidate why in 
countries with relative flexible labour markets wage inequality rises in response to a shift in demand 
and why in countries with more rigid labour markets unemployment rises.  
Remains to examine what exactly caused the structural shift in labour demand in favour of high-
skilled workers.  
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Two main explanations have been put forward: trade with low-skill abundant Newly Industrialised 
Countries (NIC) and skill-biased technological change (SBTC). 
 
The fact that imports from the NIC were on the rise at about the same time that the labour market 
position of low-skilled workers in industrialised countries declined did not go unnoticed and North-
South trade was soon to be rounded up as a usual suspect. 
The public prosecutor could invoke one of the core theorems of the mainstream Heckscher-Ohlin 
trade theory, i.e. the Stolper-Samuelson theorem, to make out the case against international trade. 
The Heckscher-Ohlin theory states that countries can mutually benefit from international trade by 
specialising in the production of those goods that require relatively much of the production factors 
that the country is well endowed with, i.e. high-skill abundant countries should specialise in 
producing skill-intensive goods. 
However, the Stolper-Samuelson theorem subjoins that although countries can mutually benefit 
from international trade, free trade is not neutral in terms of income distribution within countries 
as it predicts that when a high-skill abundant country starts trading with a low-skill abundant 
country, the relative wages of low-skilled workers will fall in the first country and rise in the latter.      
 
A number of economists argued that skill-biased technological change is probably a more likely 
explanation for the structural rise in the demand for high-skilled workers than international trade. 
They reasoned that investment in new technologies (e.g. computers) raised the average skill level 
required to perform a job and thereby raised the relative demand for high-skilled workers. 
 
Theoretical arguments do not permit to conclude which of these two explanations is the most 
important. 
 
Different empirical methodologies have been proposed to test the claim that international trade 
with Newly Industrialised Countries deteriorated the labour market position of low-skilled workers 
in industrialised countries.  
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In the mid-1990s, following the early empirical work, economists seemed to reach a consensus on 
the limited impact of international trade. Skill-biased technological change ended up in the dock as 
the more likely culprit.   
However, more recently a number of prominent trade economists uttered that the consensus may 
have been overhasty. Some new empirical methodologies and non-Heckscher-Ohlin theoretical 
models have been proposed that do not permit to exculpate international trade that easily. 
Moreover, most empirical studies considered the situation in the United States. Relatively little 
research on this issue has been performed on data for EU countries, and if so mostly only for a 
single country. The substantial differences in institutions, trade flows and specialisation patterns 
between the United States and most EU countries, but also within the European Union, should warn 
against the extrapolation of previous results.  
 
In this thesis I give an account of own empirical work on the impact of international trade with 
Newly Industrialised Countries on the wages and employment of low-skilled and high-skilled 
workers in the European Union, based on data for a panel of EU countries. 
I will focus on the two last decades of the 20th century, as this was the period that imports from 
NIC became worth mentioning. In the 1980s, the Asian Tigers (Hong Kong, Singapore, South 
Korea and Taiwan) and the Asian Pussycats (Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines and Thailand) 
were the most active exporters among the emerging economies. After the fall of the Iron Curtain 
and the Berlin Wall, Central and Eastern European Countries gradually started to export to EU 
countries, especially to Germany and Italy. 
However, in the 1990s, the export performance of most emerging economies was eclipsed by the 
dazzling entrance of China.  
Whereas in 1990, China’s import share in most industrialised countries was negligible, today, 
China produces a quarter of all TV sets and washing machines worldwide and half of the cameras 
and copy-machines, with still 500 million peasants- i.e. more than the entire EU population- 
expected to migrate to urban areas in the next two decades (Forney 2004).  
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The results of the empirical work that are reported join with and revise the outcome of the project 
carried out for the European Commission by Cuyvers, Dumont, Rayp, Stevens and Van Den Bulcke 
(2001 a). 
The project was prompted by the general concern for the labour market impact of a further 
enlargement of the European Union. 
 
I will consider the two main explanations put forward by economists to explain the weakened 
position of low-skilled workers in industrialised countries though explicitly accounting for their 
interdependence. 
In most of the early empirical work a dichotomy between international trade and technological 
change seems to have been assumed.  
This seems somewhat odd given the general perception of international trade as a mechanism for 
technology transfer and spillovers and the possibility of trade-induced technological change.  
 
Having pointed out which research topics will be considered I think this may be the appropriate 
place to present the inevitable list of the topics that will not be assessed. 
 
Though I fully endorse the view of van de Ven (2003) that apart from environmental depletion, the 
closing of the indecently wide North-South divide is the true challenge of globalisation, I will not 
consider the impact of trade (liberalisation) on developing countries. 
Reviewing the empirical evidence on the impact of trade openness on growth and poverty in 
developing countries, Dollar and Kraay (2004) concluded that both individual case studies and 
cross-country growth regressions support the view that globalisation enhances economic growth 
and on average tends to reduce poverty in developing countries, but Winters (2004) added that the 
evidence also shows that trade liberalisation alone does not boost growth significantly and that 
institutions play an important role in translating trade openness into economic growth. 
 
Focusing on the developed countries seems justified, as Krugman (2004) rightly stated that taking 
seriously the apparent and sometimes rational fears of people in rich countries, with regard to 
globalisation, should be part of any political strategy to promote free world trade. 
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As shown by OECD (2001), the growth record of foreign direct investment (FDI) 1 has been far 
more impressive than the record of international trade in goods or services, in the 1980s and 1990s. 
This supports the view that capital moves more swiftly than goods and may therefore have a far 
larger impact on labour markets. 
 
The impact of FDI on wages and employment is not considered in this contribution.  
In a twin project for the European Commission Cuyvers, Dumont, Rayp, Stevens and Van Den 
Bulcke (2001 b) reviewed previous estimations of the impact of foreign direct investment on labour 
demand and performed own estimations on a panel of EU countries, with respect to investment in 
Central and Eastern European countries (CEEC). Activities of CEEC affiliates were found to have 
a significant impact on employment. In addition to the sector component, the component 
accounting for inter-sector spillover effects, often ignored in previous estimations, is also found to 
be significant and as substantial as the direct effect. 
FDI and international trade are obviously linked. Both are relatively dominated by the activities of 
multinational firms. UNCTAD (2002: p. 153) estimated the share of international trade involving 
multinational corporations at about two-thirds for the second half of the 1990s and one-third of 
world trade would consist of trade among affiliates of the same corporation. 
However, foreign outsourcing, i.e. the contracting out to low-wage locations of sliced-up fragments 
of production processes in high-wage countries, is by many believed to be as important if not more 
important than FDI.  
Given foreign outsourcing implies arms-length transactions as well as equity transactions, a focus 
on multinational firms and FDI could underrate the impact of this phenomenon. 
In most estimations I considered foreign outsourcing, measured as imports of intermediate goods, 
as an alternative to trade in final goods. 
 
Another potential determinant that is not considered is immigration. As immigrants in 
industrialised countries tend to be low-skilled, a net inflow of immigrants can be expected to raise 
the supply of low-skilled workers. All other things equal this will increase the skill premium, or 
                                                 
1 FDI is mostly defined as a participation of at least 10 per cent of ordinary shares in a foreign company.  
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given sticky wages, increase the unemployment of low-skilled workers. However, available data 
on relative labour supply in OECD countries suggest that if anything, the relative supply of high-
skilled workers increased, which indicates that changes in labour supply cannot explain the 
weakened position of low-skilled workers, unless official data on labour supply severely 
underestimate the amount of clandestine low-skilled immigrants. 
 
I will also not consider the possible overall decline in the competitive advantage of high-skill 
abundant countries in manufacturing activities with respect to low-wage countries that could affect 
the wages and employment of high-skilled workers and low-skilled workers with no distinction.  
 
How relevant and interesting these issues may be, they are beyond the scope of this thesis. 
The main research topic is whether international trade with Newly Industrialised Countries has 
played a role in the deteriorated labour market position of low-skilled workers in the European 
Union. Other determinants will be considered to the extent that they could bias the estimates of the 
impact of international trade and as far as data allows. 
 
This thesis contains two parts. 
In part I, including chapters 2 and 3, a rather elaborate though obviously not exhaustive review of 
the empirical and theoretical literature with respect to the labour market impact of international 
trade is presented. 
The theories are discussed in some detail as they provide the framework for most previous 
empirical work as well as for own empirical work reported in part II, consisting of chapters 4 up to 
6. 
The empirical methodologies are extensively described to point out their respective strength and 
weakness and to show the main differences in theoretical and methodological assumptions. At the 
end of part I, the overview is used to argue why some estimation procedures have been considered 
for own empirical work and why other approaches have not.  
 
Part II can however be digested without full reading of the first part, as I refer to the relevant 
sections in part I as much as possible. 
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In chapter 2 some stylised facts of recent decades with respect to the evolution of wages and 
(un)employment of low-skilled and high-skilled workers in EU countries are summarized. Trends 
in imports from Newly Industrialised Countries (NIC) towards the European Union are also briefly 
discussed. 
The main theoretical models that consider the impact of international trade on labour markets are 
treated in section 3.1. In section 3.2, I review the empirical work and the different methodological 
approaches that have been put forward to assess the impact of international trade on income 
distribution. 
 
Part II presents the results of own empirical work, based on data for a panel of EU countries in the 
1980s and 1990s.  
In chapter 4, two-step mandated wage regressions are performed to assess whether or not Stolper-
Samuelson effects (i.e. the impact of changes in import prices on factor prices) have been 
significant in the European Union. With this procedure the impact of international trade can be 
disentangled from the impact of technological change and the indirect impact of international trade, 
e.g. trade-induced technological change, can be accounted for.  
The Stolper-Samuelson theorem is derived under a number of rather restricting limitations. Though 
the theorem can be shown to be rather robust to relaxing some of these assumptions, perfect 
competition in labour markets is a necessary condition for the theorem to hold.  
Most EU countries are conventially perceived as being characterized by a number of institutional 
labour market rigidities (e.g. collective bargaining, minimum wages …). 
If due to these rigidities wages are not fully flexible, changes in labour demand will not as much 
affect wages but rather induce unemployment.    
Two alternative estimation procedures have been considered to estimate the impact of trade with 
the NIC on EU labour markets, under the assumption that wages are sticky due to labour market 
institutions like minimum wages, unemployment benefits or collective bargaining.   
 
Allowing for sticky wages, the demand for low-skilled and high-skilled labour is derived from a 
flexible cost function in chapter 5. By incorporating external determinants like international trade, 
      
                                                                                                                                                              
                                                                                                                                                        16 
 
the impact of these factors on the demand for production factors can be estimated. The estimated 
elasticities of labour demand with respect to the external determinants provide an indication of the 
magnitude of the impact.  
 
In chapter 6, a bargaining framework is adopted, reflecting the fact that in firms, industries or at 
the country level, unions bargain for wages, employment and/ or working conditions. If unions 
represent and organize part of the labour supply they may have some power to bargain for the 
sharing of rents resulting from the market power of firms. 
Increased international trade could reduce the bargaining power of unions. Dependent on the 
bargaining regime and union preferences, the decrease in union power will have a different impact 
on wages and employment.  
A two-step estimation procedure is proposed to infer the impact of international trade on wages 
and employment, within a union bargaining framework. 
In a first step, union power is derived from a production function. The estimated union bargaining 
power is then, in a second step, regressed on a number of potential determinants (e.g. import 
penetration). The impact of international trade on wages and employment can then be inferred from 
the first step indications of the bargaining regime and union preferences. 
 
Most previous studies with respect to the impact of international trade on labour markets in 
industrialised countries considered a single country, mainly the United States. 
Although the relative wages as well as the relative employment of low-skilled workers dropped 
more dramatically in the United States from the 1980s onwards than in most EU countries, data 
availability also seems to explain the US dominance in empirical work. 
Given the institutional differences between the United States and EU countries, as well as intra-EU 
heterogeneity, the results of studies that only cover one country cannot simply be carried over to 
the whole European Union.  
 
As mentioned above, a panel of EU countries has been constructed. 
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Panel estimations have the advantage that they allow to assess the degree and nature of 
heterogeneity (asymmetry in shocks or asymmetry in the impact of shocks) across observational 
units, in casu EU countries.  
Panel estimations have the additional advantage that some country-specific changes (e.g. aggregate 
relative labour supply, changes in the share of non-tradables) can be captured by the country-
specific intercepts and are therefore less likely to bias the estimation results.  
As geographical distance, differences in factor endowment and technological level undoubtedly 
matters, more or less homogenous groups of Newly Industrialised Countries have been 
distinguished. 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
PART I 
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2. Whatever Happened? 
 
 
 
"All this happened, more or less. The war parts, anyway, are pretty much true. One guy I knew 
really was shot in Dresden for taking a teapot that wasn't his. Another guy I knew really did 
threaten to have his personal enemies killed by hired gunmen after the war. And so on. I've changed 
all the names." 
 
-Kurt Vonnegut Slaughterhouse Five. 
 
 
2.1 Introduction 
 
 
This section reproduces some stylised facts, more or less, for EU countries in recent decades, with 
respect to wages and employment broken down by skill level. Trends of imports from Newly 
Industrialised Countries (NIC) in the European Union will also be discussed.  
The data clearly show that EU countries are rather heterogeneous, which should be accounted for 
in any analysis of the impact of international trade on labour markets in the European Union, both 
in terms of the possibility of asymmetric shocks or asymmetric effects of common shocks (e.g. due 
to institutional differences). It also cautions against the extrapolation of results for a single EU 
country to the whole European Union. 
 
Cuyvers, Dumont and Rayp (2003) Cuyvers, Dumont, Rayp and Stevens (2003) constructed a panel 
for as many EU countries as possible for the period 1985-1996. 
Constructing consistent and continuous time series proved difficult due to structural breaks in data 
sets, the limited coverage of countries and a large number of missing values in sources of 
internationally comparable data. Austria, Greece, Ireland, Luxembourg and the Netherlands could 
not be considered for analysis, lack of sufficient data on some of the necessary variables required 
for estimation. 
 
A disturbing observation is that the availability, quality and international comparability of data on 
skills for EU countries appears, in contrast to what one would expect, to be deteriorating (e.g. data 
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on wages for manual and non-manual workers, the only available internationally comparable proxy 
for wages of low-skilled and high-skilled workers, is no longer provided by EUROSTAT).  
This severely undermines empirical work on issues related to skills and the definition of well-
considered policies, as the much-needed data are lacking, in sharp contrast with the United States, 
where highly detailed and freely available data sets incites a stream of empirical work.      
 
 
 
2.2 The Rise and Fall of Wages and Employment 
 
 
“ SKILL 
 
Pronunciation:    skil 
 
 Definition:   [n]  ability to produce solutions in some problem domain; "the skill of a well-trained boxer"; "the sweet 
science of pugilism"  
[n]  an ability that has been acquired by training  
  
Synonyms:   accomplishment, acquirement, acquisition, attainment, science  
   
See Also: ability, craft, craftsmanship, horsemanship, literacy, marksmanship, nose, numeracy, oarsmanship, power, 
salesmanship, seamanship, showmanship, soldiering, soldiership, swordsmanship, virtuosity, workmanship  
  
“ SKILLED WORKER 
  
  Definition:   [n]    
 
  Synonyms:   trained worker  
   
 See Also: aeronaut, airman, aquanaut, artificer, artisan, aviator, baker, balloonist, bread maker, butcher, 
calligrapher, calligraphist, coiner, cook, craftsman, crew member, crewman, cutter, dental hygienist, draftsman, 
draftsperson, draughtsman, dyer, editor, electrician, engraver, fisher, fisherman, fixer, flier, flyer, founder, framer, 
functionary, funeral director, funeral undertaker, galvaniser, galvanizer, gilder, grip, harpooneer, harpooner, hunter, 
huntsman, indexer, journeyman, laminator, lens maker, lineman, linesman, lobsterman, lockkeeper, lockman, 
lockmaster, maintenance man, man, metalworker, military man, military personnel, minter, moneyer, mortician, 
mounter, oceanaut, official, oilman, optician, painter, perfecter, plaiter, plasterer, plater, power worker, power-station 
worker, preserver, pressman, printer, projectionist, refiner, refinisher, renovator, repairer, repairman, restorer, 
riveter, rivetter, router, sailor, service man, serviceman, shearer, skinner, slaughterer, smith, undertaker, worker.” 
 
(Source: http://www.hyperdictionary.com/dictionary) 
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2.2.1 Data on skills 
 
Reliable and detailed data on skills are as hard to obtain as a plain definition. 
For a long time, in theories of international trade, capital and homogeneous labour have been 
considered as the two sole production factors. Only with the apparent deterioration of the labour 
market position of low-skilled workers in industrialised countries, did skill heterogeneity of labour 
become an issue for policy-makers and data collectors. 
 
The skill level of workers is obviously a multi-dimensional measure that is difficult to reflect in a 
single yardstick, as a decent measure of skills should capture basic education and training as well 
as learning-by-doing and the ability to adapt to a changing environment (Forbes 2001). 
 
Aggregate data on schooling years and schooling quality are available from the Barro-Lee data set. 
Barro and Lee (1996, 2001) gathered data on the educational attainment, over five-year intervals 
from 1960 to 1990, for 126 countries. Seven groups of schooling are distinguished, ranging from 
people without any formal education to people with a degree of higher education.  
Data on inputs include number of school days per year and number of school hours per year. Data 
on outputs (e.g. average scores on internationally comparable tests in reading, mathematics and 
science) are used to measure schooling quality, though these data are only available for a subset of 
countries. 
 
In table 2.1 the Barro-Lee data on secondary and higher schooling for the period 1960-1990 are 
given for four country groups: OECD countries, (formerly) centrally planned economies, countries 
from East Asia and the Pacific and a group of Latin American and Caribbean countries.  
 
In 1990, the (formerly) centrally planned economies apparently had a higher proportion of their 
population finishing secondary education and throughout the period 1960-1990 had a higher 
average of school years than OECD countries. In 1990, in Latin America, relatively more students 
finished higher education than in East Asia. East Asian and Pacific countries had the largest growth, 
over the period 1960-1990, in the proportion of their population finishing secondary school and 
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Latin American countries the highest growth in the proportion finishing higher education but in 
1990 both country groups still lagged the (formerly) centrally planned economies and the OECD 
countries in students finishing secondary and higher schooling. 
 
 
 
Table 2.1: Secondary and Higher School Attainment as a Share of the Population  
 
 
  Education  
  Secondary Higher Mean School 
years Region Year Some Full Some Full 
OECD 1960 
1970 
1980 
1990 
0.310 
0.347 
0.443 
0.413 
0.116 
0.116 
0.227 
0.153 
0.068 
0.099 
0.155 
0.216 
0.030 
0.040 
0.067 
0.102 
7.05 
7.58 
8.76 
9.02 
(Formerly) 
Centrally 
planned 
Economies 
1960 
1970 
1980 
1990 
0.314 
0.445 
0.504 
0.617 
0.109 
0.145 
0.117 
0.209 
0.031 
0.063 
0.077 
0.112 
0.015 
0.035 
0.045 
0.077 
7.54 
8.58 
8.95 
9.98 
East Asia and 
the Pacific 
1960 
1970 
1980 
1990 
0.085 
0.130 
0.218 
0.248 
0.028 
0.041 
0.101 
0.115 
0.016 
0.027 
0.050 
0.076 
0.008 
0.012 
0.022 
0.035 
2.83 
3.80 
5.10 
6.08 
Latin America 
and the 
Caribbean 
1960 
1970 
1980 
1990 
0.126 
0.143 
0.181 
0.214 
0.041 
0.050 
0.056 
0.074 
0.015 
0.025 
0.052 
0.082 
0.007 
0.010 
0.020 
0.037 
3.26 
3.82 
4.46 
5.24 
Source: Barro and Lee (1996: p. 220). The averages per country group are weighted by each country’s population aged 15 and over. The shares 
give the fraction of the population that indicated the given level as its highest attained education level. 
 
 
At the level of individual sectors (manufacturing or services) time series data on wages and 
employment by education or skill level are not readily available for many countries and long 
periods of time, which can probably be explained by the longstanding focus on capital and 
homogeneous labour as the main production factors. In most studies the distinction between high-
skilled and low-skilled workers is proxied by non-production/production, non-
operatives/operatives, non-manual/manual or white-collar/blue-collar workers. 
In 1995 the OECD asked its member states to provide data on wages and employment for individual 
industries, broken down by occupation. Data on occupation intrinsically provide more information 
on skills than data on education. The OECD requested countries to submit data, following the 
International Standard Classification of Occupation (ISCO 88) developed by the International 
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Labour Office. The 27 occupational categories reflect different levels of education and abilities 
required to perform a given job. 
 
 There are nine one-digit categories: 
 
1) Legislators, senior officials and managers 
2) Professionals (e.g. physical, mathematical and engineering science professionals) 
3) Technicians and associate professionals  
4) Clerks 
5) Service workers, shop and market sales workers 
6) Skilled agricultural and fishery workers 
7) Craft and related trades workers 
8) Plant and machine operators and assemblers 
9) Elementary occupations 
 
These nine categories can be aggregated into: 
 
 
 White-collar high-skilled  (WCHS): categories 1 up to 3 
 White-collar low-skilled (WCLS): category 4 and 5 
 Blue- collar high-skilled (BCHS): category 6 and 7 
 Blue-collar low-skilled (BCLS): category 8 and 9 
 
 
For EU countries, data on employment at industry level, following the ISCO 88 classification are 
available from 1993 onwards as a result of the Labour Force Surveys, carried out every year in 
each EU country, applying common methods, definitions and classifications to obtain a reasonable 
level of international comparability. It provides detailed information on (un)employment at the 
household level (e.g. ISCO classification of occupation). The OECD found significant differences 
between countries in the reported number of workers in the nine one-digit ISCO 88 categories, 
which seem to reflect differences in definitions of occupations and different reclassifications of 
national data into ISCO 88, especially with respect to category 2 and 3 for white-collar workers 
and category 6 and 7 for blue-collar workers. The four aggregated groups  (WCHS, WCLS, BCHS 
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and BCLS) are considered as reasonable in terms of international comparability (OECD 1998: p. 
6). 
 
Classifications based on educational attainment and classifications based on ISCO 88 appear- not 
too surprisingly- to be positively correlated and using education or occupation to proxy skill results 
in similar conclusions with regard to skill composition and trends (OECD 1998: pp. 8-9).  
In his review of studies on the impact of international trade on wage inequality (see section 3.2.5) 
Slaughter (2000) concluded that results appear to be rather robust to which measures are used to 
proxy the skill level. 
Burtless (1995) pointed out that in the United States, in the first half of the 1980s, the relative 
wages of high-skilled workers, when proxied by non-production workers, rose far less substantially 
than the relative wages of college graduates, an alternative proxy for high-skilled workers. 
 
In figure 2.1, using data from the Labour Force Surveys on employment in 1999, classified by 
ISCO 88, the share of blue-collar workers that are low-skilled and the share of white-collar workers 
that are high-skilled is shown for thirteen EU countries. 
As mentioned before, the ISCO 88 classification permits to classify workers into high-skilled 
white-collars, low-skilled white-collars, high-skilled blue-collars and low-skilled blue-collars. 
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Figure 2.1: Degree of Correct Skill Classification following White-Collar/ Blue-Collar Distinction 
for Thirteen EU Countries in 1999 
 
         Source: Own calculations from Labour Force Survey data (EUROSTAT). 
 
 
Using these data, the share of white-collar workers that are high-skilled (as assumed when using 
white-collar workers to proxy high-skilled workers) and the share of blue-collar workers that are 
low-skilled (as assumed when using blue-collar workers to proxy low-skilled workers) can be 
computed. 
The shares give an indication of the bias of the distinction blue-collar/white-collar workers, when 
used as a proxy for low-skilled/ high-skilled workers. Data for earlier years reveal a similar pattern. 
In general, more than 40 per cent of blue-collar workers are reported to be high-skilled and about 
50 per cent of white-collar workers are reported to be low-skilled.   
 
Figure 2.2 shows, for Finland2, the evolution of employment of high-skilled workers relative to 
low-skilled workers, using the ISCO classification of high-skilled workers (WCHS + BCHS) and 
low-skilled workers (WCLS + BCLS) and alternatively the proxy distinction white-collar (WCHS 
+ WCLS) and blue-collar (BCHS + BCLS). The ratio of relative employment of high-skilled 
                                                 
2 Finland provided the OECD with the longest time series on employment by ISCO 88. 
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(white-collar) workers for 1970 is set at one. The ratio is given for low-skill sectors (LS) and high-
skill sectors (HS) separately3. 
 
Figure 2.2: Trend of Relative Employment of High-Skilled Workers according to ISCO 88 (Skill) or 
White-Collar/ Blue-Collar Distinction (Proxy) in Finland (1970-1990) 
 
Source: Own calculations from data provided by the OECD (DSTI/ EAS division). 
Using the white-collar/ blue-collar distinction apparently results in a more substantial increase in 
the relative employment of high-skilled workers than when the ‘actual’ skill classification is 
considered. 
A remarkable finding is the extremely close link between the evolution in the ratio in low-skill and 
high-skill sectors, irrespective of which distinction is used.  
 
 
Figures 2.1 and 2.2 suggest that the traditional proxies for skills could result in biased conclusions, 
though the trends are similar. In principle, data using ISCO 88 are more appropriate than most 
proxy classifications. The reason that proxy measures are used more often is that other data are 
more readily available.  
Whereas most countries provided the OECD with data on employment by ISCO 88 (albeit mostly 
only for a limited number of years) not a single country responded to the explicit request for wages 
by occupation level (OECD 1998: p. 4).  
                                                 
3 A median split on the value added shares of production workers is used to distinguish between low-skilled sectors and high-skilled sectors. Using 
the ratio of high-skilled workers to low-skilled workers gives a similar distinction. 
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Except for availability there is an important caveat to the ISCO 88 data, especially for EU countries.  
For the EU these data are gathered from the Labour Force Surveys. As pointed out by OECD (1998) 
the numbers as well as the ratio high-skilled/ low-skilled workers could be subject to serious 
measurement error. This is suggested by the fact that the aggregates of ISCO employment taken 
from the Labour Force Survey data do not match- and often substantially differ from- more reliable 
data on total employment from the OECD Structural Analysis Industrial (STAN) data. The OECD 
actually rescaled the data it received, using its own data on total employment at the sector level, 
assuming that the proportions between the categories reported were reliable.  
A quick-and-dirty check suggests that this is not necessarily so.  
Given the following identity in each industry i: 
 
Total wage sumi= Wagemanual . number of operativesi + Wagenon-manual . number of non-operativesi 
 
regressing the total wage sum on the number of operatives and the number of non-operatives for a 
pooled set of industries, the estimated coefficients should be reasonable estimates of the wages of 
operatives and non-operatives.  
For four EU countries (Germany, Finland, Italy and the United Kingdom) the OECD has data on 
employment by ISCO 88 at the two-digit ISIC industry level for 1985. For the same countries and 
the same year the UNIDO General Industrial Statistics provide a breakdown of employment at the 
sector level by operatives and non-operatives, i.e. a proxy for low-skilled and high-skilled workers. 
The total wage sum for ISIC industries can be taken from the STAN database.  
EUROSTAT (NewCronos- Theme 3) provides time series on gross hourly wages of manual 
workers and monthly wages of non-manual workers at the ISIC sector level for the period 1972-
1998.  
 
These have been used to compute yearly wages for manual and non-manual workers. Actual 
differences across industries in wages of manual and non-manual workers have been accounted for 
in the regressions. The results are reported in table 2.2. 
In a first regression, for each of the four countries, the total wage sum is regressed on the number 
of blue-collar and white-collar workers, based on data provided by the OECD on employment 
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broken down by ISCO 88. In a second regression, the total wage sum is regressed on the number 
of low-skilled and high-skilled workers, again following the ISCO 88 data. 
 
If the ISCO 88 data are anything to go by the latter regression should provide reasonable estimates 
of the wages of low-skilled and high-skilled workers, which are not available and could therefore 
be used as an alternative to wages for proxy categories like manual/ non-manual workers.   
 
In the third regression the total wage sum is regressed on the number of operatives and non-
operatives from the UNIDO General Industrial Statistics. 
For all estimates the 95 per cent confidence intervals are given in square brackets. 
The actual wages for manual and non-manual workers from EUROSTAT are also reported as a 
benchmark for the reliability of the employment data. 
The UNIDO data seem to perform best for all four countries. For Finland they provide a perfect fit 
whereas for Germany and Italy the estimated wages of non-manual workers substantially exceed 
the wages of manual workers reported by EUROSTAT.  
 
Table 2.2: Estimation of Wages using OECD ISCO 88 Data or UNIDO Data to proxy Skills (1985) 
 
Dependent variable: Total wage sum 
GERMANY                                                                          Estimated annual wages 
  ISCO 88  
Number of blue-collar workers (BCHS + BCLS) 28106 [25263, 30948] 
Number of white-collar workers (WCHS +WCLS) 69628 [64674, 74581] 
R2 0.96 
Number of low-skilled workers (WCLS + BCLS) 26722 [18844, 34599] 
Number of high-skilled workers (WCHS + BCHS) 57229 [50688, 63771] 
R2 0.94 
  UNIDO  
Number of operatives 31454 [27677, 35231] 
Number of non-operatives 53027 [49771, 56283] 
R2 0.95 
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 Actual annual wages (EUROSTAT) 
Manual workers  31408 
Non-manual workers  45468 
 
FINLAND                                                                               Estimated annual wages 
  ISCO 88  
Number of blue-collar workers (BCHS + BCLS) 75844 [74428, 77259] 
Number of white-collar workers (WCHS +WCLS) 103146 [100412, 105882] 
R2 0.99 
Number of low-skilled workers (WCLS + BCLS) 93425 [90712, 96137] 
Number of high-skilled workers (WCHS + BCHS) 80242 [78182, 82303] 
R2 1.00 
  UNIDO  
Number of operatives 61250 
Number of non-operatives 133265 
R2 1.00 
   Actual annual wages (EUROSTAT) 
Manual workers  61250 
Non-manual workers  133265 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 2.2: (continued) 
 
 
ITALY                                                                                    Estimated annual wages 
  ISCO 88  
Number of blue-collar workers (BCHS + BCLS) 13292 [12100, 14485] 
Number of white-collar workers (WCHS +WCLS) 62839 [58139, 67539] 
R2 0.95 
Number of low-skilled workers (WCLS + BCLS) 37767 [35698, 39837] 
Number of high-skilled workers (WCHS + BCHS) 12751 [11514, 13988] 
R2 0.95 
  UNIDO  
Number of operatives 15397 [14149, 16645] 
Number of non-operatives 36846 [34532, 39160] 
R2 0.91 
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 Actual annual wages (EUROSTAT) 
Manual workers  18102 
Non-manual workers  23659 
 
UNITED KINGDOM                                                              Estimated annual wages 
  ISCO 88  
Number of blue-collar workers (BCHS + BCLS) 8340 [8178, 8503] 
Number of white-collar workers (WCHS +WCLS) 12169 [11891, 12446] 
R2 1.00 
Number of low-skilled workers (WCLS + BCLS) 10639 [10106, 11170] 
Number of high-skilled workers (WCHS + BCHS) 9212 [8734, 9690] 
R2 1.00 
  UNIDO  
Number of operatives 8185 [7733, 8637] 
Number of non-operatives 11817 [11301, 12333] 
R2 1.00 
   Actual annual wages (EUROSTAT) 
Manual workers  6883 
Non-manual workers  10500 
           Source: The total wage sum is taken from the OECD STAN database, data on wages of manual 
           and non-manual workers from EUROSTAT (NewCronos- Theme 3: Earnings). 
           Employment figures by ISCO 88 are provided by the OECD and employment of operatives and  
           non-operatives are from the UNIDO General Industrial Statistics. Confidence intervals (95 per cent)  
           are given in square brackets. 
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Using the ISCO 88 data on low-skilled and high-skilled workers provides very unlikely estimates 
of wages. For three countries estimation results actually suggest that low-skilled workers would 
have earned more than high-skilled workers in 1985. 
 
The apparent poor quality of the LFS data is rather problematic, as for the 1990s the Labour Force 
Survey is the only source for internationally comparable employment data broken down by skills 
for EU countries, as the UNIDO General Industrial Statistics do not provide data on operatives and 
non-operatives after 1990.  
However, for some EU countries more reliable data for the 1990s are available from country 
sources or the OECD International Sectoral Database (ISDB), which have been used as much as 
possible in the estimations in part II. 
With respect to data on wages, EUROSTAT no longer provides wages for manual and non-manual 
workers (for most countries data coverage stops in 1998), which poses a severe problem for future 
empirical work as this was one of the only sources providing data on wages broken down by skill.   
 
 
2.2.2 Wage inequality 
 
The earliest studies drawing attention to the weakened labour market position of low-skilled 
workers appeared in the United States, where in the 1980s wage inequality increased dramatically 
as can be seen in figure 2.3, which shows the evolution of the relative wages of non-production 
workers (proxy for high-skilled workers) in the period 1958-1996. 
The relative wages are a weighted average of the relative wages in 450 US manufacturing industries 
using each industry’s share in total employment as a weight. Data are taken from the NBER-CES 
Manufacturing Industry Database. 
From a more long-run perspective it should be pointed out that the relative wages of high-skilled 
workers in the United States had, as in most other industrialised countries, decreased almost 
continuously for several decades prior to the 1980s (von Tunzelmann and Anderson 2001).  
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Figure 2.3: The Evolution of the Relative Wages of Non-Production Workers in the United States 
(1958-1996) 
                      Source: Own calculations from the NBER-CES Manufacturing Industry Database (1958-1996). 
 
As shown in figure 2.4, the relative employment of non-production workers already increased 
considerably in the 1970s. 
 
Figure 2.4: The Evolution of the Relative Employment of Non-Production Workers in the United 
States (1958-1996) 
      
                  Source: Own calculations from the NBER-CES Manufacturing Industry Database (1958-1996). 
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The relative employment is again a weighted average of relative employment in 450 US 
manufacturing industries 
According to Cline (1997) a strong increase in the relative supply of high-skilled workers 
dominated any relative labour demand effect in the 1970s, explaining the drop in the skill premium. 
In the 1980s the relative supply further increased but less spectacularly insofar that the supply effect 
was dominated by an increased demand for high-skilled workers, resulting in a rising skill 
premium. 
 
The dramatic increase in earnings inequality that occurred in the United States is not found in most 
other industrialised countries. As figure 2.5, based on data reported in OECD (1996) shows, in the 
United Kingdom earnings inequality (measured as the ratio of earnings in the ninth decile relative 
to earnings in the fifth (median) decile of employees, with employees ranked from lowest to highest 
earnings (D9/D5)) increased considerably in the period 1979-1996. However, in other EU countries 
inequality hardly changed or even decreased (Belgium and Germany).  
 
Relating median earnings to earnings of the lowest decile (D5/D1), again shows that inequality 
increased rather substantially for the United Kingdom and the United States, slightly in France, the 
Netherlands and Sweden but decreased in Belgium, Denmark, Germany and Finland (OECD 1996: 
61-62). As reported in OECD (2003 a) from the mid-1990s wage inequality stabilized in the United 
Kingdom, increased in Germany, Italy and the Netherlands and decreased in France.  
For Europe, Atkinson (1996) found that the Scandinavian countries, Belgium, Germany, 
Luxembourg and the Netherlands have the lowest income inequality, South-European countries 
and Ireland have the highest income inequality and France and to a lesser extent the UK occupy an 
intermediate position.   
 
Hellier and Chusseau (2003) reported a sharp increase in the wage gap between the highest and the 
lowest income decile in the United States and the United Kingdom in the 1980s and the 1990s. In 
France and Germany this gap, which decreased in the 1960s and 1970s, hardly changed, whereas 
the Netherlands and Sweden witnessed increased wage inequality though these countries remained 
relatively egalitarian.  
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Figure 2.5: Trends in Earnings Inequality in the European Union (1979-1996) 
 
Countries with increased earnings inequality 
 
 
               
Countries with relatively stableor decreasing earnings inequality 
  
 
         Note: Data are taken from OECD (1996: table 3.1), more recent data have been provided by Joël Hellier. Earnings inequality 
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                   is measured as the ratio of earnings of the ninth decile relative to the earnings of the fifth decile (median) of employees  
                   with employees ranked from lowest to highest earnings. Dispersion is measured for all employees (male and female)  
                   except for the United States for which only male workers are considered. 
 
The previous trends concern aggregate earnings inequality. 
 
Figure 2.6 shows the ratio of wages of non-manual workers relative to the wages of manual workers 
in manufacturing industries for nine EU countries in the period 1985-1996. The ratio is a weighted 
average of the ratio across industries, with each industry weighted by its share in the total wage 
sum for all manufacturing industries.  
Contrary to figure 2.5, figure 2.6 suggests that wage inequality did not just increase in the United 
Kingdom, albeit most distinctly in this country, but also in Belgium, France, Denmark and 
Germany.  
 
Economists often evoke a trade-off between wage inequality and unemployment to explain the 
difference between a moneyless jobs United States and a jobless money European Union (e.g. 
Krugman 1995 a).  
OECD (2003 a: p. 42) granted that some of the policies that it advocated in its 1994 Jobs Study to 
increase employment rates (e.g. activation measures) may have increased wage inequality, as some 
of these measures simply increase labour supply, mostly of low-skilled people, which without a 
compensating increase in labour demand will depress wages. Decentralisation of wage bargaining 
and the reduction of minimum wages may also have gnawed at the wages of low-wage workers 
whereas revoking employment protection may have encouraged low-pay and low-productivity 
jobs.  Low-paid employment increased considerably in the United States and the United Kingdom 
in the 1980s and in Italy, the Netherlands and most Central European OECD countries in the 1990s 
(OECD 2003 a: p.63). The OECD enumerated the potential benefits of labour and product market 
flexibility in stimulating innovation and productivity growth but found a negative cross-country 
correlation between employment growth and labour productivity growth in the 1990s, suggesting 
a trade-off between employment and productivity (OECD 2003 a: p. 42). 
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Figure 2.6: Trends in the Relative Wages of Non-manual Workers in Nine EU Countries in the 
Period 1985-1996 
 
 
Countries with increased relative wages 
 
 
Countries with stable or decreased relative wages  
        
         Source: Own calculations from the UNIDO General Industrial Statistics, Labour Force Survey data (EUROSTAT) and OECD Structural    
                       Analysis Industrial (STAN) and International Sectoral database (ISDB). 
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2.2.3 (Un)employment 
 
Table 2.3 shows the unemployment rates and the ratio of employment to population, broken down 
by education level for 2001, for a number of OECD countries.  
Overall, the unemployment rate of people without a higher secondary education exceeds 
substantially the unemployment rate of people with a higher education level. The gap in 
unemployment rates is extremely high in the Czech Republic, Hungary and Poland. In Mexico and 
South Korea the unemployment rate of persons with little education is reported to be lower than 
the unemployment rate of the highly educated, although the unemployment rates, especially for 
Mexico seem rather uninformative, looking at the employment- population ratio. On average, 
persons not having finished secondary schooling account for half of total unemployment in OECD 
countries (OECD 2003 a: p. 86) 
According to the OECD the weak employment performance of low-skilled workers in the 1990s 
reflected their lower labour market participation, which as it occurred simultaneously with an 
increase in aggregate employment opportunities would be consistent with the view that skill-biased 
technological change and international trade reduced the demand for low-skilled workers (OECD 
2003 a: p.29).  
 
Figure 2.7 shows the unemployment rate of people with a secondary education degree relative to 
the unemployment rate of people with a higher education degree in seven EU countries, comparing 
the 1992 level to the level of the ratio in 2001. 
The ratio increased in Germany and the United Kingdom and less pronounced in France and Italy. 
It hardly changed in Belgium, slightly decreased in Spain and rather substantially in Denmark. 
The increase in Germany and the United Kingdom is remarkable, given the rise in the skill premium 
in both countries at about the same time.  
However, whereas the ratio appears to have increased continuously throughout the period 1992-
2001 in Germany, the ratio in the United Kingdom fell from 3.05 in 1992 to 2.55 in 1997, increasing 
spectacularly after 1997. In France the ratio fell from 2.49 in 1992 to 2.28 in 1997, to increase to 
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2.54 in 2001. In Belgium the ratio increased between 1992 and 1997 from 3.42 to 3.79. The ratio 
fell from 2.74 in 1992 to 2.41 in 1997 in Denmark and further fell to 1.58 in 2001.  
Table 2.3: Unemployment Rates and Employment/ Population Ratio by Educational Attainment 
(2001) 
 
  No upper secondary 
education 
Upper secondary 
education 
Higher education 
Belgium Unemployment rates 8.5 5.5 2.7 
 Employment/population  49.0 73.9 84.5 
Czech Republic Unemployment rates 19.2 6.2 2.0 
 Employment/population  46.7 75.7 87.8 
Denmark Unemployment rates 5.0 3.3 3.2 
 Employment/population  61.9 80.7 87.3 
Finland Unemployment rates 11.4 8.5 4.4 
 Employment/population  58.2 75.5 85.1 
France Unemployment rates 11.9 6.9 4.8 
 Employment/population  57.7 76.5 83.7 
Germany Unemployment rates 13.5 8.2 4.2 
 Employment/population  51.8 70.5 83.4 
Hungary Unemployment rates 10.0 4.6 1.2 
 Employment/population  36.8 71.9 82.5 
Italy Unemployment rates 9.1 6.8 5.3 
 Employment/population  48.8 71.9 81.6 
South Korea Unemployment rates 2.9 3.4 3.3 
 Employment/population 67.5 69.4 75.8 
Mexico Unemployment rates 1.4 1.7 2.2 
 Employment/population  62.8 64.1 81.5 
Poland Unemployment rates 22.6 15.9 5.0 
 Employment/population  41.5 64.8 84.0 
Spain Unemployment rates 10.2 8.4 6.9 
 Employment/population  55.0 71.7 80.7 
Sweden Unemployment rates 5.9 4.6 2.6 
 Employment/population  68.8 81.9 86.9 
United Kingdom Unemployment rates 7.6 3.9 2.0 
 Employment/population  54.0 79.5 88.3 
United States Unemployment rates 8.1 3.8 2.1 
 Employment/population  58.4 76.2 84.4 
Source: OECD (2003 a: p. 316). The numbers reported are shares of the population between 25 and 64.        
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Figure 2.7: The Unemployment Rate of People with a Secondary Education Degree relative to 
People with a Higher Education Degree in Seven EU Countries (1992-2001) 
 
 
                   Source: Eurostat New Cronos.  
 
 
Figure 2.8 shows the trends in relative employment of non-manual workers in the manufacturing 
industries, in the period 1985-1996, for the panel of nine EU countries.  
 
Aggregate relative employment is taken as the weighted average over manufacturing industries, 
with the industries’ share in total manufacturing employment used to weigh.  
 
In three EU countries (Belgium, France and Germany), which according to figure 2.6 witnessed 
increased relative wages of non-manual workers, relative employment of non-manual workers 
increased as well though not spectacularly.  
In the two countries, which experienced the highest increase in the skill premium relative 
employment was rather stable (United Kingdom) or even decreased (Denmark).  
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If anything, figures 2.6, 2.7 and 2.8 clearly show the diverging trends among EU countries in 
relative wages and employment.  
Figure 2.8: Trends in the Relative Employment of Non-Manual Workers in Nine EU Countries in 
the Period 1985-1996 
 
Countries with increased relative employment 
 
        
 Countries with stable or decreased relative employment 
 
          
 
            Source: See figure 2.4 
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The data also show that the simultaneous dramatic increase in relative wages and employment of 
high-skilled workers, as witnessed in the United States and often considered as evidence of skill-
biased technological change is not generally found in the European Union.  
However, overall the data show that either in terms of increased wage inequality or employment 
opportunities the position of low-skilled workers also deteriorated in most EU countries, albeit with 
exception of the United Kingdom less pronounced than in the United States. 
 
The OECD found indications that, contrary to the general belief, the employment performance of 
EU countries improved in the 1990s. 
The OECD estimated the non-accelerating inflation rate of unemployment (NAIRU), i.e. the 
equilibrium unemployment rate that can be maintained without endangering price stability for the 
period 1991-2001 and found that for eight EU countries it actually appears to have decreased, that 
it did not change much in the United States, Austria and Italy and increased in Germany, Greece, 
and Finland. They however pointed out some conceptual and empirical caveats of the NAIRU 
estimation and therefore also considered other indications of labour market performance (OECD 
2003 a: pp. 30-31). 
 
The match between vacancies and the unemployed worsened in the 1980s and showed little 
improvement in most OECD countries in the 1990s indicating a structural mismatch between 
labour supply and demand (OECD 2003 a: pp. 31-35). 
 
According to the OECD, wage moderation seems a more likely explanation for the decrease in 
equilibrium unemployment. In most EU countries total labour costs outpaced productivity growth 
in the 1970s, levelled in the 1980s and lagged productivity growth in the 1990s. The OECD listed 
a number of institutional factors that influence wage setting, other than those that are also likely to 
affect the matching between vacancies and the unemployed (e.g. employment protection and 
unemployment benefits) as the latter did not seem to have improved. Union bargaining is believed 
to cause wage rigidity and thereby unemployment, a mechanism that may be weakened by co-
      
                                                                                                                                                              
                                                                                                                                                        42 
 
ordination (e.g. through centralization at the national level) of the bargaining process across sectors 
or firms. If unions try too hard to reduce wage inequality between low-skilled and high-skilled 
workers employers may become reluctant to hire low-skilled workers (OECD 2003 a: p. 36).   
Taxes on labour are another obvious determinant of total labour costs. The OECD referred to 
empirical work on the impact of labour taxes on unemployment by Daveri and Tabellini (2000) 
and Nickell et al. (2003) which- contrary to previous work by e.g. Layard, Nickell and Jackman 
(1991)- seemed to show that taxes raise equilibrium unemployment. This effect appears to be 
smaller in those countries that have co-ordinated wage bargaining. According to the OECD this 
would suggest that labour taxes have a more substantial negative impact on employment in 
Belgium, France, Germany, Italy, the Netherlands and Spain and less impact in Finland, Norway 
and Sweden where wage bargaining is more co-ordinated (OECD 2003 a: p. 37).  
 
Wage moderation seems to have resulted in substantial employment growth in the business sector 
in the 1990s in most EU countries, in contrast with the sluggish growth in the 1970s and 1980s. 
The OECD concluded that there are clear indications of a structural improvement in employment 
performance in EU countries in the 1990s. Moreover, in most EU countries job growth has been 
more pronounced in industries that pay relatively well, except in the Netherlands and the United 
Kingdom where low-paying jobs increased more than medium- or high-paying jobs. At the 
downside, wage inequality seems to have increased in countries where wage setting became more 
decentralised and market driven, especially in the United Kingdom. Moreover, some subjective 
(e.g. workers' perception) and objective (e.g. overtime) measures seem to indicate worsened 
working conditions (OECD 2003 a: pp. 40-48).  
 
 
 
2.3 International Trade with Newly Industrialised Countries 
 
 
Landesmann, Stehrer, and Leitner (2002) gathered data from the OECD Bilateral Trade database 
for seven OECD countries (France, Germany, Japan, the Netherlands, Sweden, the United 
Kingdom and the United States) with respect to a group of trading partners from the North (high-
wage OECD countries) and trading partners from the South, classified into four groups: Southern 
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European countries (Greece, Portugal, Spain and Turkey), Asian Tigers (Hong Kong, Singapore, 
Taiwan and South Korea), Eastern European transition countries (Czech Republic, Poland and 
Hungary) and Southern  developing countries (Argentina, Brazil, China, India, Indonesia, 
Malaysia, Mexico, Philippines, Thailand and the rest of the world).   
Apparently, import penetration from the South, in the EU countries considered, increased mainly 
in the period 1989-1996, whereas in the United States it increased over both the periods 1980-1988 
and 1989-1996. Import penetration from the Asian Tigers occurred during the first sub-period for 
the United States as well as the EU countries. Landesmann, Stehrer and Leitner stress the 
integration of the formerly autarkic trade bloc of Central and Eastern European countries, which 
opened up to trade with the European Union in the 1990s, whereas the Southern European countries 
had already started integrating in the European Union in the 1980s.  
The Southern developing countries mainly increased their imports in the period 1989-1996. 
 
Figure 2.9 shows the evolution of the average import shares of four groups of Newly Industrialised 
Countries in the period 1990-2000 with respect to nine EU countries. The data were taken from the 
OECD International Trade by Commodities Statistics (ITCS) and converted into volumes at the 
ISIC sector level with a concordance table provided by EUROSTAT4.  The four NIC groups are: 
Asian NIC (Hong Kong, Indonesia, Malaysia, Philippines, South Korea, Singapore and Thailand), 
CEEC (Czech Republic, Hungary and Poland), Latin (Argentina, Brazil, Chile and Mexico) and 
China. 
 
Import penetration from the Asian NIC hardly increased in the 1990s, except in Spain, Sweden and 
especially the United Kingdom where the import share has risen considerably.  
 
Imports from Central and Eastern European countries increased mainly in those EU countries that 
are most nearby, i.e. Germany and Italy, but remained quite modest in most other countries.  
 
                                                 
4 The ITCS trade statistics of the OECD in general do not include goods in transit or goods that are temporarily admitted 
or withdrawn in a country (except for goods for inward or outward processing). Import values are expressed in 
thousands of US dollars and relate to imports c.i.f. (cost, insurance and freight). 
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Imports from the Latin-American countries remained at the low initial level throughout the 1990s 
in all EU countries.  
 
 
      
                                                                                                                                                              
                                                                                                                                                        45 
 
Figure 2.9: Evolution of Import Shares of NIC Groups (1990s) 
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            Source: Own calculations from the OECD International Trade by Commodities Statistics (ITCS). 
                         Asian NIC: Hong Kong, Indonesia, Malaysia, Philippines, South Korea, Singapore and Thailand 
                         CEEC: Czech Republic, Hungary and Poland, Latin: Argentina, Brazil, Chile and Mexico. 
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Imports from China increased dramatically in such a way that the country rushed past the three 
other NIC groups as main exporter in 2000 in five out of nine EU countries. 
By now, China produces a quarter of all TV sets and washing machines in the world and half of 
the cameras and copy-machines (Forney 2004). 
 
In figure 2.10 the import shares, averaged (not weighted) over the nine EU countries, are given at 
the two-digit ISIC level (except for ISIC 38 which is broken down at the three-digit level): 
 
 ISIC 31: Food, beverages and tobacco 
 ISIC 32: Textiles, footwear and leather  
 ISIC 33: Wood, cork and furniture 
 ISIC 34: Paper, printing and publishing 
 ISIC 35: Chemicals  
 ISIC 36: Non-metallic mineral products 
 ISIC 37: Basic Metal Industries 
 ISIC 381: Fabricated metal products 
 ISIC 382: Non-electrical machinery 
 ISIC 383: Electrical equipment  
 ISIC 384: Transport equipment 
 ISIC 385: Precision instruments  
 
The Asian NIC have high import shares in low-skill intensive industries like Textiles (32) and Wood 
(33) but also in the high-skill Electrical Equipment (383) sector. The import share of Textiles 
decreased during the 1990s (partially due to fierce competition of China) whereas the import share 
of Electrical Equipment increased. Landesmann, Stehrer and Leitner (2000) found for their group 
of seven OECD countries that for the Asian Tigers, Office Machines and Computing became the 
top industry in terms of import penetration at the end of the period 1980-1996, whereas Textiles 
dropped from a first place at the beginning to a third place at the end of the period. A substantial 
part of imports in Office Machines and Computing probably reflects the outsourcing of low-skill 
intensive intermediate inputs by high-wage countries.  
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Figure 2.10: Evolution of the Average EU Import Shares of NIC Groups in Twelve Manufacturing 
Industries (1990s) 
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China 
 
             
               Source: Own calculations from the OECD International Trade by Commodities Statistics (ITCS). 
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The Central and Eastern European countries became active exporters to the European Union in 
the 1990s. 
Their main industries are low-skill sectors Textiles and Wood, medium-low-skill sectors Non-
Metallic Mineral Products (36), Basic Metal Industries (37) and Fabricated Metal Products 
(381) and (medium-) high-skill sectors Electrical Equipment and Transport Equipment (384). 
 
The Latin American emerging economies have import shares below 2 per cent in all industries 
except in Food, Beverages and Tobacco (31) and Basic Metal Industries.   
 
Import shares of China boosted in the 1990s in Textiles and Wood but also in high-skill 
industries like Electrical Equipment and Precision Instruments (385).  
 
The data reveal that import volumes from these countries can hardly be argued to be modest 
when related to total imports in manufactured goods as e.g. Krugman (1995 a) did with respect 
to the United States to refute the claim that international trade with emerging economies may 
have had a substantial impact on wage inequality.  
In textiles the four NIC groups have a combined import share in the European Union of more 
than 40 per cent and even in electrical equipment the combined import share exceeds 20 per 
cent5.  
Moreover, Leamer disagreed with Krugman that small import volumes cannot result in a large 
impact on wages as he stated that in an Heckscher-Ohlin model import prices matter, not import 
volumes. 
 
Landesmann, Stehrer and Leitner (2002) found that the NIC were not only exporting low-skill 
goods to the European Union, as would be expected. They considered the share of high-skill 
white collars workers in total sector employment as a measure of skill intensity and found that 
the industries with the highest skill intensity experienced high growth of import competition of 
the NIC, especially from the Southern European countries, the Asian Tigers and the Southern 
Developing Countries.  
Schott (2003) showed that even at a rather detailed aggregation level, product categories tend 
to be heterogeneous. The importance of some NIC in high-skill sectors could reflect the recent 
                                                 
5 The total share of NIC in textiles would be substantially higher if countries like India and Tunesia were also considered. 
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phenomenon of foreign outsourcing by developed countries of the most labour intensive 
fragments of production processes towards low-wage countries.   
 
Table 2.4 shows EU average growth of the import shares of the four NIC groups at the sector 
level and sector skill intensity. 
The correlation between skill intensity and share growth is 0.54 (t-value: 2.04) for the Asian 
NIC,  -0.46 (t-value: -1.63) for the Central and Eastern European countries, 0.56 (t-value: 2.11) 
for the Latin American NIC and -0.30 (t-value: -1.00) for China. 
 
Table 2.4: EU Average Growth of Import Shares of NIC Groups and Skill Intensity at Sector 
Level (1990-2000) 
ISIC Asian NIC CEEC LATIN China Skill Intensity 
31 -0,5 1,8 -0,4 0,8 0,093 
32 -1,7 6,1 -1,0 7,9 0,058 
33 0,7 5,0 0,1 6,7 0,084 
34 1,0 1,7 0,3 0,5 0,183 
35 0,7 1,0 0,0 1,1 0,261 
36 2,0 4,2 0,0 3,0 0,104 
37 0,8 1,8 0,3 0,7 0,110 
381 0,6 5,0 -0,1 4,9 0,132 
382 1,2 2,6 0,3 2,2 0,370 
383 3,5 3,8 0,3 5,1 0,303 
384 1,6 3,6 0,1 0,5 0,261 
385 0,6 1,2 0,2 3,4 0,302 
Source: Import shares are computed from OECD (2002). Skill intensity (share of white-collar high-skilled workers in total employment)  
is taken from Landesmann, Stehrer and Leitner (2002). For industries for which skill intensity is given at the three- or four-digit level, an  
average across sub-sectors is considered. 
 
The correlation between import shares and skill intensity was negative for all NIC groups in 
1990 as well as in 2000 but in 2000 the correlation was only significant (at the 5 per cent level) 
for the Central and East European countries whereas in 1990 it was significant at the 10 per 
cent level for Latin American NIC and China and at the 5 per cent level for Central and Eastern 
European countries. The positive correlation between import shares of high-skill OECD 
countries and skill intensity dropped from 2.51 in the 1990 to 2.01 in 2000. 
Whereas the import shares reveal a specialisation of NIC in low-skill sectors, the dynamic 
pattern supports the finding of Landesmann, Stehrer and Leitner (2002) that a number of NIC 
started to compete with OECD countries in high-skill sectors in the 1990s. According to 
Landesmann, Stehrer and Leitner the data for seven OECD countries in the period 1980-1996 
clearly show the importance to account for differences between NIC in terms of technological 
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level and specialisation patterns and to consider non-Heckscher-Ohlin mechanisms to explain 
the dynamic pattern of North-South trade, e.g. the increasing import penetration of some NIC 
groups in high-skill intensive sectors. 
Apparently, exports of technology-intensive products are growing faster for developing 
countries than for industrialised countries. In 2000, high-tech exports by developing countries 
amounted to 450 million dollars, which was more than their exports of primary goods, resource-
based goods or low (medium)-tech goods. Though most of these high-tech exports reflect 
labour-intensive activities like assembling imported components, Singapore, South Korea and 
Taiwan have moved into complex manufacturing and design, and local content of high-tech 
manufacturing is growing, e.g. in China (UNCTAD 2002: pp. 145-146).   
 
 
2.4 Conclusions 
 
 
The data reported in this chapter suggest the following stylised facts: 
 
 Dramatic increase in the skill premium in the 1980s and a sharp rise in the relative 
employment of high-skilled workers in the 1970s in the United States. 
 Strong increase in overall earnings inequality in the United Kingdom in the 1980s and 
1990s and more moderate increase in Italy, the Netherlands and Sweden. 
 Stable or even decreasing overall earnings inequality in most other EU countries. 
 The relative wages of non-manual workers in manufacturing industries increased in 
most EU countries in the 1980s and 1990s, most pronounced in the United Kingdom.  
 The unemployment rate of people with a low level of education is substantially greater 
than the unemployment rate of people with a high level of education in most OECD 
countries. The difference in the unemployment rates further increased in a number of 
EU countries in the 1990s, especially in Germany and the United Kingdom.  
 In the period 1985-1996 the relative employment of non-manual workers in 
manufacturing industries increased considerably in Germany and moderately in 
Belgium, Finland, France and Sweden. In other EU countries the relative employment 
hardly changed or even decreased. 
 Import shares from Newly Industrialised Countries have increased in all EU countries. 
In the 1980s the (South-) East Asian NIC became important importers. In the 1990s the 
East European countries started to export to EU countries but their performance was 
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eclipsed by the dramatic rise in imports from China. The NIC increasingly start to export 
low-skill intensive intermediate inputs in high-skill intensive industries.  
 
The stylised facts for EU countries are more mixed and do not show the clear-cut deterioration 
of low-skilled workers found in the United States. This should warn against generalizing 
conclusions for the United States or single EU country studies. 
However, overall the facts reveal that either in terms of rising wage inequality or rising 
unemployment, the labour market position of low-skilled workers also declined in most EU 
countries 
 
The simultaneity of the deteriorated position of low-skill workers in most industrialised 
countries and the increased imports from low-skill abundant countries prompted the public 
prosecutor to round up international trade as a usual suspect for having caused the downslide 
of low-skilled workers.     
Although, apart from the established correlation the prosecutor could rely upon mainstream 
international trade theories to state his case free trade advocates were soon to take up the 
defence of international trade by accusing another likely suspect, i.e. skill-biased technological 
change.  
But more on that in the next chapter. 
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3. What has International Trade got to do with it? 
 
 
"Helen: Well! This is the place. 
  Jo: And I don't like it. 
  Helen: When I find somewhere for us to live I have to consider something far more  
important than your feelings ... the rent. It's all I can afford. [...] 
 
  Jo: Tomorrow? What makes you think we're going to live that long? The roof's leaking! 
  Helen: Is it? No it's not, it's just condensation. 
  Jo: Was it raining when you took the place?" 
- Shelagh Delaney A Taste of Honey. 
 
 
 
As the data in the previous chapter suggest, the relative supply of low-skilled workers decreased 
in most OECD countries, which all other things equal should have resulted in a fall in the skill 
premium or relative employment of high-skilled workers. However the stylised facts in the 
previous chapter also show that the skill premium and/ or unemployment of low-skilled workers 
actually increased, which is an indication of a structural shift in relative labour demand in favour 
of high-skilled workers. International trade with low-skill abundant countries and skill-biased 
technological change (SBTC) have been put forward as the two main potential explanations for 
such a labour demand shift.  
Imports from Newly Industrialised Countries (NIC) became noteworthy in OECD countries at 
about the same time that the skill premium in the United States and unemployment of low-
skilled workers in EU countries started to rise. Although the Stolper-Samuelson theorem 
provides a theoretical argument for the impact of international trade with low-skill abundant 
countries on the skill premium many trade economists considered skill-biased technological 
change as a more important determinant of rising wage inequality.  
The Stolper-Samuelson theorem, as one of the four core theorems of the textbook Heckscher-
Ohlin model, predicts that if a country that relatively abounds in high-skilled labour opens up 
to trade with a country that relatively abounds in low-skilled labour, the wages of low-skilled 
workers will fall in the first and the wages of high-skilled workers will fall in the latter country. 
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Another core theorem of the Heckscher-Ohlin model, namely the Factor Price Equalization 
theorem, even takes the point as far as to predict that factor prices will equalize between both 
countries. 
As will be argued in this chapter the Stolper-Samuelson theorem is, in contrast with the Factor 
Price Equalization theorem, rather robust to relaxing some of the restrictive assumptions of the 
Heckscher-Ohlin framework and therefore seems a logical starting-point to assess the impact 
of international trade on income distribution. 
The argument of trade economists that skill-biased technological change is an equally valid 
explanation for a rise in the skill premium in high-skill abundant countries rings true but there 
are no theoretical reasons to favour one explanation over the other and the assessment of the 
contribution of both factors is therefore an empirical issue. Any serious empirical assessment 
should moreover account for the interdependence of international trade and technological 
change. 
 
The early empirical work did not result in unambiguous conclusions but gradually an academic 
consensus dawned on the limited role of international trade and the dominant role of SBTC in 
explaining the deteriorated labour market opportunities of low-skilled workers.  
However, more recently some prominent scholars started to question the consensus view by 
raising some methodological caveats of previous empirical work and by presenting non-
Heckscher-Ohlin mechanisms through which international trade may affect the labour market 
position of low-skilled workers. 
 
The Heckscher-Ohlin assumption that labour markets are perfectly competitive is necessary 
even for the robust Stolper-Samuelson theorem to hold. Especially for the European Union 
where labour market institutions like minimum wages, unemployment benefits and collective 
bargaining are generally perceived to be important this assumption seems somewhat unrealistic. 
Labour market rigidity is often evoked to explain why in many EU countries wages hardly 
change but why instead, given the lack of wage flexibility, unemployment increased.  
It seems appropriate to acknowledge the importance of labour market institutions in the 
European Union and to abandon the Heckscher-Ohlin model for some more European 
theoretical models.  
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Other assumptions like perfect product market competition and no factor (e.g. capital) mobility 
between countries also fit awkwardly with the world out there and some scholars proposed 
models that relax these assumptions.  
Section 3.1 provides an overview of the main models that have been presented to analyse the 
impact of international trade on income distribution, which provide the theoretical framework 
for the empirical work that will be reviewed in section 3.2. 
 
In section 3.1.1, I start with an elaboration of the Heckscher-Ohlin framework and the Stolper-
Samuelson theorem as this provides a logical and coherent explanation for the impact of 
international trade on the rewards of the different production factors.  
In the next subsections I discuss some of the more recent non-Heckscher-Ohlin models and 
mechanisms put forward to explain how international trade could affect wages or employment. 
These models relax some of the restrictive Heckscher-Ohlin assumptions to account for foreign 
outsourcing; international capital mobility; imperfect product market competition and labour 
market institutions that could cause wage rigidity.    
  
In section 3.2, I review the empirical assessment of the impact of international trade with 
emerging economies on wages and employment in industrialised countries. 
The early empirical work focused on some predictions of the Stolper-Samuelson theorem, e.g. 
that the relative price of low-skill intensive products should have fallen or that skill intensity 
should have decreased in all industries. 
Some of this circumstantial evidence is presented in section 3.2.1. 
 
Decomposition analysis, taken up in section 3.2.2, tested the prediction of the Heckscher-Ohlin 
model that trade liberalisation results in shifts of employment between rather than within 
industries. Between-industry employment shifts are ascribed to international trade whereas the 
within-industry residual is mostly explained by technological factors. 
 
Another strand in the empirical literature are factor content calculations, the results of which 
are reported in section 3.2.3. 
In factor content calculations the impact of international trade is estimated by computing the 
amount of production factors that are embodied in trade flows and by inferring the number of 
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jobs lost, or the downward pressure on wages, due to the actual increase in labour supply 
embodied in net imports. 
   
Following Grossman (1987) some economists have estimated reduced form regressions that 
consider the impact of international trade on wages and employment, accounting for the labour 
market interaction between wages and employment. 
Some of the results of these reduced form estimations are reported in section 3.2.4. 
 
The mandated wage regression approach, proposed by Leamer (1996 a) and refined by Feenstra 
and Hanson (1997, 1999) and Haskel and Slaughter (2001), is an instrument to disentangle the 
impact of international trade from the impact of technological change as well as to estimate the 
indirect effect of international trade, e.g. trade-induced technological change. Wood (1994) 
argued that ignoring the latter effect could result in an underestimation of the labour market 
impact of international trade. 
The mandated wage regression procedure and its main results are reviewed in section 3.2.5. 
 
Relaxing the Heckscher-Ohlin assumption of flexible wages the demand for different 
production factors can be derived from flexible cost functions. Extending these flexible 
specifications with external determinants that may affect the demand for production factors 
(e.g. international trade) permits to estimate the elasticity of factor demand with respect to these 
external variables. The results of estimations within a flexible cost function framework are 
discussed in section 3.2.6. 
 
In most studies deriving factor demand from flexible cost functions, labour market institutions, 
though explicitly acknowledged, are not specified. Sticky wages are simply allowed for without 
considering the specific mechanisms that can explain downward wage rigidity. Collective 
bargaining is an important characteristic of wage setting in many EU countries. Within a 
bargaining framework, modelling the bargaining between firms and labour unions, union power 
can be estimated. If globalisation weakens the bargaining power of unions this will affect wages 
and employment in unionised sectors. 
Section 3.2.7 treats with the results of the relatively rare empirical studies on the impact of 
international trade on union bargaining power and the inferred impact on wages and 
employment.  
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In the final section of the overview of the empirical literature I give an account of the results of 
some Computable General Equilibrium (CGE) models that allow for a general equilibrium 
analysis of the interaction between international trade and labour markets, accounting for 
imperfect product market competition, the role of non-tradables and intermediate goods, 
international capital mobility and changes in relative factor supply. 
 
In section 3.3, I conclude the first part by arguing, referring to the theoretical and empirical 
literature, why for the empirical assessment of the impact of trade with the Newly Industrialised 
Countries on wages and employment in the European Union, some methodologies have been 
used in part II and why others have not.  
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3.1 The Theory 
 
 
In this section I discuss the theoretical models that have been used as a framework for the 
empirical studies that are reviewed in section 3.2. 
I start with the Heckscher-Ohlin (HO) model, as one of its four core theorems, i.e. the Stolper-
Samuelson theorem, clearly predicts the impact of trade liberalisation on income distribution. 
The HO model has been questioned for its lack of empirical relevance and its rather restrictive 
assumptions though, as discussed in section 3.1.1.4, the Stolper-Samuelson theorem is rather 
robust to relaxing some of these assumptions. However, the Stolper-Samuelson is not robust to 
relaxing all the assumptions and some authors considered a number of mechanisms, outside the 
traditional Heckscher-Ohlin framework, through which international trade may affect wages 
and employment. These mechanisms are discussed in sections 3.1.2 up to 3.1.6. 
 
 
      3.1.1 Heckscher-Ohlin framework 
 
 
The Heckscher-Ohlin (HO) model has been the single most popular theoretical framework to 
elucidate the gains of international trade although many scholars doubt its empirical relevance.  
 
The foundation of the so-called Heckscher-Ohlin model was laid by Heckscher (1919) and 
Ohlin (1933). Stolper and Samuelson (1941), Samuelson (1948, 1949, 1953), Rybczynski 
(1955), Jones (1965) and Vanek (1968) made some important contributions to the further 
elaboration and generalization of the Heckscher-Ohlin model, which is sometimes also referred 
to as the Heckscher-Ohlin-Samuelson or Heckscher-Ohlin-Vanek model.  
The Heckscher-Ohlin framework, and more specific the Stolper-Samuelson theorem, offers a 
way to predict the impact of international trade on the rewards of different production factors. 
The Stolper-Samuelson theorem predicts that those factors that a country is relatively well 
endowed with will benefit from trade liberalisation as they will witness an increase in relative 
rewards at the expense of the production factors that the country is relatively poorly endowed 
with. The Stolper-Samuelson theorem therefore provides a logical explanation for the 
established deteriorated position of low-skilled workers. 
 
                   3.1.1.1 Two Factors- Two Goods Heckscher-Ohlin Model 
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The Heckscher-Ohlin model can be schematised in the simplest way with two countries (e.g. 
OECD and NIC) using two production factors (e.g. high-skilled labour LHS and low-skilled 
labour LLS) for the production of two goods, with a high-skill intensive good XHS requiring 
relatively more LHS than a low-skill intensive good XLS. One country (OECD) is assumed to be 
abundant with high-skilled workers relative to the other country (NIC). Traditionally, the HO 
model is represented with capital and labour as the two production factors. As the focus in this 
thesis is on the distinction between low-skilled and high-skilled workers, I will consider the 
two types of labour in the two factors model. Capital can arguably be considered as a production 
factor that is immobile between countries whereas this assumption is less exacting for labour. 
Krugman (1995 b) reasoned that as the share of capital in income hardly changed it is 
appropriate to focus on low-skilled and high-skilled labour. 
Considering just two factors and two goods is convenient for graphical representation and the 
straightforward derivation of the HO theorems. Later on models with more factors and goods 
are considered.  
 
There are a number of assumptions underlying the Heckscher-Ohlin model (Francois and 
Nelson 1998: pp. 1484-1485): 
 
 Behaviour and institutions: 
 
 Rational behaviour by households and firms. 
 Perfect competition. 
 
 Identical homothetic indifference curves in both countries 
 Production factors: 
 
 Uniform quality. 
 Perfectly mobile between sectors in both countries. 
 Perfectly immobile between both countries. 
 
 
 Goods 
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 Identical technological opportunities. 
 Production functions are linear homogenous (degree one), twice differentiable 
and strictly concave. 
 
 Factor intensity: good XLS is low-skill intensive relative to good XHS for all relevant 
factor prices (i.e. there is no factor intensity reversal) 
 
 One country is relatively more endowed with high-skilled labour than the other 
 
 International trade is costless  
 
These assumptions are obviously rather restrictive but allow for a general equilibrium and the 
derivation of the "core propositions" of the Heckscher-Ohlin model (Jones and Neary 1984: p. 
15): 
 
 Heckscher-Ohlin theorem: a country will tend to export the good that 
relatively intensively uses the production factor that it is relatively well endowed 
with. 
 
 Factor-price equalization theorem: 
 
o global form: international trade will result in equalization of the factor rewards 
of trade partners. 
o local form: small changes in factor endowment will, at constant goods prices, 
not affect factor rewards (Leamer and Levinsohn 1995 prefer to call this the 
Factor Price Insensitivity theorem).  
 
 Stolper-Samuelson theorem: an increase in the price of a good will 
increase (decrease) the reward of the production factor that is relatively 
intensively (little) used for producing that good.  
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 Rybczynski theorem: An increase in the endowment of a given production 
factor will, at fixed goods prices, raise (decrease) the production of the good that 
relatively intensively (little) uses that given production factor.  
 
If country OECD is relatively well endowed with LHS and country NIC with LLS, the opening 
of the economies to trade will, starting from autarky, result in a shift of production towards XHS, 
away from production of XLS, in country OECD and an opposite shift in country NIC as shown 
in figure 3.1. 
 
Figure 3.1:  Output and Relative Prices in Country OECD and Country NIC under Autarky and 
Free Trade 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                                             
 
 
                                                Source: Cuyvers, Dumont and Rayp (2003).  
 
Given the relative abundance with high-skilled workers country OECD can produce relatively 
much of XHS as reflected by the steep production possibilities curve, whereas the flat 
possibilities curve of country NIC reflects its comparative advantage in the production of XLS. 
In autarky, equilibrium is given by the point were one of the consumers indifference curves (i.e. 
I0) touches the possibility curves, that is in point A for country OECD and in point B for country 
NIC. 
The line tangent to the possibilities curve and the equilibrium indifference curve is an isovalue 
line (connecting combinations of both goods that provide the same value), the slope of which 
reflects the relative price of XLS and given the assumption of perfect competition also reflects 
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the relative wages of low-skilled workers. In autarky the relative wages of low-skilled workers 
are higher in country OECD than in country NIC. 
If both countries would remove trade barriers, the relative price of XLS will change and 
determine the terms of trade. 
 
The terms of trade are given as: PxLS (NIC) / PxHS (NIC) < P*xLS / P*xHS  < PxLS (OECD) / PxHS (OECD) 
 
Where P*xLS / P*xHS is the relative world market price of the low-skill intensive good. 
So trade liberalisation results in a drop (rise) in the relative price of the low-skill intensive good 
in country OECD (NIC). As a result production of XLS falls from A to A’ in country OECD but 
rises from B to B’ in country NIC.  
 
Country OECD now actually produces more of XHS than needed for domestic consumption. It 
will export the surplus in exchange for the surplus of XLS produced by country NIC. 
Before considering the impact of trade liberalisation on income distribution it should be pointed 
out that figure 3.1 clearly shows the net gains from trade for both countries. 
Under free trade both country OECD and country NIC can reach consumption point C, which 
satisfies I1, i.e. an indifference level that cannot be obtained under autarky as it exceeds the 
domestic production possibilities of both countries.   
 
The impact of a decrease in PxLS on the relative demand for low-skilled workers is depicted in 
figure 3.2. WLS/ PxLS denotes the wage of low-skilled workers relative to the price of the low-
skill intensive good and HSI and LSI the relative intensity of low-skilled labour in the 
production of respectively good XHS and good XLS. 
 
D0 (dotted line) is the initial relative demand for low-skilled workers and D1 (full line) the 
relative labour demand after PxLS decreased (e.g. due to lower import tariffs).    
The horizontal part of D0 and D1 between HSI and LSI reflects the 'Rybczynski theorem' (or 
Factor Price Insensitivity theorem), i.e. an increase in the relative supply of low-skilled workers 
will, given constant goods prices, change the output mix without affecting factor rewards.  
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A decrease in the price of good XLS will lower real wages of low-skilled workers, reflected in 
the downward shift of relative demand between HSI and LSI6.  
However, the lower PxLS also implies that the wages of low-skilled labour relative to the price 
of XLS increases. 
Both the wages of low-skilled and high-skilled workers would increase if PxLS decreases for 
relative labour supply below HSI, in which case the considered country would be fully 
specialized in producing the high-skill intensive good XHS. If factor endowment between both 
countries differs to the extent that both would fully specialize, international trade actually 
benefits all production factors in all countries and there would be no losers. 
Leamer (1996 a) suggested that this might be the case for trade between the United States and 
some Asian NIC. Countries that are abundant in capital and high-skilled labour can focus on 
higher quality goods. Cheaper imports of non-competing goods from low-skill abundant 
countries will only raise real wages of both high-skilled and low-skilled workers. This is the 
'lifting all boats' argument, i.e. trade with NIC does not necessarily have to affect the position 
of low-skilled workers in high-skill abundant countries (Leamer 1996 a: p. 10). 
 
Figure 3.2: Relative Demand for Low-Skilled Labour: Impact of a Decrease in the Relative Price 
of the Low-Skill Intensive Good 
 
  WLS/ PxLS 
                        D1        
                       
                                                     D0 
                                                            
 
                                                                                             
 
                        HSI                        LSI                               LLS/ LHS  
   Source: Adapted from Leamer (1996 a).                        
                         
Stolper and Samuelson (1941) have shown that the changes in product prices have a magnified 
effect on (real) factor rewards (i.e the magnification effect coined by Jones 1965). The Stolper-
                                                 
6 This is also reflected in figure 3.1 in the decreased slope of the line tangent to the indifference curve in C and to the production possibilities 
curve of country OECD in point A.  
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Samuelson theorem clearly states that when both countries have a common cone of 
diversification (see next paragraph) not all production factors benefit from trade liberalisation. 
The Stolper-Samuelson theorem can formally be derived from the fact that changes in goods 
prices should be a weighted average of changes in the prices of production factors (Jones and 
Neary 1984: pp. 16-17): 
 
d PxLS / PxLS = LS, xLS dwLS/wLS + HS, xLS dwHS/wHS                                                               (3.1) 
d PxHS / PxHS = LS, xHS dwLS/wLS + HS, xHSdwHS/wHS                                                          (3.2) 
 
F, G denotes the cost share of production factor F in the production of good G.  
 
If the price of the low-skill intensive good XLS decreases (d PxLS / PxLS < 0) the system of the 
two equations (given both goods are produced domestically) implies that the wages of low-
skilled workers will decrease (dwLS/wLS < 0). Moreover, as the price changes are weighted 
averages of the wages wLS will fall more substantially than PxLS, i.e. the magnification effect. 
The Stolper-Samuelson theorem can be depicted in a Lerner-Pearce diagram, as in figure 3.3, 
which shows the unit isovalue curves of high-skill intensive good XHS and low-skill intensive 
good XLS. Unit isovalue curves connect the amounts of LLS and LHS that can be combined to 
produce one unit value of output and are thus respectively given by 1/ PxLS for good XLS and 
1/ PxHS for good XHS. RXHS and RXLS are the rays of factor intensity of the respective goods. 
The region between these two factor intensity lines is often referred to as the cone of 
diversification. As long as the relative factor endowment point of a country lies in this cone, 
both products can be produced with full employment of all production factors. As long as the 
endowment point does not fall outside the cone, a shift in relative factor endowment will induce 
a shift in the product mix without affecting the relative factor rewards, as argued in the 
Rybczynski theorem. 
 
Given the assumption that production factors are mobile between the two sectors, the chosen 
unit value combinations for both sectors should be tangent to the negatively sloped line of the 
relative factor rewards. XHS and (XLS)0 show an initial equilibrium at factor rewards given by 
the full negatively sloped line [(1/WHS)0 and (1/WLS)0].  
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If the price of the low-skill intensive good decreases, its unit value isoquant (1/ PxLS) will shift 
outwards as it will require more input factors to produce a unit value of XLS. For XHS and (XLS)1 
to be equilibrium combinations the factor rewards line should be tangent. 
 
Figure 3.3: Lerner-Pearce Diagram of the Stolper-Samuelson Theorem 
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                         Source: Adapted from Deardorff (1994 b). 
 
The counter-clockwise turn implies that wages of low-skilled workers will fall and wages of 
high-skilled workers will increase. The Lerner-Pearce diagram also clearly shows another result 
of the price decrease of good XLS, namely that both sectors will use relatively more low-skilled 
workers than initially. The latter conclusion has been brought forward by Lawrence and 
Slaughter (1993) to refute a Stolper-Samuelson explanation of increased wage inequality in the 
United States, as in most industries the ratio of high-skilled workers to low-skilled workers 
actually increased. Cline (1997) showed that by considering shifts in the relative supply of high-
skilled workers the fact that production did not become more low-skill intensive does not imply 
that there may not have been Stolper-Samuelson effects (see also the foreign outsourcing model 
by Feenstra and Hanson (1996) in section 3.1.3 in which it is shown that skill intensity can 
actually increase in all countries due to international trade). 
 
Mussa (1979) showed how the Stolper-Samuelson theorem can be represented (geometrically) 
in terms of the dual of a production function, i.e. a cost function. A fall in the price of the low-
                   
                                                                                               
                                                                                                                                           72 
skill intensive good implies a fall in the wages of low-skilled workers to ensure the general 
equilibrium zero profits condition (assumption of perfect competition).  
 
                    3.1.1.2 Skill-Biased Technological Change (SBTC) 
 
Within the Heckscher-Ohlin framework as presented in the previous sections it can be shown 
that technological change may have the same impact on factor rewards as a reduction in 
international trade barriers. 
If, for example, technological progress occurs in the production of XHS (i.e. technological 
change is sector-biased) a unit value can at given product prices be produced more efficiently 
using less LLS and LHS. The unit value curve of XHS will shift towards the origin. In figure 3.4 
the unit value curve shifts alongside the initial ray of factor intensity (RXHS)0, which reflects 
Hicks-neutral technological progress (i.e. no factor bias). If technological progress is biased in 
favour of sector XHS the outcome is similar to a price decrease in PxLS.  
 
Figure 3.4: Lerner-Pearce Diagram of Technological Change in the High-Skill Intensive 
Industry 
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                               Source: Adapted from Krugman (1995 a).                       
 
The relative wages of low-skilled workers will fall and production of XHS will use low-skilled 
labour more intensively. If technological progress would occur in the production of XLS the 
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relative wage of low-skilled workers would rise. As argued by Leamer (1996 a) the factor bias 
of technological change does not seem to matter, the sector bias does. 
However, Krugman (1995 a) objected that this assertion depends on the assumption that goods 
prices are given and technological progress is local. This would be the case if the considered 
country is too small to affect world prices and if there are no international technology spillovers. 
Krugman considered both assumptions as unrealistic, especially when considering the United 
States and the European Union.  
 
If utility is assumed to be Cobb-Douglas with a constant share α spent on good XHS and factor 
intensity is fixed in both sectors the allocation of production factors can be represented in an 
Edgeworth box without referring to goods prices or factor rewards as shown in figure 4.5. 
 
Initially Q0 is the point denoting how much of LLS and LHS is allocated to the production of 
respectively XHS (from the origin OXHS), respectively XLS (from the origin OXLS). 
 
 
Figure 3.5: Allocation of Low-Skilled and High-Skilled Labour and the Factor Bias of 
Technological Change 
                                                                                                                                 OXLS 
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                   Source: Adapted from Krugman (1995 a). 
 
 
As α is the share of total income spent on XHS we have (Krugman 1995 a: p. 15):  
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(wHS/wLS).LHS, xHS  +  LLS, xHS  = α [(wHS/wLS).LHS  +  LLS]                                                 (3.3) 
 
and  
 
wHS/wLS = (α LLS -  LLS, xHS)/(LHS, xHS -  α LHS)                                                                    (3.4) 
 
with LHS, xHS (LLS, xHS) the amount of total high-skilled labour LHS (low-skilled labour LLS) 
allocated to the production of XHS. 
 
If Hicks-neutral technological progress occurs in the production of XHS (sector bias), given 
constant factor intensity, it follows from (3.4) that the relative wage of high-skilled workers 
will not change. If however, technological progress in the skill-intensive industry favours high-
skilled workers (factor bias) and factor intensity increases from (RXHS)0 to (RXHS)1 allocation 
shifts from Q0 to Q1. As both LLS, xHS and LHS, xHS are lower at this point it follows from (3.4) 
that the relative wage of high-skilled workers will rise. Skill-biased technological change in 
either sector will increase the skill premium. Krugman went on to show that this result did not 
depend on the assumption of fixed factor intensity. Relaxing the Cobb-Douglas assumption that 
elasticity of substitution equals one, technological progress in the skill-intensive industry will 
increase the skill premium. However, if elasticity of substitution is lower than one, the skill 
premium will decrease.  
 
Krugman concluded that when countries are too large to simply be considered as price-takers 
or technological spillovers are international, the factor bias of technological progress clearly 
matters for factor rewards whereas the impact of the sector bias is ambiguous. 
Haskel and Slaughter (2002) argued that Krugman's claim that when product prices are 
endogenized skill-biased technological change will increase the skill premium irrespective of 
the sector bias in technological change, does not necessary hold under different assumptions 
about technology and demand, as shown by Davis (1998 a); Haskel and Slaughter (1998) and 
Xu (1998) and that in many cases it is the sector bias of technological change and not the factor 
bias that matters for the factor rewards.   
Moutos (2000) proposed a two-sector model with one sector producing a homogenous good 
and the other sector a good that can be offered by firms at different quality levels. Low-skilled 
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and high-skilled labour were considered as the two production factors. Higher quality goods 
require more high-skilled labour than lower quality varieties. Moutos showed that technological 
change that is uniform across the two sectors as well as Hicks-neutral, i.e. technological change 
without a sector or a factor bias could raise the skill premium. The main mechanism to explain 
this finding is the increase in productivity which will raise real income, generating a higher 
demand for the higher quality varieties and as a result a higher demand for high-skilled workers.  
If wages are sticky, preventing the skill premium to increase, even skill-neutral technological 
change may raise the unemployment of low-skilled workers, which Moutos figured could 
explain the high unemployment rates in the European Union. 
 
In much of the early empirical work, international trade and technological change were 
apparently considered as mutually exclusive explanations. However, as argued by Wood (1994) 
international trade may induce technological change. A comprehensive assessment of the 
impact of international trade should therefore account for this indirect effect. 
Acemoglu (1999) presented a theoretical model in which trade induces skill-biased 
technological change both in skill-abundant and skill-scarce countries, raising wage inequality 
without necessarily affecting relative product prices. This seems to provide a theoretical 
underpinning of Wood’s argument and fits well with most stylised facts. 
Dinopoulos and Segerstrom (1999) showed, in a North-North Trade model with endogenous 
skill acquisition, how trade liberalisation could result in skill-biased R&D activities that will 
increase skill intensity in all industries and thereby reduce the relative wages of low-skilled 
workers.    
Chusseau (2002) presented an endogenous growth model in which the impact of North-South 
trade on R&D activities and technological change in the IT sector is considered, assuming 
capital-skill complementarity and substitution between capital and low-skilled labour. 
In line with other endogenous growth models the impact of international trade is ambiguous. If 
labour markets are perfectly competitive trade liberalisation with respect to the South will 
actually slow down R&D activities and productivity, compared to the autarky situation, 
whereas if minimum wages are imposed North-South trade will increase R&D activities and 
raise productivity in the North.  
Ethier (2002) considered a model in which capital and high-skilled labour are assumed to be 
complements and low-skilled labour and outsourced activities substitutes. Assuming that 
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capital utilization is a choice variable allows for endogeneity of skill-biased technological 
change. 
Thoenig and Verdier (2003) presented a dynamic model in which firms can endogenously 
determine the bias of technological change. If increased openness results in knowledge leakages 
and spillovers that may strengthen the position of competitors, firms will try to increase the 
share of tacit knowledge embedded in their production technology to reduce the threat of 
imitation and technological leapfrogging. The shift towards a higher tacit share is likely to 
require a larger share of high-skilled workers. As a result, this defensive technological change 
will be skill-biased and in the model increases wage inequality in both countries considered 
(Thoenig and Verdier 2003: p. 709). 
 
Another potential link between trade and technology are international technology spillovers. 
Grossman and Helpman (1991) considered international trade as an important spillover 
mechanism. In their endogenous growth model the impact of technology and trade policies will 
depend upon whether knowledge spillovers are local or global in scope.  
Coe and Helpman (1995) and Lichtenberg and Van Pottelsberghe de la Potterie (1996) found 
evidence of substantial trade-related international R&D spillovers between OECD countries 
and Coe, Helpman and Hoffmaister (1995) found evidence of substantial trade-related R&D 
spillovers from industrialised countries to developing countries.  
 
International trade and skill-biased technological change are the two main explanations brought 
forward to explain the weakened labour market position of low-skilled workers in most 
industrialised countries. There are no theoretical reasons to favour one over the other so 
assessing the impact of both explanations is an empirical issue. However, a sound empirical 
assessment should account for the interdependence between international trade and 
technological change.  
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                       3.1.1.3 M factors- N goods Heckscher-Ohlin model 
 
 
In the Heckscher-Ohlin model with two production factors and two goods the impact of trade 
liberalisation on the rewards of the respective production factors is rather straightforwardly 
framed in the Stolper-Samuelson theorem. If a high-skill abundant country opens up to trade 
with a low-skill abundant country and factor endowments in both countries are not such that 
countries fully specialize the wages of low-skilled (high-skilled) workers will fall in the high-
skill (low-skill) abundant country. However, in a model with M production factors and N goods 
the 'core propositions' are more complicated and less general.  
 
Without any restrictions on the number of production factors and the number of produced 
goods, Ethier (1984) considered an initial product prices vector p0 and an ultimate product 
prices vector p1, as well as an initial factor rewards vector w0 and an ultimate factor rewards 
vector w1. Given the relationship between product prices and factor rewards p = w A(w) with 
A(w) being the matrix of least-cost factor cost shares it can be shown that: 
 
(w1- w0) A(w) (p1- p0) > 0                                                                                                     (3.5) 
 
 
The positive correlation between (w1- w0) A(w)  and (p1- p0) implies that (Ethier 1984: p. 164): 
"there is a tendency for changes in relative commodity prices to be accompanied by increases 
in the rewards of factors employed most intensively by those goods whose prices have relatively 
risen the most and employed least intensively by those goods whose relative prices have fallen 
the most."  
 
In an M x N model the increase in the price of the n-th good will not exceed the proportional 
increase in the cost: 
 
 dpn/pn = 1, n dw1/w1 + 2, n dw2/w2 + ... + m, n dwm/wm                                                                                  (3.6) 
 
 
As factor shares (i, n is the share of factor i in the cost of producing good n) are positive and 
sum to unity there will be at least one factor for which the rewards will increase more or as 
much as the price of the n-th good. 
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If we assume this to apply to the m-th production factor and consider the k-th good for which 
the price did not change: 
 
0 = dpk/pk = 1,k dw1/w1 + 2, k dw2/w2 + ... + m, k dwm/wm                                                                          (3.7) 
 
Given that all factor shares are positive and dwm/wm > 0 this implies that there should be at least 
one production factor for which the factor reward decreased. 
This leads to the correlation version of the Stolper-Samuelson theorem defined for M 
production factors and N goods (Ethier 1984: pp. 165-166): 
 
"A rise in any single commodity price will cause the reward of some factor to rise in terms of 
all other goods and to fall in terms of none, and it will cause the reward of some other factor 
to fall in terms of all goods- provided that the good is initially produced and that every factor 
which it employs is subsequently also employed elsewhere in the economy."  
 
 
                       3.1.1.4 How Robust is the Stolper-Samuelson Theorem?  
 
 
The Heckscher-Ohlin model requires a number of strong assumptions. As argued by Jones and 
Scheinkman (1977) the Factor Price Equalization theorem and to a lesser extent the Heckscher-
Ohlin theorem are very sensitive to the HO assumptions, especially with respect to identical 
technology between countries: ”If two countries have dissimilar technologies, any basis for an 
exact equivalence in factor-pricing structure (in the absence of international factor mobility) 
quite obviously disappears. In similar though less exact fashion, any strong difference in the 
quality of technologies between countries could outweigh factor endowment differences and 
upset the Heckscher-Ohlin theorem.” (Jones and Scheinkman 1977: p. 911). 
As shown in the previous section, even under the strong HO assumptions, the theorems derived 
within a 2 x 2 model need to be relaxed for models that allow for more than two production 
factors and more than two goods. However relaxing a number of the HO assumptions does not, 
in contrast with the Factor Price Equalization theorem and the Heckscher-Ohlin theorem, seem 
to matter too much for the Stolper-Samuelson theorem and the Rybczynski theorem.  
 
The assumption of the HO model that technologies do not differ between countries is often seen 
as too restrictive and led some scholars to opt for more Ricardian models. Krugman and 
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Obstfeld (2003), given the perceived lack of empirical support for the HO model, favour a 
Ricardian explanation of trade with its focus on technological differences and see a more limited 
role for the Heckscher-Ohlin model in assessing the effects of international trade on income 
distribution, for which the Ricardian theory is less adequate.  
Jones (2000) stated that the Stolper-Samuelson nor the Rybczynski theorem actually require 
the assumption that technologies are the same between countries but only implies some 
properties of the inverse technology matrix (reflecting the requirement of input factors per unit 
output): “Even though sufficient conditions can thus be stated to prove strong or weak forms of 
the Stolper-Samuelson theorem (and, by reciprocity, the Rybczynski theorem) in the higher n x 
n case, the severity of these conditions might suggest that these propositions are best reserved 
for smaller-dimensional models. This would, in my view, represent a mistake because the 
essence of the Stolper-Samuelson theorem is that any factor of production can have its real 
return enhanced by the indirect means of altering some commodity prices (it may take more 
than one). All it takes to prove this is that there is no joint production (or not too much) and 
that there are at least as many commodities as factors of production.” (Jones 2000: p. 26) 
Allowing for imperfect competition in the goods markets does not need to be dramatic either 
for the factor intensity theory, as assuming goods are differentiated by quality and thus can be 
produced by technologies with different intensities, as in Falvey and Kierzkowski (1987), trade 
patterns can still be linked to factor endowment. 
 
Hakura (1999) proposed a modified Heckscher-Ohlin model that allows for technological 
differences between countries and shows that using direct and domestically produced indirect 
input requirements provides more accurate measures of the production factors that are 
embodied in international trade in final goods.  
Trefler and Zhu (2000) also argued that a modified Heckscher-Ohlin model, despite some 
significant problems, is useful to think about international differences in technology, as well as 
to assess the impact of international trade on factor prices, product prices, the composition of 
output and induced technological change.  
 
Thompson (2002) relaxed some of the conditions with respect to production technology, perfect 
competition and full employment and concluded that the Stolper-Samuelson link between 
product prices and factor rewards is rather robust.  
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Abrego and Edwards (2002) claimed that relaxing the assumptions of the HO model with 
respect to homogeneity of goods, perfect labour markets and factor immobility, though 
substantially decreasing the impact generally does not affect the direction of Stolper-Samuelson 
effects. They however subjoined that when allowing for differentiated goods and 
complementarity between imports and domestic low-skill intensive goods, even the direction 
may change and that in a multi-goods model the linkage between trade with developing 
countries and wages in advanced countries is more indirect and tenuous. 
 
Bowen, Leamer and Sveikauskas (1987) and Harrigan (1997) found indications of persistent 
technological differences between countries.  
Schott (2003) however raised the possibility that the reported findings of cross-country 
differences in production technologies could be a statistical artefact of within-industry product 
heterogeneity. The three-digit level electrical machinery industry, for example, includes low-
end portable radios as well as high-end communications satellites. Reported cross-country 
differences in technology but also conclusions with respect to the home bias in international 
trade and non-homotheticity of preferences could therefore be due to unobserved differences in 
the intra-industry product mix (i.e. different country specialisation). 
As mentioned before, Jones (2000) argued that the Stolper-Samuelson theorem neither the 
Rybczynski theorem actually requires the assumption that technologies are the same across 
countries. 
 
The existence of a single cone of diversification is important for the Stolper-Samuelson theorem 
to hold in its strict form. If factor endowment between countries is too divergent, i.e. if the 
endowment point of one of the countries considered falls outside the cone of diversification, 
formed by the factor intensity lines RXLS and RXHS (see figure 3.3), that country cannot produce 
both goods and ensure full employment of all production factors. Both countries may specialize 
in the production of a single good. If this would be the case, trade liberalisation would, as argued 
by e.g. Bhagwati and Deheija (1994) and Leamer (1996 a) cause a tide that lifts all boats as 
there would be no competing goods and a decrease in the price of imported goods would 
unambiguously increase the real rewards of all production factors.  
Deardorff (2002) showed that if there are more goods than production factors two kinds of free 
trade equilibrium could arise. 
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Considering three goods and two production factors, equilibrium with a single cone of 
diversification is possible, as shown in figure 3.67. 
 
Figure 3.6: Single Cone Free Trade Equilibrium with Three Goods and Two Factors 
 
LHS 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                        LLS 
Source: Adapted from Deardorff (2002). 
 
The skill intensity (price) of the three goods is respectively SR1 (p1), SR2 (p2) and SR3 (p3). The 
isocost line, determined by the relative wage of low-skilled workers, is tangent to the three unit 
value isoquants. If the endowment point of a country falls within the cone formed by SR1 and 
SR3 production with full employment of all factors is possible. A country can diversify 
production within the single cone. 
However, the output of the three goods is not fully determined by prices and factor endowment 
as a country will be indifferent between only producing good 1 and 3 and producing all three 
goods. 
Output will be determined by world demand (Deardorff 2002: p. 3). 
 
The single cone equilibrium is only possible if world market prices are such that the isocost line 
is tangent to all unit value isoquants. Although market forces may ensure this to happen it 
cannot be guaranteed. An alternative equilibrium is possible with two cones of diversification, 
as shown in figure 3.7.  
 
                                                 
7 Deardorff (2002) considered capital and labour as the two production factors. In line with previous graphical representations low-skilled and 
high-skilled labour are considered. Accounting for more than two production factors results in multidimensional cones of diversification which 
obviously would complicate things.  
SR1 
SR2 
SR3 
X1=1/p1 
 
X2=1/p2 
X3=1/p3 
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Figure 3.7: Two Cones Free Trade Equilibrium with Three Goods and Two Factors 
 
LHS 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                                            LLS 
 
     Source: Adapted from Deardorff (2002). 
 
 
With the isocost line given by wages wLS1 and wHS1 a country with its endowment point falling 
within the cone formed by SR1 and SR2 can produce good 1 and 2, employing all workers at 
the given wages.   
With the isocost line given by wages wLS2 and wHS2 a country with its endowment point falling 
within the cone formed by SR3 and SR4 can produce good 2 and 3, employing all workers at 
the given wages. 
 
A country with its endowment point outside one of the two cones will produce only one good 
at relative wages given by the line tangent to the isoquant, at the skill intensity ray running 
through the endowment point.    
Deardorff (2002) considered the model with two cones to be a more appropriate tool than the 
single cone model to analyse North-South trade, as in a single cone model wages should be 
equal in developed and developing countries, unless some countries are fully specialized. 
 
Using data for 1990 on some 45 developed and developing countries, Schott (2003) found 
evidence that the assumption of a single cone of diversification could be rejected in favour of 
the assumption of two cones of diversification. 
SR1 
SR2 
SR3 
SR4 
Cone 1 
Cone 2 
1/wLS1 1/wLS2 
          
1/wHS1 
          
1/wHS2 
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Burkett (2000) used data for 58 countries and also found that the hypothesis of a single cone 
was rejected against the hypothesis of two cones.   
The exposition by Deardorff showed that the same good, i.e. the medium high-skill intensive 
good 2 can be produced with different skill intensity, in different countries. Low-skill abundant 
countries will employ relatively more low-skilled workers in producing this good than high-
skill abundant countries. 
This implies that it is difficult to establish whether reported technology gaps between countries 
are due to differences in technological level or efficiency or whether the differences can actually 
be explained by common production technologies being used with different skill intensities, 
given the differences in factor rewards. 
 
The Stolper-Samuelson theorem holds regardless, with respect to trade between countries for 
which factor endowment falls within the same cone. If a high-skill abundant country does not 
produce the low-skill intensive good 1, a fall in the price of this good, will unambiguously 
favour all its factors. Schott (2003) found that few capital abundant countries produced the 
labour intensive HO aggregate. However, if the high skill abundant country produces the 
medium high-skill intensive good 2, a fall in the price of this good, e.g. due to falling trade 
barriers with respect to low-skill abundant countries, would still imply an increase in the skill 
premium (Deardorff 2002: pp. 4-5). Schott (2003) found that few countries fully specialize and 
that most of them produce medium labour-intensive goods. This seems to support a North-
South Heckscher-Ohlin model with two cones, as depicted in figure 3.7. 
 
I believe to have shown in this section that the Stolper-Samuelson theorem provides a 
theoretically coherent and rather robust prediction of the impact of international trade on the 
distribution of income over the production factors and therefore seems a logical starting-point 
for the empirical assessment of trade with Newly Industrialised Countries on wage inequality 
in high-skill abundant countries. 
A starting-point that is, as some of the restrictive Heckscher-Ohlin assumptions are necessary 
even for the robust Stolper-Samuelson theorem to hold and clinging to this theorem regardless 
could result in biased estimates of the labour market impact of international trade. In the next 
sections a number of theoretical models that relax the most unrealistic Stolper-Samuelson 
assumptions are presented and the impact of international trade on labour markets within these 
non-Heckscher-Ohlin models is discussed.  
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              3.1.2 Foreign Outsourcing 
 
 
When Krugman (1995 b) stressed that the overall volume of North-South trade did not change 
as dramatically as is sometimes assumed he mentioned a potentially new aspect of international 
trade: the slicing up of the value added chain, with firms being increasingly able to break up 
their production process in geographically separated fragments although he subjoined that this 
was more a general belief than that it could be substantiated by hard statistical evidence. 
Srinivasan (1995) believed that Krugman understated the important role of technological 
progress in decreasing transport and communications costs and thereby in facilitating the slicing 
up of the value added chain. Feenstra and Hanson (1996) objected that Krugman only 
considered foreign direct investment flows by multinationals whereas international trade in 
intermediated inputs increased far more than trade in final goods.   
Jones and Kierzkowski (2001) believed that significant cuts in coordination costs allow firms 
to take advantage of international differences in technologies and factor prices to develop global 
production networks and suggest that, as the price of international services declines, the need 
to contain the different production stages within the framework of a multinational organization 
may have reduced in favour of international arms-length transactions.  
UNCTAD (2002: p. 141) concluded that foreign outsourcing is becoming generalized: ”Non-
core functions, such as the labour-intensive parts of the production process, the assembly of 
less sophisticated products, or the logistical organization of product distribution are 
outsourced to low-cost sites. The contract manufacturing phenomenon epitomizes these 
outsourcing trends as the complete production process is outsourced. It increases the scale and 
importance of suppliers’ operations, as global value chains are more and more finely sliced 
into specialized functional and geographical elements.” 
 
In a survey of Belgian firms, 35 percent of the respondents responded to have outsourced 
activities to firms abroad in the period 1990-1996 whereas only 27 per cent of the responding 
firms invested in a foreign affiliate (Federal Planning Bureau 2000: p. 242). 
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Feenstra and Hanson (1996) developed a model of foreign outsourcing8 which results in a 
modified version of the Stolper-Samuelson theorem and can explain why wages of high-skilled 
workers as well as skill intensity of production increased in both high-skill abundant and low-
skill abundant countries.   
The model assumed a high-skill abundant North and a low-skill abundant South, producing a 
single manufactured good with a continuum of intermediate inputs indexed by z [0,1]. A unit 
of intermediate input z requires aLS(z) of low-skilled labour and aHS(z) of high-skilled labour 
and capital K(z) which substitutes for labour. Production is modelled with the following Cobb-
Douglas function (Feenstra and Hanson 1996: p. 93): 
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Ai is a technology parameter allowed to differ between the North and the South (i = N, S) and 
θ is the share of labour in output. The final good Y is assembled without any costs using the 
intermediate inputs (Feenstra and Hanson 1996: p. 93): 
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The endowment and technology in the North and the South differ sufficiently to prevent factor 
price equalization. The return of capital is assumed to be lower in the relatively capital abundant 
North which will, given the possibility of international capital flows, result in foreign 
investment by Northern firms. 
 
 
                                                 
8 Apparently there is some competition among scholars to coin the most original term for the phenomenon of firms breaking up their production 
process and contracting out separable fragments to the most optimal location (country), with the following contestants: (foreign) outsourcing 
(Katz and Murphy 1991; Feenstra and Hanson 1996; Kohler 2001a; Grossman and Helpman 2002 and Egger and Egger, 2000); slicing up the 
value added chain (Krugman 1995 b); (international) fragmentation (Deardorf 1998 b; Jones and Kierzkowski 2001; Venables 1999; Arndt 
and Kierzkowski 2001; Burda and Dluhosch 2001and Kohler 2001b, 2002); intra-product specialization (Arndt 1997); disintegration of the 
production process (Feenstra 1998); vertical specialization in international trade (Hummels, Rapoport and Yi 1998; Hummels, Ishii and Yi 
2001and Strauss-Kahn 2002, 2003); intra-mediate trade (Antweiler and Trefler 2000); global production sharing (Feenstra and Hanson 2001). 
Without designating a winner I will stick to the term foreign outsourcing throughout this text.      
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The minimum unit cost of producing Qi(z) in country i, i.e. the dual of the production function 
(3.8), is given by (Feenstra and Hanson 1996: p. 93): 
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Ranging the intermediate inputs in order of increasing unit costs and assuming the unit costs to 
be a continuous function of z, the unit costs of respectively the North (CN) and the South (CS) 
can be depicted as in figure 3.8. 
 
As long as both the North and the South produce some intermediate inputs, the CN and the CS 
line should cross at a given z*. The intermediate inputs below z* will then be produced in the 
South, given its cost advantage, whereas the more high-skill intensive inputs above z* will be 
produced in the North. 
 
Figure 3.8: Unit Costs of the Continuum of Intermediate Inputs in the North and the South  
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      Source: Adapted from Feenstra and Hanson (1996). 
 
To determine the critical point z* the demand for the production factors can, following 
Shepard’s lemma (e.g. Mas-Colell, Whinston and Green 1995: pp. 140-141) be derived by 
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differentiating (3.10) with respect to factor prices, which for the South results in the following 
expression for labour demand (Feenstra and Hanson 1996: p. 95): 
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The capital share can be derived from the Cobb-Douglas production function: 
 
 

 1LwLwKr S,HSS,HSS,LSS,LSSS                                                                                           (3.13) 
 
Each intermediate input receives a share α (z) of total expenditures. 
The equilibrium of the model is given by an expression in which CN is set equal to CS for z* 
and the expressions of derived demand for the three production factors in the South and the 
North (analogous to expressions 3.11-3.13), setting world expenditure equal to the sum of factor 
payments in the North and the South. 
If capital flows from the North to the South (not possible in the Heckscher-Ohlin model), given 
the lower capital return in the North, the return to capital will increase in the North and decrease 
in the South. As a result, if wages are fixed, unit costs CN will increase whereas CS will decrease 
as shown in figure 3.8. The critical point will shift from z* to z’. Intermediate inputs between 
z* and z’ will now be produced in the South. The ratio of high-skilled labour relative to low-
skilled labour actually increases in both the North and the South inducing increased relative 
demand for high-skilled workers in both countries, which will tend to increase relative wages 
of high-skilled workers in both countries.   
The eventual labour market equilibrium is shown in figure 3.9. 
If capital moves from the North to the South such that the point where CN and CS cross increases 
from z* to z’ derived relative demand for high-skilled workers (Di) increases in both countries. 
If wages would be fixed, point B would be reached. This is however not an equilibrium on the 
labour market. Labour market equilibrium implies an increase in the relative wage of high-
skilled workers, resulting in equilibrium at point C. Feenstra and Hanson showed that under a 
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stability condition, capital movement from the North to the South (or alternatively technological 
catch-up of the South) will raise z* even when relative wages of high-skilled workers rise.   
Figure 3.9: Relative Supply and Demand of High-Skilled Labour 
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          Source: Adapted from Feenstra and Hanson (1996). 
 
They also derived a modified Stolper-Samuelson theorem which links the relative prices of 
intermediate inputs to relative wages, i.e. relative prices of inputs produced in the North relative 
to inputs produced in the South will increase corresponding to the increase in the relative wage 
of high-skilled workers. It is this modified theorem that leads Feenstra and Hanson to argue that 
rather than the traditional comparison of domestic and import prices, the price deflators for 
domestic value added should be compared to import prices, within a given industry or economy-
wide (see section 3.2.1).  
 
Deardorff (1998 b) demonstrated that in a world without factor price equalization (due to 
countries operating in different cones of diversification) outsourcing of a production stage 
towards a country that requires more resources than in the country of original production may 
still be worthwhile if there are substantial differences in factor rewards across countries. 
According to Deardorff factor prices may actually be driven apart by fragmentation although 
outsourcing may also result in factor price equalization. The factor deciding which way the 
wind will blow is the factor intensity of the different production stages and more precisely the 
difference between factor intensity of the respective sliced up stages of the value added chain 
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and the factor intensity of production in each country before outsourcing occurred. A similar 
point is made by Venables (1999).  
Glass and Saggi (2001) proposed a model of foreign outsourcing, which contrary to the model 
proposed by Feenstra and Hanson (1996) is driven by differences in technology between 
countries and not so much by differences in factor endowment. The model is considered by the 
authors to complement the Feenstra and Hanson model by considering the impact of foreign 
outsourcing on the rate of innovation. 
As foreign outsourcing lowers the marginal cost of production, the increase in profits is 
assumed to provide a greater incentive for innovation. Whereas outsourcing will depress the 
relative wages, outsourcing-induced innovation will result in a positive growth effect, which 
could offset the negative direct impact.  
    
Kohler (2002) argued that theoretical models describing foreign outsourcing and its driving 
forces are rather stylised with regard to distribution of income over production factors, whereas 
models focusing on income distribution tend to simplify the forces of foreign outsourcing. He 
also pointed at the diverging conclusions of different theoretical models on the impact of 
outsourcing on the position of low-skilled workers. Whereas the framework by Feenstra and 
Hanson (1996) explains both the decrease in relative wages of low-skilled workers and the 
increased skill-intensity of production in both high-skill and low-skill abundant countries, other 
models lead to more ambiguous conclusions as to the impact on low-skilled workers. In Arndt 
(1997), Venables (1999) and Jones and Kierzkowski (2001) it is shown that under certain 
conditions foreign outsourcing could actually favour low-skilled workers in high-skill abundant 
countries that outsource part of their production to low-skill abundant countries.  
 
Kohler (2002) tried to link up the different theoretical principles that have been put forward to 
model outsourcing by proposing a general equilibrium framework where both Ricardian and 
Heckscher-Ohlin aspects play a role in determining the impact on factor rewards. The model 
allows for an arbitrary number of final goods, input factors and production fragments. 
International factor price differences and differences in technology are the driving forces of 
foreign outsourcing. The impact on factor rewards depends on the factor intensity of the 
production stages that remain in the outsourcing country and not on the factor intensity of the 
stages that are outsourced. 
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Strauss-Kahn (2002) proposed a model of foreign outsourcing in which, to reflect the situation 
in continental Europe, wages were assumed fixed. Outsourcing increases relative employment 
of high-skilled workers in the high-skilled abundant country whereas agglomeration effects, 
which are also considered in the model, result in a simultaneous impact on employment 
inequality in both high-skilled abundant and low-skilled abundant countries (i.e. similar to the 
co-movement of wages in Feenstra and Hanson 1996).  
 
Accounting for the recent phenomenon of foreign outsourcing implies that a strict Heckscher-
Ohlin framework has to be vacated. 
Feenstra and Hanson (1996) derived a modified Stolper-Samuelson theorem from a model that 
incorporates foreign outsourcing. Following their model, foreign outsourcing will raise the skill 
premium in high-skill abundant as well as in low-skill abundant countries and at the same time 
raise skill intensity in all countries. As will be argued in the overview of the empirical literature 
this seems more in line with some stylised facts than the predictions derived from a strict 
Heckscher-Ohlin model. 
Some of the other foreign outsourcing models that have been discussed in this section provide 
more ambiguous predictions with respect to the impact of foreign outsourcing on labour 
markets. As it seems impossible to decide, on theoretical grounds, what the outcome will be, 
empirical studies are needed to estimate the net effects of international trade in intermediate 
goods.     
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               3.1.3 Sachs and Shatz Mechanisms 
 
 
Following some of the early empirical work, which focused on the implication of the Stolper-
Samuelson theorem that trade liberalisation results in a fall in the relative prices of low-skill 
intensive products in high-skill abundant countries, an implication that did not receive much 
support from the data (see section 3.2.1), Sachs and Shatz (1996) proposed a number of non-
Stolper-Samuelson mechanisms through which international trade can affect wages without 
changing domestic product prices. They first considered the possibility of international capital 
mobility (as Feenstra and Hanson 1996). If firms in high-skill abundant countries can relocate 
their low-skill intensive activities to low-skill abundant countries the relative wage of low-
skilled workers can fall even without any change in the relative price of the low-skill intensive 
goods. They proposed a model with two sectors producing tradables (high-skill intensive XHS 
and low-skill intensive XLS) and a sector producing non-tradables XN. The low-skill intensive 
good is an intermediate good, used in the production of the high-skill intensive final good and 
can be produced either domestically or in a low-skill abundant country. Capital is assumed to 
be specific to sector XLS and XN (i.e. the capital stock of the first cannot be used in the latter and 
vice versa) and capital is not considered as a direct input in the production of the final good 
XHS. High-skilled labour LHS is fixed and only used for producing XHS whereas low-skilled 
labour, fixed as well, is used for producing XLS and XN. The amount of capital allocated to 
produce XLS in the low-skill abundant country is considered to be exogenous (determined by 
the FDI policy of the host country, relative factor prices, tax policy…). If the wages of low-
skilled workers are lower in the host country than in the home country, capital will be more 
profitable in the host country. Under full international capital mobility the low-skill intensive 
good will no longer be produced domestically. If capital is shifted from the home country to the 
host country to allow for higher quasi-rents, displaced low-skilled workers in the home country 
will be forced to look for a job in the non-tradables sector. The wages of low-skilled workers 
will then be determined by the demand for low-skilled workers in this sector (i.e. equal to the 
marginal value of LLS in XN or 




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X will fall whereas 
NX
P will tend to fall given increased output but could 
increase due to a positive income (demand) effect, which follows from the more profitable 
production of the intermediate good. If the income effect is smaller than the supply effect, the 
                   
                                                                                               
                                                                                                                                           93 
wages of low-skilled workers in the home country will fall. The price of XLS is determined by 
the demand for the intermediate good used in the production of XHS, which depends on the input 
of the intermediate good and the supply of high-skilled workers. As the latter two are assumed 
to be fixed, the price of the low-skill intensive good will not change whereas the wage of low-
skilled workers changes. Assuming that the production of XHS also requires sector-specific 
capital and LHS can also be used to produce XLS results in the finding that the wage gap between 
low-skilled and high-skilled workers is determined in the non-tradables sector. If skill intensity 
in sector XLS is lower than skill intensity in sector XN the latter sector will become more 
intensive in low-skilled labour9. Low-skilled workers will have to accept a lower relative wage 
for all displaced low-skilled labour to be absorbed by the non-tradables sector.  
 
Sachs and Shatz then adjusted the model to allow for the domestic low-skill intensive sector to 
be monopolistic in the absence of international capital mobility. Foreign production of XLS is 
competitive and determined by the foreign capital stock only. Production of XLS can either 
occur using a low marginal cost technology or using a high-cost alternative technology at a cost 
of P*. The monopolistic domestic sector will earn a rent when using the low-cost technology 
but it cannot set its price higher than P* as this would allow foreign firms to supply XLS using 
the high-cost technology. Foreign imports can be seen as a competitive fringe of the domestic 
monopolist. 
Now, if the foreign sector increases its production of XLS the domestic monopolist will hold its 
price at P* and absorb increased imports by reducing domestic production. This will displace 
(low-skilled) workers from this sector and force them into the non-tradables sector. However, 
as there is now a negative income effect (monopolist profits decrease due to import competition) 
the wage of low-skilled workers will unambiguously fall. 
 
Finally, Sachs and Shatz used the framework by Murphy, Shleifer and Vishny (1989) to show 
another potential mechanism through which international trade could affect relative wages 
without any change in relative product prices. 
In an economy with N sectors, goods in sector j can be produced either using low-skilled and 
high-skilled labour (Qj = LLS, j + LHS, j) or alternatively with a more advanced technology 
requiring a fixed cost of high-skilled labour to allow production at a lower marginal cost (Qj = 
                                                 
9 Data for the US show that import-competing industries are less high-skill intensive than export-competing industries and the non-tradables 
sectors are the most high-skill intensive (Sachs and Shatz 1996: p. 30). 
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θ[LLS, j + LHS, j]   with θ>1). Under the assumption that there is not enough high-skilled labour 
to allow for the use of the advanced technology in all sectors the scarcity of high-skilled labour 
will elicit a skill premium10. 
A monopolist owns the advanced technology. Market demand is characterised by a constant-
elasticity-of-substitution (CES) utility function (Sachs and Shatz 1996: p. 19): 
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with Cj the consumed quantity of good j and σ the constant elasticity of substitution. 
From this the demand for each sector is given as (Sachs and Shatz 1996: p. 22): 
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                                                                                             (3.15) 
 
Where P is a price index corresponding to (3.14), Y is domestic income and Y* foreign income. 
Given inelastic demand (i.e. σ < 1) the monopolist-owner of the advanced technology will set 
the price as high as possible with the upper limit determined by the possibility of other firms to 
compete with the low-tech alternative. The monopolist will use the advanced technology as 
long as market demand is large enough to cover the fixed cost of high-skilled labour. The 
monopolist can produce for domestic demand but also export to the world market. International 
trade could make the use of the advanced technology profitable even if it would not be in a 
closed economy. Potential monopolists will bid for the high-skilled workers so that their wages 
will increase until pure profits of the advanced technology production are exhausted. Trade 
liberalisation, when allowing the advanced technology to be used profitably, may thus raise the 
wage of high-skilled workers without affecting product prices or the wages of low-skilled 
workers. 
 
 
 
 
3.1.4 Sticky Wages 
                                                 
10 Sachs and Shatz (1996) actually assume that there is just enough high-skilled labour to allow for the use of the advanced technology in 
just one sector but argue that this assumption is not restrictive and could easily be relaxed. 
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As mentioned before, an assumption of the Heckscher-Ohlin model, which on empirical 
grounds seems rather problematic for the European Union, is that labour markets are perfectly 
competitive, implying that wages are fully flexible. If so, wages will absorb all effects of 
international trade, safeguarding full employment of all production factors.  
If wages on the contrary are sticky, a fall in labour demand shall result in unemployment of 
some workers. 
Labour market rigidity is often evoked to explain the high EU unemployment rates relative to 
the United States, though as mentioned before the evidence for a clear-cut equity-efficiency 
trade-off is not overwhelming and for the 1990s the OECD argued that employment 
performance in a number of EU countries improved, probably as a result of wage moderation. 
However, unemployment rates of low-skilled workers are disturbingly high in most EU 
countries, as in the United States for that matter, as shown in table 2.3 in chapter 2 and labour 
market institutions undoubtedly explain part of this poor employment performance of workers 
with little education. 
 
Krugman (1995 b) followed Brecher (1974) in considering a model of downward wage rigidity. 
He discriminated between a European model where international trade with low-wage countries 
is, given wage rigidity, assumed to affect employment and an American model where only 
wages are affected.  
If, starting from autarky, Europe would open up to trade with low-wage countries, the changes 
in supply and demand and the resulting changes in production and employment are shown in 
figure 3.10.  
 
True to the notation in the previous sections Q1 represents the high-skill intensive good XHS and 
Q2 the low-skill intensive good XLS. 
Initially, the autarky point A shows how much of the high-skill intensive respectively low-skill 
intensive good is being produced and consumed. The line tangent to the production possibilities 
curve is the budget line and the line OA is the income expansion path. 
 
As Europe is too large to be considered as a price-taker, imports from low-skill abundant 
countries will not entirely eliminate production of low-skill intensive goods in Europe. 
European production of the low-skill intensive good will decrease though, but at constant 
relative prices, until trade is balanced. 
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Figure 3.10: Adjustment of Production and Consumption in the European Model 
                        
                         Source: Krugman (1995 b). 
 
Production in Europe slopes down the Rybczynski line AR, reflecting the Rybczynski theorem, 
which implies that if the endowment of a production factor falls, the production of the good 
that relatively intensively requires that given production factor will fall. As relative prices of 
goods in the European Union are fixed by sticky factor prices, the available endowment of low-
skilled workers, at competitive factor prices, can be considered to fall. Following the Rybczynski 
theorem, production will shift from the low-skill intensive good Q2 to the high-skill intensive 
good Q1. Q is the point where trade is in equilibrium at the fixed relative product prices. The 
lower production level results in an inward shift of the budget line with consumption falling to 
point C. Krugman argued that previous estimates of the impact of trade on employment ignored 
this decrease in income and thus in domestic demand, as a result of the fall in employment. 
Assuming relative wages and relative prices do not change, the total impact can be derived from 
a look at the factor content. 
 
In figure 3.11 point A represents the autarky point with full employment of low-skilled and 
high-skilled workers. In autarky the derived demand for factors embodied in production equals 
supply. However, if income falls, derived demand will shift inwards along the income 
expansion path OA. The slope of the budget line EC equals the relative wage of high-skilled 
workers. A-E low-skilled workers are now unemployed. From figure 3.11 it is clear that 
0
A
C Q
R
Q 1
Q 2
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employment of low-skilled workers in Europe falls by EA, which is more than low-skilled 
labour embodied in imports (ED).  
 
Figure 3.11: Adjustment of Consumption and Employment in the European Model 
 
                                     Source: Adapted from Krugman (1995 b). 
 
The total employment effect of imports in Europe equals the net imports of low-skilled workers 
plus a general equilibrium multiplier effect (Krugman 1995 b: p. 354): 
 
Net imports of low-skilled labour (ED) + [Net exports of high-skilled labour (DC) x Ratio of 
low-skilled labour relative to high-skilled labour in Europe (tg α)] 
 
Krugman did not address the apparent (Keynesian) implication of the European model that 
there are no gains from international trade for countries with sticky wages, as each trade 
equilibrium point on the Rybczynski line AR falls below domestic production possibilities, as 
clearly shown in figure 3.10. 
 
In Davis (1998 a) the different impact of international trade in countries with flexible labour 
markets compared to countries with rigid labour markets is concisely reproduced, as in figure 
3.12. The Heckscher-Ohlin quadrant maps the relation between the relative world supplyt of 
high-skilled workers h (world supply of high-skilled workers HW relative to the world supply 
of low-skilled workers LW) band the relative price of the high-skill intensive good P. 
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Figure 3.12: Flexible Wages (Stolper-Samuelson) Versus Rigid Minimum Wages (Brecher) 
 
 The higher the relative world supply of high-skilled workers the lower the price of the high-
skill intensive good. The Stolper-Samuelson quadrant reflects the fall in the relative wages of 
low-skilled workers wL due to a rise in P. The integration of low-skill abundant countries in the 
world economy will lower the relative world endowment h and this will lower the wages of 
low-skilled workers in the previously integrated high-skill abundant countries. If there is 
however a minimum wage wL* which at a given world endowment h* is above the flexible wage 
wLF the according equilibrium relative goods price should be P*. At this price level the 
Heckscher-Ohlin relation shows that skill intensity of employment should be h*, which now 
shows the employed factors instead of the world endowment. Given the relative world 
endowment of high-skilled workers hW the unemployment level will be given by the relation in 
the Brecher quadrant. With a minimum wage wage wL* the unemployment level is U*.    
Given the stylised facts, showing that in most EU countries the relative employment of low-
skilled workers decreased, rather than their relative wages, in line with the general view that 
labour market institutions play an important role in the European Union, a model that accounts 
for sticky wages seems more appropriate than a model like Heckscher-Ohlin which only holds 
under the restrictive assumption that labour markets are perfectly competitive. 
 
 
            
             Source: Davis (1998 a: p. 1617). 
Stolper-Samuelson Heckscher-Ohlin 
Brecher 
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  3.1.5 Imperfect Product Market Competition 
 
Neary (2001) believed that the focus on competitive general equilibrium models restricts the 
impact of foreign competition to decreases in prices or increased imports and ignores the 
potential impact on mark-ups or profit rates. He considered oligopoly as the market structure 
that is most in line with stylised facts. 
Following Spencer and Brander (1983), he considered a model with a domestic firm involved 
in a Nash strategic competition game with a foreign firm. In a first stage both firms decide on 
their investment level, which reduces marginal costs. In the second stage the firms decide on 
their output level, maximizing their profits, considering investment as a sunken cost.  
Investment has a non-strategic motive, i.e. the decrease in marginal costs. In addition there is a 
strategic motive, as each firm will anticipate the impact of its investment decision on the other 
firm. A higher level of investment lowers costs and thereby pushes the rival firm down its output 
reaction function. This implies that there is a strategic incentive to invest above the efficient 
level (Neary 2001: pp. 11-12).  
Neary considered the impact of import quota on the equilibrium, compared to a situation of free 
trade. As a quota fixes the foreign firm’s imports, the strategic motive to (over-) invest 
disappears. 
Sales of the domestic firm will be lower with import quota but the price will be higher and 
inefficient investment does not occur. Profits may therefore be higher. 
Reducing the level of quota will incur strategic investment. As investment in R&D is assumed 
to require only high-skilled workers and production only low-skilled workers, the more 
aggressive investment by both firms will favour high-skilled workers. Without changes in 
wages, skill-biased technological change occurs. 
To assess the impact of a reduction in quota if wages change, Neary imposed a number of 
restrictions (e.g. both countries are identical, there is a continuum of identical sectors and firms 
produce either for the domestic or the foreign market). 
Neary argued that the relative wages of high-skilled workers are likely to increase, dampening 
but not reversing the initial increase in skill intensity but though the main conclusions appear 
to be robust to relaxing some of the rather restrictive assumptions (e.g. homogenous goods, 
production only requiring low-skilled workers) he considered the model more as a future 
research programme than as a full explanation of changes in skill premium in OECD countries 
due to changes in import quota in oligopolistic markets. 
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As pointed out by Neary, the model is more likely to apply to international trade between 
countries with a similar level of development than to trade with Newly Industrialised Countries. 
 
Choudri and Hakura (2001) proposed a general Ricardo-Heckscher-Ohlin model with 
monopolistic competition. The Ricardian aspect of the model reflects differences in production 
techniques between countries whereas the monopolistic competition aspect accounts for 
differentiated goods.  
Monopolistic competition is incorporated by using a Dixit-Stiglitz utility function with 
symmetrically differentiated goods which permits to model the demand in a country for a 
variety of a good produced in another country, accounting for trade barriers. Ricardian and 
Heckscher-Ohlin factors are introduced in the model by linking the price ratio to respectively 
relative productivity and relative factor prices (Choudri and Hakura 2001: p. 5). 
Using data from the OECD International Sectoral Database at the two-digit level for France, 
Germany, Italy, Japan, the United Kingdom and the United States in the period 1970-1990, to 
test the model, Choudri and Hakura (2001) found indications favouring the integrated model 
over the more specific nested Ricardian or Heckscher-Ohlin models.  
The model is proposed to derive a relation explaining relative exports of two countries to a third 
country and is not very informative with respect to the impact of international trade on income 
distribution. Empirical verification moreover requires data on productivity, factor prices and 
factor use for all country pairs considered in relation to a third trade partner. 
 
A number of Computable General Equilibrium (CGE) models that will be discussed in section 
3.2.8, model imperfect competition using a CES utility function, as proposed by Dixit and 
Stiglitz (1977). The underlying assumption of this utility function is that consumers appreciate 
variety. For a given income level, an increase in the number of differentiated goods increases 
consumers’ utility. Firms will earn a mark-up that will depend on their market share. As goods 
within the same industry are not perfect substitutes, the impact of imports will be less substantial 
than if product markets were fully competitive and goods would be perfect substitutes.  
Smith (1999) argued that the Dixit-Stiglitz model accounts for intra-industry trade, which is a 
generally acknowledged aspect of trade between developed countries that cannot easily be 
explained by traditional trade theories. He found that even trade between the European Union 
and developing countries is for a substantial part intra-industry, though he admitted that the 
three-digit level he considered is probably too aggregated to substantiate this claim. 
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There may moreover be a qualitative difference between intra-industry trade among developed 
countries, reflecting the consumers’ preference for differentiated goods and increasing returns 
to scale (e.g. Helpman and Krugman 1985) and North-South intra-industry trade, reflecting the 
outsourcing by the North, of low-skill intensive fragments of production processes, to the South 
(see section 3.1.2).   
  
Dinopoulos, Syropoulos and Xu (2002) presented a model of Chamberlinian monopolistic 
competition between two countries, with endogenous factor supplies (i.e. the supply of high-
skilled workers rises with the skill premium). Following Krugman (1979), the Dixit-Stiglitz 
demand side of the model implies that trade liberalisation will increase the elasticity of demand 
and, as a result of free entry, force firms to move down along their average cost curves. 
However, due to internal economies of scale the output as well as total factor productivity of 
firms will increase. 
The authors relaxed the assumption of homotheticity in production and assumed that an increase 
in output raises the skill intensity of production. If the production function is assumed to be 
homothetic factor intensity does not depend on firms’ output level.  
The model predicts that trade liberalisation will result in an increase in the skill premium as 
well as in an increase in the relative employment of high-skilled workers, an increase in total 
factor productivity, the output of the representative firm and the number of product varieties. 
According to the authors the model is in line with the stylised facts for the United States, where 
both the relative wages and employment of high-skilled workers appear to have increased in 
the 1980s. 
 
Most product markets in industrialised countries are unlikely to meet the assumption of perfect 
competition. New Trade theories explained the phenomenon of intra-industry trade by 
considering economies of scale and differentiated goods. However, these models seem more 
attuned to trade between countries with similar relative factor endowment and technological 
levels than to North-South trade for which differences in factor endowment are probably more 
important driving forces than consumers' love of variety.   
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3.1.6 Union Bargaining and International Trade 
 
 
In the European model proposed by Krugman (1995 b), described in section 3.1.4, sticky wages 
are explicitly accounted for but the labour market institutions that could cause wage rigidity are 
not specified.  
Considering institutional factors that may explain sticky wages, labour unions will undoubtedly 
pop up in the minds of many economists.  
Agell (1999) instanced the evidence that generous unemployment benefits of long duration and 
strong but uncoordinated unions generate unemployment but argued that the evidence on the 
impact of other labour market institutions like job security, minimum wages or the tax wedge 
on labour income is mixed at best. 
Leamer (1999) supposed that most economists associate minimum wages with unemployment 
as they assume one-dimensional labour contracts that only stipulate wages. However, when 
considering that working conditions as well as wages are bargained for, minimum wages 
legislation may be met with adjustments in working conditions (e.g. effort) that guarantee full 
employment. 
Apparently, recent surveys on wage rigidity and laboratory studies of reciprocal behaviour 
suggest that social norms could cause wage rigidity, independently of legal constraints11. Legal 
reform, therefore, will not always prove to be very effective.  
In a contraire view, Agell (1999) reasoned that some labour market rigidities could actually be 
useful and that globalisation could call forth some rigidities rather than more labour market 
flexibility, as is commonly expected. His main argument is that as labour markets are 
instruments of social insurance, increased external risks (e.g. linked to globalisation) will raise 
the demand for more insurance (Agell 1999: pp. F143-F144). Rodrik (1997) developed a similar 
argument.  
Manning (2004) raised the possibility that the implicit assumption in the efficiency-equality 
trade-off debate, namely that labour markets are perfectly competitive in the absence of 
intervention, may be wrong. If it is costly for workers to change jobs, information about job 
opportunities is not perfect or workers have some non-wage preferences, wage elasticity of the 
labour supply with respect to an individual firm may not be infinitely elastic as assumed and 
the labour market could be characterised by monopsony. Manning presented a model in which 
                                                 
11 These findings remind Agell (1999: p. F145) of Keynes (1936) who seemed to explain wage rigidity by aspects of the human psyche rather 
than by unions or government regulation.  
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some labour market institutions (minimum wages, unions and unemployment benefits with a 
job search requirement) actually improve efficiency in monopsonistic labour markets.  
 
If labour unions have some bargaining power with respect to employers, they could claim part 
of (supernormal) profits, such that workers get paid wages above their marginal product, as a 
result of which firms will tend to employ less workers. To the extent that unions bargain for 
supernormal profits, i.e. profits due to imperfect competition in product markets, union 
bargaining power and product market power may actually be linked. Import penetration is likely 
to increase product market competition and thereby infringe upon the bargaining position of 
unions. If moreover firms have an increasingly credible threat to relocate activities abroad 
through foreign direct investment or outsourcing, union bargaining power may further be 
weakened. As unions are reported to reduce wage inequality, the negative impact of 
internationalisation on the bargaining power of unions might be an explanation for increased 
wage inequality and an improved employment record (as occurred in a number of EU countries 
in the 1990s, see section 2.1) or rising unemployment if unions become more wage-oriented in 
response to intensified import penetration as argued by Gaston  (1998).    
 
Aidt and Tzannatos (2002) summarized the net benefits of unions as participatory and dispute 
resolution benefits minus monopoly costs and rent-seeking costs. Whether the net benefits are 
positive depends on the size of the three terms. 
Unions may be beneficial if through consultation and collective agreements they reduce 
conflicts between workers and employers. Better working conditions could result in lower 
labour turnover and higher productivity. 
 
If unions can monopolize the labour supply they have a strong position to bargain with firms 
for supernormal profits, associated with imperfect product markets or government regulations. 
The monopoly position of unions can result in the passing on of higher wages to product prices 
or the reallocation of labour to non-unionised sectors due to the increased relative price of 
labour in unionised sectors.   
McDonald and Solow (1981) proposed an efficient bargaining framework, in which unions and 
firms bargain for both wages and employment.  
The expected utility function of a union can be represented by (Smith 2003: p. 210): 
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U= L (U(wu) - U(wa))                                                                                                          (3.16) 
where L is the employment level, wu is the wage obtained by unions and wa is the outside option 
for unions (alternative wage). 
A family of union indifference curves (I3> I2> I1> I0) and a family of isoprofit curves (π3> π2> 
π1> π0) is represented in figure 3.13. The labour demand curve LD links the peaks of the isoprofit 
curves. 
 
Figure 3.13: Labour Demand and the Contract Curve in an Efficient Bargaining Framework 
 
 
Point A is an efficient outcome but the firm will prefer a point like B (higher profits) to A 
whereas a union has no preference of A over B. The union will prefer a point like C (higher 
utility) to A whereas a firm is indifferent with respect to A and C. Any point between B and C 
provides a Pareto welfare improvement on point A. The curve connecting the tangency points 
between the isoprofit curves and the union indifference curves is defined as the contract curve. 
Except for the intersection of the contract curve with the labour demand curve (where wages 
equal the lower bound wa), bargained wages will exceed the marginal product of labour and 
moreover firms will employ more workers at the negotiated wage level than they would in the 
absence of unions. 
The minimum profit constraint πmin, e.g. imposed by shareholders or the capital market, 
provides the upper bound for negotiation. Efficient bargaining results in an efficient outcome 
                 Source: Smith (2003: p. 212). 
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from the perspective of the firm and the union, not from the perspective of allocation, as wages 
exceed the marginal product of labour (Smith 2003: pp. 211-213). 
 
Unions will try to obtain a wage-employment combination as close to the constraint πmin 
whereas a firm will try to obtain a wage-employment point at which wages are as close to the 
marginal product of labour as possible. The bargaining strength of the union will determine the 
outcome.  
If unions are only concerned with maximizing the wage mark-up wu - wa, rather than an upward 
sloping contract curve as in figure 3.13, the contract curve would be vertical, as shown by 
contract curve C2 in figure 3.14. 
Unions will try to bargain for a larger share of the rent, leaving the employment level 
unaffected. If a union would be wage-oriented, i.e. clearly prefer wages to employment, the 
contract curve may even be downward sloping as C3 in figure 3.14. 
 
 Figure 3.14: Position of the Contract Curve in an Efficient Bargaining Framework depending 
on the Degree of the Union's Wage Orientation 
 
A decrease in union power will shift the bargaining outcome towards LD. Dependent on the 
position of the contract curve this will have a different outcome. 
If the contract curve is upward sloping, a fall in union bargaining power will result in a fall in 
wages as well as in employment. 
 
                 Source: Smith (2003: p. 213). 
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If the contract curve is vertical, a decrease in union power will only affect wages and if the 
contract curve is downward sloping, wages will fall but employment will actually increase. As 
pointed out by Smith (2003) the position of the contract curve is an empirical matter that cannot 
be settled at the theoretical level. 
A right-to-manage model is an alternative to the efficient bargaining framework. In this model 
the firm and the union bargain for the wage level, after which the firm unilaterally determines 
the employment level. A monopoly union model is a special case of the right-to-manage model 
in which unions are assumed to set the wages unilaterally, after which the firm sets the 
employment level unilaterally. 
In a right-to-manage framework the firm will take an employment point on its labour demand 
curve where wages equal the marginal product of labour. In this framework a fall in union 
bargaining power will unambiguously decrease the wage level and increase the employment 
level (Smith 2003: p. 214-215). 
 
If firms are forced to share their profits with workers, capital investment and R&D activities 
may be depressed (Aidt and Tzannatos 2002: pp. 24-25).    
 
Unions can also induce rent-seeking costs, if they push for policies that reduce competition on 
product markets (as this will increase the supernormal rents) or labour markets (e.g. minimum 
wages).  
 
Reviewing the evidence from microeconomic studies, Aidt and Tzannatos (2002) concluded 
that unions are apparently successful in raising the wages of union members or of all workers 
covered by collective agreements. There is also ample evidence that unions, which dominantly 
recruit low-paid workers, reduce wage inequality between low-skilled and high-skilled workers 
(e.g. Freeman 1980; Blau and Kahn 1996; Aidt and Tzannatos 2002 and Card, Lemieux and 
Riddell 2003). Aidt and Tzannatos argued that this tendency to reduce the skill premium, which 
at first thought suggests reduced returns to skill acquisition (e.g. Deardorff 1999) may actually 
increase human capital formation if low-skilled workers are fired due to the increased relative 
wages and are therefore forced to require skills to find a job. Agell (1999) made a similar point. 
 
Institutional characteristics like union density and the level at which bargaining takes place 
(firm, sector or national level) are relevant factors that affect the impact of unions on economic 
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performance. Countries characterised by coordinated collective bargaining tend to have lower 
unemployment rates and a more compressed wage distribution. However, only the latter result 
is somewhat robust, as the relationship between coordination and economic performance 
weakens substantially when cross-country differences in policy, institutions and conditions are 
accounted for (Aidt and Tzannatos 2002: p. 104). 
Aidt and Tzannatos also found little evidence in favour of the popular hump hypothesis (i.e. a 
U-shaped relationship between economic performance and the level of bargaining 
coordination), which puts that semi-coordinated collective bargaining leads to worse outcomes 
than both coordinated and uncoordinated collective bargaining. 
 
According to Blanchflower, Oswald and Sanfey (1992) data on US manufacturing industries in 
the period 1964 to 1985, are consistent with a labour contract framework with risk-averse firms 
but clearly not consistent with a model of competitive labour markets. This would indicate that 
even for the United States, the assumption of competitive labour markets is too heroic. 
Among the first to consider wage bargaining in an open economy were Lawrence and Lawrence 
(1985) who considered a monopoly union framework to assess the impact of long-run changes 
in demand (e.g. due to cheaper imports) on wage differentials. 
The utility function for an individual union member can be given as (Lawrence and Lawrence 
1985: p. 54): 
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where L denotes the number of union members that are employed and N is the fixed total 
number of union members. U(w) is the utility of a job in the unionised sector and )w(U is the 
utility of receiving the reservation wage w , i.e. the wage in a less unionised sector or the 
unemployment benefit. L/N is considered as the probability of a union member to be employed 
in the given (unionised) sector and 1-L/N the probability that the union member is employed in 
another sector or benefits some unemployment compensation.   
Under the assumption that the utility functions of individual members can be summed the 
maximization by unions can, following McDonald and Solow (1981), be given as: 
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with )w(UU  12subject to the aggregate derived labour demand in the industry considered. 
Lawrence and Lawrence considered a Constant Elasticity of Substitution (CES) function to 
model production technology and the (inverse) aggregate demand curve of the industry: 
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where P is the international product price index, Z autonomous demand, Y aggregate demand,  
β the constant elasticity of demand and V is a stochastic demand shifter. 
If foreign firms can produce substitutes for domestic goods at lower costs this would be 
reflected in a negative value for V. Changes in international competitiveness could also affect 
demand elasticity β (Lawrence and Lawrence 1985: pp. 54-55).  
 
From the production function, the first-order maximization conditions and the aggregate 
demand, the demand for labour can be derived (Lawrence and Lawrence 1985: p.55): 
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with w and r the rewards of respectively labour and capital, α and ρ are technology parameters 
from the CES production function and 


1
1 is the elasticity of substitution between labour 
and capital. 
The union is assumed to choose wages (w) and employment (L) such that (3.17) is maximized, 
equating the elasticity of the gain in utility from employment with respect to the wage rate, with 
the elasticity of the derived labour demand. 
If cheaper imports of substitutes, changes in tastes or a decrease in income shifts domestic 
product demand inwards, unions will keep wages unchanged. If the rental rate is also considered 
fixed and capital is mobile or short-lived, labour and capital will be reduced equiproportionally. 
However, wages and the capital-labour ratio could be affected if the demand shift changes the 
elasticity of the derived demand.  
                                                 
12 )w(UDU u with D the fixed additive disutility of holding a job and wu the standard of living that would be 
achievable if a worker is not employed by the firm (e.g. unemployment benefit).   
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If capital is long-lived and sector-specific (e.g. steel, shipbuilding) it cannot be transferred on 
the spot and the elasticity of the demand for labour may be low. The impact of a common 
demand shock thus depends on the nature of the capital stock in a given industry and wages 
could behave differently, as a result of which inter-industry wage differences could increase 
(Lawrence and Lawrence 1985: pp. 55-56). 
Lawrence and Lawrence considered an extreme case of an industry in which capital is infinitely 
long-lived and unions are faced with a permanent reduction in demand. As long as revenue is 
higher than variable costs, firms will continue production but they will no longer invest in new 
capital. If capital is fixed, as a result of the reduced substitution possibilities between capital 
and labour, labour demand elasticity will decrease. If the effect of low elasticity of substitution 
dominates the effect of the downward shift in demand, wages will tend to rise in this "end 
game", i.e. a situation where unions are aware of the fact that firms no longer consider any new 
capital investment.   
If cheaper imports increase the elasticity of demand β, capital-intensive industries with little 
possibilities to substitute labour for capital will actually witness an increase in wages. The 
authors argued that the case of the US steel industry in the period 1970-1984 is in line with the 
predictions that can be derived from the "end game" framework. They considered the level of 
protection of the steel industry in the United States as too small to explain the increase in hourly 
wages by 27 per cent in the 1970s, despite stagnating demand and investment. As plants started 
to close and demand fell sharply, wages decreased by 12 per cent between 1982 and 1984.   
 
Bhagwati and Deheija (1994) proposed a general equilibrium insider-outsider model to assess 
the impact of import competition on rents and jobs, bargained for by unions. The economy is 
assumed to consist of an unionised sector A (e.g. autos) and a rest sector R, which is assumed 
to be non-unionised and competitive. 
The model is graphically depicted in figure 3.15. 
 
The MP lines reflect marginal product. OA is the number of union members (insiders) and AO’ 
the number of non-unionised workers (outsiders), thus OO’ is the economy-wide labour supply. 
Employment in sector A is shown from the origin O and employment in sector R from the origin 
O’. 
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Figure 3.15: Impact of Import Competition on Union Rents in an Insider-Outsider Model 
 
 
                                                 Source: Bhagwati and Deheija (1994) . 
 
In sector A, unions will bargain for a wage that ensures that all its OA members (insiders) are 
employed. If this wage W is legislated as a national minimum wage, employment in sector R 
will be determined by the point at which the wage equals the marginal product. Unemployment 
of non-unionised workers (AB) may and probably will occur. To ensure full employment wages 
in sector R should fall to V (Bhagwati and Deheija 1994: pp.66-67) 
Assuming wages in sector R are flexible enough to ensure full employment, Bhagwati and 
Deheija consider what would happen if the relative price of the good produced by sector A (pA) 
would drop, e.g. due to increased import competition. 
 
The marginal product line of sector A will shift inwards and the union will have to accept a 
drop in the wages, from W to X, if it wants to ensure employment for all its members. Real 
wages expressed in the price of sector A will remain constant, but expressed in terms of the 
price in sector R will have decreased. If the fall in trade terms is not expected by the union they 
will stick to a wage level W, as result of which only OC union members will be employed by 
sector A. The rest of the union members will have to join the army of workers in sector R, 
where all O'C workers will be employed at the low wage level Y (Bhagwati and Deheija 1994: 
pp. 67-68).  
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Bhagwati and Deheija claimed that the insider-outsider bargaining model is consistent with the 
situation in the United States, where wages fell and employment hardly changed. Within the 
model, unions expecting a downward shift in demand, accepting a reduction in wages to ensure 
full employment, could explain this. As according to the authors, wages did not change much 
in the European but unemployment increased, they reason that European unions may not have 
foreseen the drop in demand or did not allow for a market-clearing decrease in wages.    
 
Bhagwati (1995), though clearly favouring a skill-biased technological change explanation of 
increased wage inequality to a trade competition explanation, pointed out that, within a 
bargaining framework, employers will gain in bargaining power if they can credibly threaten to 
relocate production to low-wage countries.      
Bluestone and Harrison (1982) apparently already argued that multinational enterprises 
strategically played off one group of workers against another in a global economy (Gaston 
1998: p.3).  
 
Gaston and Nelson (1997) reasoned that as most industrialised countries have fairly similar 
factor endowment and technology, and witnessed similar (trade) shocks, differences in labour 
market institutions could explain the established cross-country differences in trends of wage 
inequality. Two of the countries that witnessed the sharpest increase in wage inequality, i.e. the 
United Kingdom and the United States, also witnessed a substantial fall in union membership.   
 
Abowd and Lemieux (1993) and Borjas and Ramey (1993) developed a model of bargaining 
between a union and a firm for the rent that follows from imperfect product market competition, 
which is modelled by Cournot competition between the domestic employer and a foreign firm. 
The framework by Borjas and Ramey suggests that import penetration has a larger impact on 
relative wages in a sector, the more concentrated that sector is, as rents are transferred from 
low-skilled workers towards foreign producers and these rents are high in concentrated sectors.   
 
Gaston (1998) developed a model that can explain the decentralisation of wage bargaining, 
which occurred in most OECD countries (e.g. Freeman and Gibbons 1993)13. The model also 
explains why unions will tend to become more wage-oriented in response to increased trade 
                                                 
13 Freeman and Gibbons see the diverging interests of high-skilled and low-skilled workers and private-sector and public-sector unions as the 
main cause for the decentralisation of wage bargaining.  
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competition and the threat of relocation towards low-wage countries. Despite risk-neutrality of 
underlying preferences, unions will prefer contracts that involve higher wages and greater 
employment risk. Gaston rationalises this result as the outcome of a political economic 
equilibrium. In response to the threat of firms to outsource production abroad unions adapt their 
bargaining position.  
If unions bargain for wages as well as for employment, the impact on wages and employment 
depends on the nature of the bargaining process, the bargaining power of the union and union 
preferences with respect to wages and employment (e.g. McDonald and Solow 1981; Oswald 
1985; Holmlund, Løfgren and Engstrøm 1989 and Mezzetti and Dinopoulos 1991).  In a right-
to-manage framework, with unions and employers only bargaining for wages, a weakening of 
the union’s bargaining strength will result in falling wages and employment could remain 
constant. In an efficient bargaining setting (where wages and employment are included in the 
bargaining process), a trade-off between wages and employment reduction will occur provided 
that the union values wages more than employment.  In the opposite situation, one rather 
expects that wages and employment change synchronically. 
 
Collective bargaining is an important aspect of the wage setting process in many EU countries. 
As institutional differences between countries are generally considered to explain a 
considerable part of the differences in labour market performance, a bargaining framework may 
offer a convenient way to estimate the impact of international trade on wages and employment, 
by assessing differences in bargaining regimes, union power and union preferences. 
Given the empirical evidence that unions tend to recruit low-skilled workers disproportionally, 
a negative impact of globalisation on union bargaining power could explain the weakened 
labour market position of low-skilled workers.  
The different impact of international trade on wages and employment, depending on the 
bargaining regime and union preferences, could explain the mixed pattern found for EU 
countries in chapter 2. 
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    3.2 The Empirics 
 
 
In a review of the evidence on international trade theory Leamer and Levinsohn (1995) 
suggested not to take trade theory too seriously but not to treat it too casually either. 
The first part of the suggestion follows from the need to understand that no theory should be 
taken as literally ‘true’ and that it is debatable to claim to ‘test’ a given theorem with noisy data. 
Trade theories should be used to ‘estimate’ certain relationships within a given theoretical 
framework that suits the specific research domain. With the second part of their suggestion the 
authors argued that if empirical results are to be enduring, there should be a clear connection 
between theory and the data  (Leamer and Levinsohn 1995: p. 1-2). 
Leamer (1998) contended that empirical work should clearly address the aggregation/ 
heterogeneity problem. The Heckscher-Ohlin model with two production factors and two goods 
offers clear-cut predictions. As shown in the theoretical section things become a bit more 
complicated in models with a higher dimension. Production factors and goods can be 
aggregated to fit a two goods-two factors model but this would mean aggregating heterogeneous 
goods and factors.   
In this section I review the different empirical methodological approaches that have been used 
to assess the labour market effects of international trade between high-skill abundant countries 
and low-skill abundant countries. The underlying assumptions and the theoretical framework 
as well as the strength and limitations of the different methodologies are discussed and the main 
results are reported.  
The empirical work predominately focused on the United States, whereas for Europe only a 
relatively small number of single country studies and almost no panel studies have been 
published. Given the substantial differences between the United States and the European Union 
as well as intra-EU heterogeneity, the results of previous empirical studies cannot simply be 
generalized for the whole European Union.  
In part II, I report the results of own empirical work for a panel of EU countries.  In section 3.3, 
I use the overview of the empirical literature to justify why in part II some empirical procedures 
have been used and why others have not. 
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3.2.1 Circumstantial Evidence 
 
 
From the discussion in section 3.1.1 it follows that a number of predictions can be derived from 
the Heckscher-Ohlin model. A high-skill abundant country is expected to witness, as a result of 
falling trade barriers, an increase in its output (and exports) of skill-intensive goods, a fall in 
the relative prices of low-skill intensive goods, a fall in the wages of low-skilled workers and 
an increase in the relative employment of low-skilled workers in all sectors. For the 1980s the 
first and the third prediction seem to be consistent with data for the United States but the 
evolution of relative prices has been a much-debated issue. Following the Stolper-Samuelson 
theorem international trade affects factor rewards through changes in relative goods prices.  
                                         
Lawrence and Slaughter (1993) and Bhagwati and Dehejia (1994) found little evidence in US 
data of decreased relative prices of low-skill intensive goods for the 1980s and reasoned that 
this points at other factors than international trade to explain increased wage inequality. Hall 
(1994) and Neary (2001) uttered that the finding that high-skill intensive goods have not 
become more expensive is actually not supportive of any theory of structural change, including 
skill-biased technological change, as technological change that would have displaced low-
skilled workers by using cheaper technology should have decreased relative prices of low-skill 
intensive goods as well.  
 
As discussed in section 3.1.2, Sachs and Shatz (1996) proposed a number of non-Stolper-
Samuelson mechanisms through which North-South trade may affect factor rewards without 
necessarily affecting relative output prices. Apart from the theoretical argument that lack of 
evidence on relative price changes does not imply that international trade may not have affected 
relative wages they diagnosed some shortcomings in the Lawrence and Slaughter (1993) 
analysis. They first objected that the data Lawrence and Slaughter used only covered some 50 
sectors and for even a lower number of sectors the data covered the entire period. The import 
and export price data were not adjusted for productivity or quality changes. Finally, they pointed 
at the substantial international trade occurring between affiliates of the same firm. International 
transfer prices may differ from prices set in arms-length transactions.  
Moreover, using data on domestic output prices for 450 US manufacturing industries for the 
period 1978-1989 and additional data on 410 industries for the period 1989-1995, Sachs and 
Shatz found rather robust evidence that prices in high-skill intensive industries rose more 
rapidly than prices in low-skill intensive industries, in line with the Heckscher-Ohlin prediction.  
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Krueger (1997) using data on 150 US manufacturing industries in the period 1989-1995, also 
found evidence that prices increased relatively less in industries that use low-skilled workers 
intensively.  
 
Feenstra and Hanson (1996) derived a modified Stolper-Samuelson theorem within a theoretical 
model explaining foreign outsourcing (see section 3.1.3), linking prices of intermediate inputs, 
rather than prices of final goods, to factor prices. They reconsidered the evidence by Lawrence 
and Slaughter (1993) and found that for the countries they considered (Germany, Japan and the 
United States) domestic prices did indeed increase more than import prices, as predicted by 
their modified Stolper-Samuelson theorem.  
 
For 450 US manufacturing industries Leamer (1998) found that correlations between price 
changes and some industry indicators (e.g. capital per worker, non-production workers’ 
employment share) reveal that price changes did not matter for relative wages in the 1960s, 
lowered the relative wages of production workers in the 1970 whereas in the 1980s it would 
have been capital that suffered and all labour groups would have gained though he subjoined 
that these simple correlations are suggestive at best and argued that multiple regressions on 
factor shares are needed for more reliable conclusions. 
 
Borjas and Ramey (1994) used data from the US Current Population Surveys for the period 
1964-1991 to perform cointegration tests on time series of the average wage differential 
between college graduates and high school dropouts and the average wage differential between 
college graduates and high school graduates. Relative wages appeared to contain a stochastic 
rather than a deterministic trend. First differencing or de-trending the data, as done in most 
previous studies, will eliminate the informative trend component whereas the relevant issue is 
precisely to find out what causes the long term persistent change in the relative wages. 
Cointegration tests as proposed by Engle and Granger (1987) establish whether two non-
stationary time series share a common stochastic trend. Borjas and Ramey considered a number 
of potential determinants that could explain changes in relative wages and tried to find out 
which of these variables is cointegrated with the time series of relative wages: the ratio of 
college graduates relative to high school graduates, the unemployment rate, percentage of 
workers that are not member of a union, percentage of immigrants in the population, female 
labour participation, R&D intensity, net imports of durables as a percentage of GDP and net 
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exports of durables as a percentage of GDP. Throughout the period 1963-1988 imports of 
durables seemed to be the variable that most closely concurred with relative wages and to a 
lesser extent also R&D expenditures per worker. The null hypothesis of non-cointegration with 
relative wages could only be rejected for net imports as a percentage of GDP.  
 
If anything, the empirical studies that tested some of the predictions of the Stolper-Samuelson 
theorem mainly by looking at simple correlations provided circumstantial rather than 
conclusive evidence. Clearly, any serious analysis should account for factors that may interact 
with predicted ceteris paribus relationships. Even if relative wages of low-skilled workers 
would have increased international trade may still have had a negative impact on these wages. 
The increase would then only indicate that other determinants of wages probably offset this 
negative impact.  
Moreover, by only considering Stolper-Samuelson effects, these studies ignore the non-
Heckscher-Ohlin mechanisms, discussed in section 3.1, through which international trade can 
affect factor rewards. 
 
 
3.2.2 Decomposition Analysis 
 
Decomposition analysis provided a seemingly sophisticated instrument to test the Heckscher-
Ohlin prediction that international trade results in changes between industries rather than 
changes within industries. 
In the Heckscher-Ohlin model trade liberalisation will shift output from industries where a 
country has a comparative disadvantage to industries where a country has a comparative 
advantage. As a result employment in the latter industries will increase and employment in the 
first industries will fall.   
 
Katz and Murphy (1991) used data from the Current Population Surveys over the period 1963-
1987, covering some 1.4 million workers in the United States, to distinguish 64 labour groups, 
classified by gender, four education levels and eight levels of professional experience. Katz and 
Murphy decomposed employment shifts into a within-industry and a between-industry 
component. They claimed that the within-industry shift is mainly explained by skill-biased 
technological change, changes in prices of non-labour inputs and foreign outsourcing. 
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On the other hand, they explained the between-industry shift by product demand shifts, sector-
biased technological change and international trade.  
They found that between-industry demand shifts were substantial for the 1960s, 1970s and the 
1980s but too modest to outweigh the downward relative wage pressure of the increase in 
relative factor supply and therefore argued that the within-industry demand shift should explain 
the observed rise in the US skill premium in the 1980s, especially as the between-industry 
demand shift slowed down in the 1980s.  
 
Bound and Johnson (1992) proposed a decomposition of the wage changes of different 
demographic groups into four components to discriminate between four explanations that have 
been put forward to explain rising US wage inequality in the 1980s: international trade, union 
power, technological change and labour supply. 
 
Bound and Johnson found little evidence that labour supply changes, product demand shifts 
(e.g. due to international trade competition) and unions affected relative wages and claimed that 
their analysis strongly supported the view that skill-biased technological change and changes 
in unmeasured labour quality were the dominant explanations for the rising wage inequality by 
education level in the United States in the 1980s. 
 
Berman, Bound and Griliches (1993) decomposed the aggregate change in the employment 
share of non-production workers into a within-industry term and a between-industry 
component. 
They considered changes over the business cycles 1959-1973, 1973-1979 and 1979-1987, using 
data on 450 US manufacturing industries from the Annual Survey of Manufacturing.  
Imports and exports only appeared to explain 29 per cent of the between-industry component 
and only three per cent of the within-industry component for the last period.  
Assuming that imports displace production workers but not non-production workers and that 
imports embody the same amount of production labour and no non-production labour Berman, 
Bound and Griliches found that imports explained only a small part of the change in the 
employment share of production workers but also found that foreign outsourcing which 
appeared to be a an important phenomenon in some individual industries (motor industry and 
semiconductors) could explain more than 100 per cent of the shift away from production 
workers. Nonetheless, they argued that foreign outsourcing was too restricted to some specific 
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industries to explain a large part of the skill upgrading that occurred in US manufacturing in 
the 1970s and 1980s. 
 
Berman, Bound and Machin (1998) decomposed the employment and wage bill shares of non-
production workers for twelve OECD countries for the 1970s and the 1980s. Their results 
suggested that the finding for the United States of skill-biased technological change as the 
dominant explanation for skill upgrading seemed to hold for most OECD countries as the 
within-industry component clearly dominated the between-industry component. OECD (1998) 
provided similar evidence for OECD countries with more pronounced conclusions if skill 
groups were proxied by education level rather than by occupation (production/ non-production).   
 
Bernard and Jensen (1997) decomposed the share of non-production workers in total 
employment or their share in the total wage bill but instead of using industry level data used 
plant level data from the Annual Survey of Manufactures of the US Census Bureau for the 
period 1976-1987, covering some 50.000 manufacturing plants.    
The data supported the view that an industry level analysis ignores substantial heterogeneity 
across plants and their results suggested that demand changes across plants, associated with 
exports, were a major source for rising wage inequality whereas skill-upgrading due to 
technological change did not appear to be a important determinant of employment shifts across 
plants.  
 
With Cline (1997: p. 54) I believe that a decomposition analysis, though seemingly providing 
a meticulous and exhaustive demonstration of the impact of international trade and 
technological change, is a rather mechanical accounting method, resting on a number of 
assumptions that are not tested and attributing the entire unexplained residual to technological 
change. Most industry level data undoubtedly conceal a high degree of intra-industry 
heterogeneity, which makes decomposing changes into between-industry and within-industry 
terms rather uninformative. Moreover, when accounting for foreign outsourcing and other 
mechanisms, international trade can explain within-industry changes as well as between-
industry changes.    
 
 
 
3.2.3 Factor Content Calculations 
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Factor content calculations are probably the most controversial empirical methodology to assess 
the impact of international trade on labour markets. 
The main idea is that trade flows embody the production factors required to produce the traded 
goods and that from this factor content the impact on labour demand (or supply) can be 
estimated. 
Borjas, Freeman and Katz (1991) mapped trade flows into equivalent production factors, using 
data on the labour input in domestic manufacturing industries in the United States for the 1980s. 
They focused on the direct labour supply, thus ignoring indirect effects through input-output 
linkages.  
The labour supply equivalent of trade flows of labour group i in year t is: 
 
 






j
jtij
jt
jt
it LaQ
T
L                                                                                                            (3.21) 
 
Where Lit denotes the total amount of labour group i required to produce output and Tjt, Qjt, Ljt 
and aij denote respectively trade flows, output, labour input and the average proportion of 
workers in the i-th group in industry j. Borjas, Freeman and Katz considered equation (3.21) in 
which international trade is assumed to affect production and non-production workers in a 
similar way but alternatively considered a specification in which imports are assumed to affect 
production workers only. Using Current Population Surveys data for the period 1964-1988 they 
divided workers into 64 groups based on gender, four education levels and eight experience 
levels.  
 
The results suggested that in the 1960s and the 1970s international trade did not affect workers 
substantially. In the 1980s, when the United States witnessed an increasing trade deficit, trade 
substantially increased the supply of workers with little education (i.e. high school dropouts). 
Under the assumption that imported goods reduce employment of production workers more 
than employment of non-production workers Borjas, Freeman and Katz regressed the change 
in the employment share of production workers on the change in imports relative to the sum of 
imports and sales, the change in the ratio of exports to sales and the change in sales. Following 
the results of these regressions for the period 1960-1985, changes in import ratios reduced the 
employment share of production workers whereas the change in the export ratio did not seem 
to have a significant impact.  
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Estimations suggest that trade as well as immigration altered the relative supply and thereby 
explain a substantial part of the observed decrease in the relative wages of high school dropouts 
in the 1980s. 
 
Sachs and Shatz (1994) performed factor content calculations on 51 manufacturing industries, 
using input-output data from the US Department of Commerce. The results suggested that the 
rise in imports from developing countries in the period 1978-1990 caused a decrease of 6.2 per 
cent in production employment and a decrease of 4.3 per cent in non-production employment 
relative to the 1978 manufacturing employment level. The impact of trade with developed 
countries on employment was more modest. Aggregating the 51 manufacturing industries into 
deciles according to skill intensity (production workers’ share) furthermore clearly indicated 
that low-skill intensive industries witnessed the sharpest decline in employment. Employment 
in the most skill intensive decile of industries increased due to trade.  
 
In the undoubtedly most elaborated and most debated factor content calculations of trade 
between industrialised and industrialising countries, Wood (1994) stated that previous factor 
content calculations underrated the impact of North-South trade as in most of these studies 
imports were assumed to affect low-skilled and high-skilled workers in an equal way whereas 
he assumed that imports from developing countries were non-competing (i.e. not produced in 
developed countries anymore)14. Using domestic labour input coefficients therefore 
underestimates the low-skill labour content of imported goods, which will be more low-skill 
intensive than the goods produced in high-skill abundant countries. Wood recalculated the US 
factor content estimations by Sachs and Shatz (1994) for a panel of developed countries, using 
labour input coefficients of developing countries rather than the domestic labour input 
coefficients of developed countries to estimate the labour content of imports. The results for 
1990 suggested that the relative demand for workers with little education decreased by more 
than 20 per cent whereas the Sachs and Shatz estimate indicated a modest 2 per cent decrease. 
Wood considered even these estimates to be biased downward as they ignore trade-induced 
technological change. Accounting for defensive innovation by firms in developed countries 
doubled the labour content estimates. 
                                                 
14 An implication of Wood’s argument that imports from the South are non-competing seems to be that all harm has been done and that further 
trade liberalisation will have no impact on labour markets in the North but will rather lift all boats, unless Southern countries would catch up 
with the relative factor endowment or technological level of Northern countries so that they can start to compete in more skill-intensive goods.  
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As mentioned in section 3.1.1.2, Acemoglu (1999), Dinopoulos and Segerstrom (1999), 
Chusseau (2002), Ethier (2002) and Thoenig and Verdier (2003) provided a theoretical 
foundation for Wood’s argument of trade-induced technological change. 
Lawrence (2000) used data on US manufacturing industries in the period 1978-1989 to estimate 
the impact of international trade competition on total factor productivity and the skill ratio. 
Import competition of developing countries appeared to have induced faster TFP growth in US 
industries though the results were rather sensitive with respect to the specification and 
estimation procedure and there were indications of a causal relationship between trade 
competition and technological change that runs in both directions (Lawrence 2000: p. 216). 
Burtless (1995) perceived some inconsistency between Wood’s argument of non-competing 
imports and technological change induced by North-South trade. If imports from developing 
countries would be fully non-competing there would not be much pressure from these imports 
on firms in developed countries to save on low-skilled workers.  
To find out to which extent international trade induced wage inequality Sachs and Shatz (1994) 
summed up some factors that make this kind of analysis more complicated than plain factor 
content calculations. First of all, manufacturing employment represents a small share of the 
total labour force. Labour markets tend to be segmented, not only between manufacturing and 
non-manufacturing, but even within manufacturing and wages are, in addition to general 
equilibrium market forces, also determined by rents, union bargaining and disequilibria, which 
may be enduring. Details on workers and industry characteristics should also be accounted for. 
Sachs and Shatz reasoned that even if one assumed labour markets were fully integrated, a 10 
per cent decrease in the demand for low-skilled workers would only imply a small impact on 
the economy-wide demand for low-skilled workers and that the observed employment effects 
of international trade seem too modest to explain the large increase in wage inequality (Sachs 
and Shatz 1994: p. 33). 
 
In contrast with most circumstantial evidence and the results of decomposition analysis, a 
number of factor content calculations suggested a substantial impact of international trade on 
labour markets, with Wood (1994) claiming that international trade was by far the dominant 
determinant.  
However, the approach has been criticised ardently by some Major-League trade economists 
for its lack of theoretical justification (e.g. Bhagwati and Dehejia 1994; Deardorff 1994 and 
Leamer 1996 b).  
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Bhagwati and Dehejia (1994) showed how factor content calculations may erroneously lead to 
the conclusion of increased factor content and inferred changes in relative wages. This is shown 
in figure 3.16. 
In a high-skill abundant country, initially, production occurs at P and consumption at C0.  QP of 
XHS is exported for QC0 of imports of XLS (i.e. trade is balanced). If a change in taste would 
shift demand toward C1 exports will increase to RP and imports to RC1. Bhagwati and Dehejia 
argued that factor content calculations would pick up this shift as an increase in the supply of 
LLS and infer a decrease in the relative wage of low-skilled workers. 
 
Figure 3.16: Factor Content of International Trade 
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   Source: Adapted from Bhagwati and Dehejia (1994). 
 
However relative product prices would not have changed and hence, following the Stolper-
Samuelson theorem, relative wages would not have changed. Similarly, if the high-skill 
abundant country would run a trade deficit by importing C0C2 more of XLS than exports allow 
for, factor content calculations would again erroneously suggest a change in relative wages in 
spite of constant relative product prices. 
 
Deardorff (1994 a) granted that factor content calculations could be correct but do not establish 
any causation and are bothersome in that trade is assumed to be exogenous. Coincidence does 
not imply causation as many exogenous changes, domestic or foreign, may equally have caused 
the observed changes in trade and wages.  
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Panagariya examined the assumptions needed to justify the use of the factor content approach: 
identical elasticities of substitution across all production functions and the utility function; no 
increasing returns; no non-competing imports; homotheticity of demand and no endogenous 
response of factor supplies to trade. Although he admitted that the question whether the factor-
content calculations are anything to go by cannot be answered unambiguously he argued: 
“Personally, I take a skeptical view of the approach: the assumptions required to implement it 
are much too strong to inspire confidence in the estimates it generates”. (Panagariya 2000: p. 
94). 
In my view the assumptions required for factor content calculations to be trustworthy are indeed 
very exigent.  
 
3.2.4 Reduced Form Regressions 
 
Following Grossman (1987), who proposed a model in which the impact of import competition 
on both wages and employment is estimated under the assumption that production factors are 
not perfectly mobile across sectors, Revenga (1992) regressed wages and employment on 
import prices for a panel of US manufacturing industries in the 1980s. Instrumental variables 
estimation suggests that the appreciation of the dollar, in the period 1980-1985, had a substantial 
impact on both wages and employment.  
 
Dewatripont, Sapir and Sekkat (1999) estimated the impact of trade between EU countries and 
developing countries on relative wages and employment but contrary to Revenga distinguished 
low-skilled workers from high-skilled workers. They used a system of two simultaneous 
equations, one with the relative employment of low-skilled (manual) workers and one with the 
relative wages as dependent variable. Data on wages and employment were used to construct a 
panel of 14 two-digit sectors for Belgium-Luxembourg, Denmark, Germany and the United 
Kingdom in 1981, 1984 and 1988. The coefficient of import penetration in the relative 
employment equation is not significant, the coefficient of exports is positive and significant at 
the 10 per cent level in a specification with sector dummies. The coefficient of imports from 
developing countries in the relative wage equation was significant at the 5 per cent level when 
no sector dummies were used and at the 10 per cent level when sector dummies were used. The 
authors to their own surprise found indications that trade with developing countries would have 
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affected relative wages rather than relative employment whereas the stylised facts show that, 
on average, for the considered years relative employment changed more considerably than 
relative wages in the five EU countries.  
 
Oscarsson (2000) modelled the output in a sector producing importable goods by a Cobb-
Douglas production function with Hicks-neutral technological change to derive the demand for 
the production factors. Apart from capital, low-skilled labour (production workers) and high-
skilled labour (non-production workers) she also considered energy, assumed to be a traded 
input with an exogenously determined price. Capital and labour were considered to be 
imperfectly mobile between sectors, even in the long run. 
The output of a sector substitutes imperfectly for the import good. The system of equations 
results in reduced form equations for the employment and wages of low-skilled and high-skilled 
workers. The impact of international trade is measured through the price of import goods, 
including an ad valorem tariff. Import penetration, defined as the imported value relative to 
sales per sector is also considered. Oscarsson used data on 63 Swedish manufacturing sectors 
at the four-digit level for the period 1975-1993. Given the small time span the data were pooled, 
imposing the restriction that elasticities are equal across sectors. Estimation results indicated 
that decreasing import prices decreased employment of both production and non-production 
workers but the impact surprisingly was larger for non-production workers. On the other hand, 
import competition depressed wages of production workers but had no significant impact on 
wages of non-production workers. The employment effects were larger than the wage effects, 
which Oscarsson attributed to low wage flexibility and the active labour market policy in 
Sweden. Technological change appeared to have decreased employment of both labour groups 
in manufacturing, without any bias, though it had a significant positive impact on the wages of 
non-production workers and no significant impact on the wages of production workers.  
 
Reduced form regressions are, as granted by Dewatripont, Sapir and Sekkat (1999) not very 
structural. They account for the interaction between labour supply and demand but do not 
specify the theoretical framework that links international trade to the labour market.  
 
3.2.5 Mandated Wage Regressions 
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Most of the early empirical studies merely encircled the Stolper-Samuelson theorem and 
therefore only provided circumstantial rather than decisive evidence on the limited role of 
international trade in explaining rising wage inequality. 
Leamer argued that multiple regressions are needed to provide more reliable conclusions. 
Leamer (1996 a) proposed the mandated wage regression procedure, which is as closely linked 
to the Stolper-Samuelson theorem as possible.  
Starting from the Heckscher-Ohlin assumption of perfect competition, which implies that there 
are no long-run supernormal rents, Leamer considered the zero profits condition for a given 
industry: 
  
 
m
mimi awp                                                                                                                (3.22)                             
 
with pi the domestic product price in sector i, wm the reward of factor m (the same across 
industries given the assumption of inter-sector factor mobility) and ami the input of factor m per 
unit of output. 
 
Differentiating (3.22) gives: 
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where θmi = wm ami / pi denotes the cost share of factor m in industry i. 
 
As physical input per unit output ami is given by vmi/ Qi we know: 
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This finally results in the relationship between product price changes, factor rewards changes 
and total factor productivity (Leamer 1996 a: p. 23): 
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or in value-added price changes15: 
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With γij the amount of product j used in the production of product i. 
If the product price changes plus total factor productivity are regressed on the factor cost shares 
θmi Leamer reasoned that the estimated coefficient can be interpreted as the change in the factor 
reward of the respective input factor m that is “mandated” by product price changes or 
technological change in order for the zero profit condition to hold.  
Leamer noted that, trusting in equation (3.27), the sector bias of technological change seems to 
matter, not the factor bias. As mentioned in section 3.1.1.2, Krugman (1995 a) argued that this 
                                                 
15 Strictly, equation (3.27) only holds for continuous changes. For discrete changes second order effects need to 
be accounted for, resulting in the following general equilibrium relationship (Leamer 1996 a: p. 24): 
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Following this equation the factor bias could matter through the second order effects. 
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view rests upon the assumption that the considered country is small and technological change 
local. 
Leamer allowed for the fact that the considered country could be large or technological 
spillovers international in scope by considering a pass-through of technological change to 
product prices.  
 
To disentangle the impact of international trade from the impact of technological change 
Leamer split equation (3.27) in a “technology” equation and a “globalisation” equation: 
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m
m  reflects the part of the changes in factor rewards that are “mandated” by changes in 
domestic product prices due to technological factors and )g(w
dw
m
m reflects the part of the changes 
in factor rewards that are “mandated” by changes in domestic product prices due to 
globalisation forces (e.g. import competition of the NIC) .  The procedure thus decomposes the 
link between product prices and factor prices into a component explained by international trade 
and a component explained by technological change. 
 
Leamer proposed to assume a common pass-through of technological change (λ) to product 
prices which denotes the portion of product price changes explained by productivity changes: 
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A pass-through close to zero can be expected for a small open economy and local technological 
change whereas a pass-through close to one would suggest that the country is large enough to 
affect product prices or that international technology spillovers are substantial. 
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The factor bias can matter if it induces sector-biased price changes but these induced price 
changes are not inevitable according to Leamer, if the demand for non-tradables would be very 
elastic and the workers freed by technological change from tradables production could easily 
be absorbed by the non-tradables sector without necessitating changes in tradable goods prices.  
 
Considering intermediate inputs the change in value-added prices is given by: 
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In equation (3.32) it is assumed that technological change only affects value-added prices. 
Leamer granted this to be a strong assumption as it ignores the possibility of technological 
progress in one sector to have forward and backward (input-output) effects, which may alter 
the demand for intermediate inputs. For a fully satisfactory analysis a worldwide general 
equilibrium input-output model is needed. Lack of such a practicable model Leamer’s empirical 
analysis assumes that second-order effects are small, the TFP pass-through is common to all 
sectors and applies only to value-added prices and that the factor bias in technological change 
does not induce any sector-biased price changes because the non-tradables sector absorbs the 
production factors saved in the tradables sector.   
 
The impact of technological change and globalisation can be estimated separately: 
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Leamer estimated equations (3.33) and (3.34) for 450 US manufacturing industries for the 
decades 1961-1971, 1971-1981 and 1981-1991. 
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An additional assumption in applying these regressions is that the rewards of different skill 
labour groups do not differ across industries. If furthermore each sector’s skill intensity were 
assumed to be constant over time, changes in the distribution of factor rewards across sectors 
would be explained by changes in the rewards of the different skill groups. Leamer found some 
indications in the data that these assumptions are not too unworldly. Data on different skill 
groups would permit for an estimation that does not impose the assumption of fixed skill 
intensity but Leamer did not trust the usual measures used to proxy skill. He argued, as did 
Mishel and Bernstein (1994), that the often-used distinction between production and non-
production workers is too broad and heterogeneous to be very useful.  
 
Leamer estimated the mandated wage specification, alternating the pass-through to be zero and 
one. He split labour into high-wage and low-wage labour. The results suggested that the wages 
of low-wage workers were under pressure from globalisation in the 1970s but globalisation 
would have mandated an increase in their wages in the two other decades. This finding seems 
robust to whether the pass-through is set at zero or at one though the other results were more 
sensitive to the choice of pass-through. If the pass-through was set at zero, high-wage workers 
appeared to have suffered from globalisation in the 1970s and gained in the 1980s. If the pass-
through was set at one this conclusion was reversed. Changes in the wages of high-wage and 
low-wage workers appeared to be explained dominantly by globalisation and to a lesser extent 
by technological change, with the share explained by globalisation up to 95 per cent and higher 
for estimations with the pass-through set at one.    
Despite the low trust he had in the production/ non-production workers distinction Leamer also 
estimated equation (3.33) and (3.34) using this proxy. The results clearly differed from the 
estimation with the high-wage/ low-wage split and suggested that the “mandated” wages of 
non-production workers (proxy for high-skilled workers) increased in all three decades and the 
mandated wages of production workers decreased in the 1970s and the 1980s. Following the 
zero pass-through estimation the drop in the production workers’ wages can be explained by 
technological change whereas following the full pass-through estimation it would be explained 
by globalisation. The share of the change in the wages of production and non-production 
workers that would be explained by globalisation ranged from 19 per cent up to 62 per cent for 
the zero pass-through estimation and from 55 per cent up to 96 per cent for the full pass-through 
estimation. 
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In the analysis of Leamer changes in the supply of production factors do not matter as the 
Rybczynski theorem (or Factor Price Insensitivity theorem) is assumed to hold, i.e. at given 
product prices a change in the factor supply will induce a shift in the domestic production mix 
without affecting factor prices. Labour demand is infinitely elastic. The Rybczysnki theorem 
strictly only holds if the country considered is too small to affect product prices. Yet, by 
considering a pass-through of technological change to product prices Leamer did not exclude 
the possibility that the country is large enough to affect product prices. In this case, factor supply 
changes matter (Rybczynski 1955). Cline (1997) distrusted an analysis in which a country like 
the United States is considered as a small country and the developing countries as an infinite 
world market. Moreover, as the Stolper-Samuelson theorem holds in the long run, the analysis 
focused on changes over a decade. The shift in factor supplies over such a relatively long period 
may be large enough to result in an equilibrium point on the downward-sloping part of the 
relative demand curve, i.e. the part where changes in factor supply do affect factor prices.     
 
Baldwin and Cain (1997) pointed at the lack of good measures of exogenous technological 
change and the fact that the components of the TFP measure are endogenous to the price setting 
process. They therefore argued against the use of technology measures in price regressions and 
considered the following regression equation (Baldwin and Cain 1997: p. 13): 
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Equation (3.35) only holds under unchanged technological conditions. 
Baldwin and Cain granted that rather strong assumptions are required for this equation to be a 
well-specified regression (e.g. unchanged constant returns-to-scale technology) but argued that 
the equation can be useful to test some of the hypotheses within the Heckscher-Ohlin model. 
 
Lack of good measures of exogenous technological change, Baldwin and Cain proposed to infer 
from the theoretical model, biases in the regression coefficients of the factor shares, by 
accounting for assumed domestic technological changes. They considered three additional 
variables: the economy-wide output of high-skill intensive industries relative to the output of 
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low-skill intensive industries; the within-industry ratio of high-skilled workers relative to low-
skilled workers and the economy-wide trade surplus relative to domestic consumption.   
Baldwin and Cain compared theoretical assumptions with stylised facts about relative product 
prices, relative output, relative employment and relative wages to infer which theoretical 
explanation is most consistent with empirical facts. 
Table 3.1 summarizes the theoretical assumptions on the impact of changes in relative supply, 
increased import competition and technological change in a two-factors (low-skilled labour LLS 
and high-skilled labour LHS) and two-goods (high-skill intensive good XHS and low-skill 
intensive good XLS) in which a skill-abundant country is considered to be large enough to affect 
its terms of trade.  
 
Table 3.1: Effects in a Two-Factors and Two-Goods Heckscher-Ohlin Model for a Large Skill- 
Abundant Country 
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 Fixed 
labour 
coefficients 
Factor 
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Fixed 
labour 
coefficients 
Factor 
substitution 
Fixed 
labour 
coefficients 
Factor 
substitution 
Fixed 
labour 
coefficients 
Factor 
substitution 
Increase in 
relative supply 
LHS / LLS 
- - + +/- 0 + - - 
Increase in 
import 
competition in 
XLS 
+ + 0 + 0 - + + 
SBTC in both 
sectors 
+ + - -/+ + +/- + + 
Neutral 
technological 
change in XHS 
- - + +/- 0 -/+ +/- +/- 
 
Source: Baldwin and Cain (1997). 
 
The table considers the impact on the relative price of the high-skill intensive good (first 
column), on relative output (second column), the coefficient of high-skilled to low-skilled 
labour in production (third column) and the relative wages of high-skilled workers (last 
column), assuming either that relative factor intensity is fixed or alternatively that factor 
substitution is possible. 
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As table 3.1 shows, if factor substitution is possible, the impact of trade competition is 
observationally equivalent to the impact of skill-biased technological change (as explained in 
section 3.1.1.2). The fact that skill intensity actually appears to have increased in most sectors 
has often been considered to support the view that skill-biased technological change is probably 
the dominant explanation, as the predicted impact on skill intensity discriminates between 
import competition and SBTC, as shown in the third column. 
   
The regression results of Baldwin and Cain for US industries were, for the period 1963-1973, 
apparently consistent with the explanation of an increase in the relative supply of high-skilled 
workers decreasing the wage gap.  
For the 1980s and the 1990s the observed increase in the wage gap between highly educated 
and less-educated workers did seem to be explained by skill-biased technological change rather 
than by import competition although estimation results suggested that the decrease in the wages 
of workers with less than 12 years of education could have been caused by an increase in import 
competition. 
 
Feenstra and Hanson (1997, 1999) have shown that a mandated wage regression provides 
consistent estimates given two conditions. The first condition is that the dual measure of total 
factor productivity is used and the second that there is no correlation between industry-specific 
factor rewards and industry-specific factor shares. Given the high correlation between primal 
and dual measures of total factor productivity the last condition is the most crucial. If the latter 
condition is not met the regression will have an omitted variable bias. The omitted variable bias 
can however be measured using available data and the mandated wage regression can therefore 
account for this bias. Feenstra and Hanson proposed a two-step expansion of the mandated 
wage regression procedure proposed by Leamer (1996 a).  
Feenstra and Hanson considered the value added price regression equation (3.30) derived by 
Leamer (1996 a). If a dual TFP measure (log change in product prices minus cost-shares 
weighted change in factor rewards) is used this equation will hold as an identity. Given the 
duality between production functions and cost functions, the more often used primal TFP 
measure (growth of value-added minus weighted average growth of input factors) is 
theoretically equal to the dual TFP measure and Feenstra and Hanson (1999: p. 910) found for 
the United States in the period 1979-1990, the correlation between both measures to be 0.99 so 
that using a primal TFP instead of a dual TFP will have a negligible effect.  
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To obtain a regression equation rather than an identity, Feenstra and Hanson assume that wages 
are random variables over industries with a mean, over all industries, of ωm. 
If this mean is introduced in (3.28) to replace dwm/wm there will be a residual term ei which will 
equal the average deviation of industry-specific wages from the cross-sector average (Feenstra 
and Hanson 1999: p. 910-911)16:    
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Feenstra and Hanson argued that the last term in (3.36) is usually treated as a residual in price 
regressions although data are available to measure this term. As main source for inter-industry 
wage differentials the authors considered variation in the quality of production factors. With 
the residual term measured, effective TFP is defined as TFP minus this residual term: 
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This can be used in equation (3.36): 
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Equation (3.38) is now an identity and regression will result in estimates of ωm equal to the 
actual changes in factor rewards. To turn this identity into a useful estimation of the impact of 
international trade and technological change on factor rewards, Feenstra and Hanson proposed 
to estimate the impact of possible determinants of product price changes and technological 
change by regressing value-added price changes, respectively effective TFP, on a set of 
structural variables (Feenstra and Hanson 1999: pp. 915-916): 
 
                                                 
16 mi is the average cost share over the period taken as the begin of period plus the end of period value, divided by two. 
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Zi is the vector of structural variables and λ the TFP pass-through. The total impact of the 
structural variables on price changes and technological change is then estimated by Feenstra 
and Hanson, combining (3.39) and (3.40) in the following first-step regression: 
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With γ = (1+λ)τ + α   and  piTiTpi )1(   . 
Feenstra and Hanson considered each ikk dZ' as the part of the change in value-added prices and 
technological change that can be explained by the change in the k-th structural variable of the 
vector Zi. Each of these K components, generated by multiplying the estimated first-step 
estimates with the respective k-th structural variable is regressed separately in the second step 
on the cost shares of the production factors: 
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The estimated second-step coefficients Km are then interpreted as the change in the reward of 
input factor m explained by the k-th structural determinant. 
 
Feenstra and Hanson showed that by allowing, in equation (3.39), the structural variables to 
affect value-added price changes over and above the impact of structural variables on TFP in 
equation (3.40), it is possible to discriminate between the factor bias and the sector bias of 
technological progress (see Krugman-Leamer debate in section 3.1.1.2). 
Assuming Cobb-Douglas preferences, Hicks-neutral technological progress in any given 
industry would result in offsetting price changes and factor rewards would not be affected (see 
section 3.1.1.2). In equation (3.39) the pass-though estimate should then be close to –1 and the 
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estimates of α close to zero, at least for those structural variables that are unlikely to have a 
direct impact on product price changes. If technological progress is biased in favour of high-
skilled workers, as pointed out in section 3.1.1.2, Krugman (1995 a) showed that the relative 
wage of high-skilled workers would increase whereas the impact of the sector bias depends on 
whether elasticity of substitution equals one or is below one17. The factor bias will induce a 
change in product prices above the offsetting price change due to technological progress and so 
even under full pass-through (λ = -1) the estimates of α need not equal zero in estimating 
equation (3.39). For those variables that may have a direct impact on product price changes as 
well as on technological change the estimates of α will give the combined effect of the direct 
impact and the factor bias. Feenstra and Hanson (1997, 1999) stressed the difference between 
their approach and Leamer (1996 a) who did not consider any additional structural variables as 
he assumed that only the sector bias mattered. 
 
Feenstra and Hanson applied the proposed two-step mandated regression on 450 US 
manufacturing industries for the period 1979-1990. They used the distinction production/ non-
production to proxy low-skilled/ high-skilled workers, acknowledging the problem with this 
proxy but referring to evidence by Berman, Bound and Griliches (1993) and Sachs and Shatz 
(1994) that using this proxy results in similar trends as using skill groups. They considered 
high-tech capital, respectively computer equipment relative to total capital and computer 
investment relative to total investment as structural variables as well as variables reflecting the 
degree of foreign outsourcing, with outsourcing defined as imported intermediate inputs 
relative to total intermediates (see section 3.1.2). They distinguished foreign outsourcing in the 
narrow sense (intermediate inputs imported from the same two-digit industry) from foreign 
outsourcing in the broad sense (all imported non-energy intermediate inputs).  They first 
estimated equation (3.39) and found a significant estimate of –1.01 for the TFP pass-through. 
They pointed out that as effective TFP is, by construction, correlated with value-added price 
changes the OLS will be biased toward –1. An instrumental variable estimation, which in 
principle could deal with the endogeneity problem, is hindered by a lack of valid instruments, 
as the best candidate instruments are the structural variables, which are however correlated with 
value-added price changes. A test of over-identifying restrictions indeed suggests that the 
                                                 
17 Feenstra and Hanson (1999: p. 919) quoted the more general relationship between factor-biased technological change and factor rewards 
changes proposed by e.g. Xu (1998) but these studies do not provide a convenient closed form solution to specify the impact of the factor bias 
on product price changes. 
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structural variables are poor instruments. To resolve the problem of a consistent estimate of the 
pass-through coefficient Feenstra and Hanson (1997, 1999) estimated the reduced form 
equation (3.41). The estimated coefficients of this first-step are then used to generate the 
dependent variables in (3.42). As the regressands in the second-step regressions are generated 
from first-step estimates the standard errors of the second-step regressions need to be corrected 
for additional variance resulting from the use of generated regressands. In the appendix to 
Feenstra and Hanson (1997) a correction procedure was proposed, which has been applied in 
Feenstra and Hanson (1997, 1999). Unfortunately, the proposed correction does not warrant 
positive variance and as a result standard errors cannot always be computed. Dumont, Rayp, 
Thas and Willemé (2003) have shown that this correction procedure suffers from a negative 
bias and thus tends to overestimate the significance of the second-step coefficient estimates.  
 
The estimates of Feenstra and Hanson (1999) suggested that foreign outsourcing could explain 
15 per cent and the computer share 35 per cent of the increase in the relative wages of non-
production workers. However, using some alternative measures for the high-tech share and the 
computer share results in a higher estimate of the contribution of foreign outsourcing and a 
lower- in some cases even insignificant- contribution of the computer and high-tech shares.  
 
Haskel and Slaughter (2001) applied a two-step mandated wage regression to a panel of 135 
UK industries in the period 1973-1986. They considered a large set of structural variables using 
data on effective tariff protection, transportation costs, import prices for three country groups 
and industry concentration for the price regression and data on innovativeness, industry 
concentration, union density, computer use and relative foreign prices for the TFP regression. 
They used the manual/ non-manual distinction to proxy low-skilled/ high-skilled workers and 
estimated separately the first-step price regression and the first-step TFP regression but did not 
consider a TFP pass-through in the price regression18. The first-step estimates were then used 
to generate the structural variables’ respective contribution to product price changes and 
productivity growth, used as the dependent variables in the second-step estimation. The second-
step TFP regressions indicated that the change in domestic product prices relative to product 
prices in Newly Industrialised Countries mandated a significant increase in the relative wages 
of high-skilled workers in the 1970s. By considering foreign product price changes, Haskel and 
                                                 
18 They did estimate a first-step price regression with TFP as a regressor and estimated the pass-through to be –0.62 but as its mandated impact 
was not significant they concluded that productivity growth did not affect factor rewards through price changes. 
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Slaughter accounted for the possibility of trade-induced technological change, for which they 
found evidence. The impact of computers was not found to be significant. 
In the first-step price regression, changes in OECD prices and NIC prices significantly affected 
UK product prices, as did tariffs and transportation costs. The second-step regressions for the 
determinants of value-added price changes showed for the 1980s that price changes of OECD 
countries, price changes of non-OECD countries, price changes of NIC and changes in effective 
tariffs all increased wage inequality but only the impact of OECD prices and tariff changes 
were significant.      
Haskel and Slaughter also estimated one-step mandated wage regressions (i.e. price changes 
and TFP considered exogenous), which would be more appropriate if the United Kingdom can 
be assumed to be a small open economy. These estimations suggested that international trade 
had been the dominant explanation of rising UK wage inequality.   
So the results seem to incriminate international trade more substantially under the small open 
economy assumption, which seems reasonable for the United Kingdom. However, as pointed 
out by Feenstra and Hanson (1999), assuming productivity growth as exogenous does not only 
imply that one assumes the considered country to be small but also that technological change 
is a local phenomenon, an assumption that somehow seems less realistic.  
Haskel and Slaughter (2003) performed two-step mandated wage regressions for some 425 US 
manufacturing industries, using data on tariffs and transportation costs but failed to find much 
evidence of a significant impact of falling tariffs and transportation costs on wage inequality in 
the 1970s or 1980s. 
 
Cuyvers, Dumont, Rayp and Stevens (2003) and Cuyvers, Dumont and Rayp (2003) applying 
the two-step mandated wage estimation procedure to a panel of nine EU countries for the period 
1985-1996 also found little evidence of Stolper-Samuelson effects. Import competition of 
(South-) East Asian NIC significantly induced technological progress but this effect somewhat 
surprisingly appeared to have mandated a decrease in the relative wages of non-production 
workers. 
 
Slaughter (2000) pointed out that although he considered the mandated wage procedure to be a 
major improvement over earlier empirical methodologies there were still a number of caveats 
in answering the key question of how much international trade has contributed to rising wage 
inequality.   
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Results of product-price studies appear to be rather sensitive to the number of industries that 
are considered. The Stolper-Samuelson theorem applies to the overall economy so normally all 
industries should be considered in the empirical analysis. However, if one wants to assess the 
impact of international trade on price changes, limiting the sample to industries that produce 
tradable goods could be justified (Slaughter 2000: p. 152). 
The results of product-price studies also seem to be relatively sensitive to whether regressions 
are weighted (e.g. Leamer 1996 a; Feenstra and Hanson 1997 and Baldwin and Cain 1997) or 
not and to the period that is considered but rather robust to the level of data aggregation or 
measures used to proxy the skill level (Slaughter 2000: pp. 156-158). 
 
As mentioned in section 3.1.1.4, the Stolper-Samuelson theorem is rather robust to relaxing a 
number of restrictive assumptions of the Heckscher-Ohlin model (e.g. no technological 
differences across countries) and the correlation version of the theorem proposed by Ethier 
(1984) seems a logical starting-point for the empirical assessment of the impact of trade with 
low-skill abundant countries on the skill premium in high-skill abundant countries, within a 
multidimensional economy (i.e. many products and more than two production factors). 
The two-step mandated wage regression procedure is more closely linked to the Stolper-
Samuelson theorem than most previous empirical methodologies and the multiple regression 
feature yields less circumstantial conclusions and permits to test the significance of the 
estimated effects. It moreover provides a convenient way to discriminate between the two main 
explanations for rising wage inequality, i.e. international trade and skill-biased technological 
change while accounting for the likely interdependence (e.g. trade-induced technological 
change).  
There are obviously also a number of limitations to this approach. With respect to the European 
Union, the assumption that labour markets are perfectly competitive, necessary even for the 
robust Stolper-Samuelson theorem to hold, does not readily mix with the common belief that 
labour market institutions play an important role in wage setting and probably cause some 
degree of wage stickiness in many EU countries. In this respect the Heckscher-Ohlin model 
does not seem to be very European.   
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3.2.6 Flexible Cost Functions 
 
 
Concluding the previous section I argued that the Heckscher-Ohlin model assumption that all 
factor rewards are fully flexible does not really ring true for most EU countries. If wages are 
fully flexible, i.e. adjust to market-clearing levels, full employment of all production factors is 
guaranteed. However, if wages are sticky a fall in the relative demand for low-skilled workers 
will not raise the skill premium but rather result in unemployment. As shown by Krugman 
(1995 b) the fall in employment implies an additional negative general equilibrium multiplier 
effect (see section 3.1.4).  
 
Flexible cost functions allow deriving the demand for production factors as well as estimating 
the impact of external determinants, like international trade, on the demand for production 
factors without imposing the assumption that wages are flexible. The estimated elasticity of 
factor demand gives an indication of the extent of the changes in wages or employment.  
A cost function models the cost-minimizing behaviour of firms. The most popular flexible cost 
functions are the duals of the transcendental logarithmic or translog production function (TL) 
and the generalized Leontief production function (GL) proposed respectively by Christensen, 
Jorgensen and Lau (1971, 1973) and Diewert (1971)19.   
 
Translog cost function (TL): 
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Generalized Leontief cost function (GL): 
 
                                                 
19 Barnett, Lee and Wolfe (1985) defined a functional form as flexible if it can attain arbitrary level and first- and second-order derivatives at 
a predetermined single point. Most flexible forms are second-order approximations: the translog and generalized Leontief functions are second-
order Taylor expansions of respectively a Cobb-Douglas and a Leontief function. Following the duality theorem of linear programming, a 
concave homogenous of degree one production function can be mapped into a unique concave homogenous of degree one cost function (e.g. 
Chipman 2001). 
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C denotes costs, pi the price of the i-th input factor and X the output. 
 
Berman, Bound and Griliches (1993) used a translog cost function to estimate the impact of 
computer investment and R&D activities on the wage bill share of non-production workers in 
the United States in the period 1979-1987. Feenstra and Hanson (2001) advocated the inclusion 
of any structural variable that may shift the production function and hence affect costs.  
 
For a TL specification this leads to the following extension (Feenstra and Hanson 2001: p. 19): 
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(3.45) 
 
Xk denotes the output as well as fixed inputs (i.e. in a short-run function with quasi fixed inputs) 
and the shift parameters.  
 
Following Shepard’s lemma (e.g. Mas-Colell, Whinston and Green 1995: pp. 140-141), if ln C 
is the minimal total cost of production, the cost minimizing cost share of input factor i can be 
obtained by differentiating the cost function with respect to the given factor’s price:  
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This results in a system of equations. Singularity of the covariance matrix of the residuals can 
be resolved by dropping the I-th cost share equation (Greene 2000: p. 642). If one considers 
non-production (high-skilled) and production (low-skilled) labour as the two flexible input 
factors and capital K as an input factor that is fixed in the short run, there is only one equation 
left. If the same cost function is assumed to hold across sectors, the change of the cost share 
can be estimated by pooling the data. Considering the equation for the wage bill share of skilled 
labour the regression in differences is given as: 
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Where zl, j are the external variables for industry j that may affect the demand for production 
factors. Berman, Bound and Griliches (1993) argued that it is not plausible to assume relative 
wages are exogenous. Assuming that quality-adjusted relative wages do not vary across sectors 
the term will be constant. Dropping relative wages from the regression will then only affect the 
constant term. Feenstra and Hanson (2001) dropped relative wages as well. They used data for 
447 US manufacturing sectors for the period 1979-1990 and considered the equation for the 
wage bill share of non-production workers. They considered the following structural variables: 
shipments (output proxy), ratio of capital to shipments, foreign outsourcing (imported 
intermediate inputs as a share of total materials purchases), shares of computers and other high-
tech capital in the total capital stock and the investment shares of computers. Foreign 
outsourcing is found to explain 15 to 24 per cent of the increase in the non-production workers’ 
wage bill share. Feenstra and Hanson (1996) found that the import share explained 15 to 33 per 
cent of the increased non-production share for the period 1979-1987. The impact of computers 
and other high-tech capital depended on whether the share in capital or in total investment is 
used. For the first measure the technology variables explained 8 to 13 per cent of the increased 
wage bill share, using the latter measure they explained 31 per cent.  
 
Anderton and Brenton (1999) estimated a share equation for high-skilled workers (proxied as 
non-manual workers) with pooled data for 11 four-digit sectors (six textiles sectors and five 
non-electrical machinery sectors) for the period 1970-1986 in the UK. They also dropped 
relative wages from the regression specification and proxied foreign outsourcing by the import 
share, distinguishing between imports from industrialised countries and imports from NIC and 
developing countries. R&D expenditures were used to proxy technological change. In addition 
they also estimated an equation using the employment share of non-manual workers rather than 
the wage bill share as dependent variable. They acknowledged this to be somewhat problematic 
from a theoretical point of view, as it cannot straightforwardly be derived from a cost function 
but considered this specification to be insightful from an empirical point of view. Imports from 
industrialised countries did not seem to have affected the wage bill share or the employment 
share of non-manual workers. Imports from NIC and developing countries, on the contrary, 
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significantly increased the demand for non-manual workers. R&D expenditures also increased 
the demand for non-manual workers but the coefficient is not significant in any specification.  
 
Anderton, Brenton and Oscarsson (2002) performed similar estimations as Anderton and 
Brenton (1999) for Sweden, using data on 41 four-digit manufacturing sectors for the period 
1975-1993. In addition to R&D expenditures they alternatively considered patenting as a proxy 
for technological change. Outsourcing is again proxied by import shares and non-OECD 
countries are considered separately from OECD countries (excluding those countries that 
became member after 1994). Following the estimation results, imports from low-wage countries 
could explain up to 25 per cent of the increase in the wage bill share and 15 per cent of the 
increase in the employment share of skilled (non-production) workers in Sweden. However, 
technological change accounted for more than 50 per cent of increased inequality.    
  
Like Anderton and Brenton (1999), Strauss-Kahn (2003) used an equation with the change in 
the employment share of low-skilled workers as the dependent variable as she reasoned that for 
France this is probably more appropriate given relative wages have been relatively stable. If 
wages are not flexible, a decrease in relative labour demand could result in decreased 
employment rather than in decreased wages. She used data on some 50 French sectors for the 
period 1977-1993. Foreign outsourcing (vertical specialisation in her terms) was defined as the 
ratio of imported inputs over output, distinguishing between imports from OECD and non-
OECD countries. Controlling for the possible endogeneity of output by performing an 
instrumental variable estimation using the lagged value of output as instrument, foreign 
outsourcing is found to explain 11 to 15 per cent of the decreased employment share of low-
skilled workers in the period 1977-1985 and 25 per cent for the period 1985-1993. Strauss-
Kahn concluded that the bulk of the change is presumably explained by skill-biased 
technological change though she did not consider any technology variable in her estimations.   
 
Egger and Egger (2000) estimated the impact of foreign outsourcing from Austria towards 
Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union for the period 1990-1998. For the estimation of 
the impact of outsourcing on relative employment they used data on 20 Austrian manufacturing 
sectors. They regressed the relative employment of high-skilled workers on relative wages, 
export openness, imports (imports of intermediated goods excluded) from Eastern countries, 
the capital output ratio and foreign outsourcing. Contrary to the aforementioned studies, Egger 
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and Egger performed the regression in levels rather than in first differences and did not drop 
relative wages from the specification. They accounted for the endogeneity of relative wages 
and foreign outsourcing. The degree of unionisation of a sector relative to the economy-wide 
unionisation rate, the price-cost margin, median sector firm size, variables reflecting tariff 
barriers and non-tariff barriers and unit labour costs in Eastern economies were used as 
instruments. Tests of the relevance and validity of the instruments suggested that ignoring the 
possible endogeneity of outsourcing might result in an underestimation of its impact on relative 
employment. Outsourcing towards Eastern countries seemed to explain about 25 per cent of the 
increase in relative employment of high-skilled workers in Austria. The levels estimations by 
Egger and Egger yield suspiciously high R2 values, which could indicate that the use of (non-
stationary) time series in levels instead of first-differences results in spurious correlation. 
 
Morrison and Siegel (1997) extended the generalized Leontief function to account for 
exogenous factors that may affect the cost function and thereby shift the demand for production 
factors. Morrison Paul and Siegel (2001) considered high-tech capital, R&D investment and 
(domestic) outsourcing as potential external determinants. The interest of the external factors 
lies in their overall impact on industries, which as Morrison Paul and Siegel raised joins with 
endogenous growth theories (e.g. Romer 1986 and Grossman and Helpman 1991) in stressing 
the importance of spillovers and other sources of increasing returns.   
 
An extended GL cost function can be written as (Morrison Paul and Siegel 2001): 
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The variables s denote output (X) and the external determinants. Applying Shepard’s lemma, 
the demand for the i-th input factor can be obtained by differentiating (3.48) with respect to its 
own price:  
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Log-differentiating the demand for an input factor given in equation (3.49) with respect to the 
n-th element of vector S gives the elasticity of demand for that factor with respect to the 
considered external factor: 
 
ni SlnDln
nSiD
                                                                                                           (3.50)                                      
 
Applying the extended GL cost function to data on US manufacturing sectors in the period 
1959-1989, Morrison Paul and Siegel found that technological change could explain the largest 
fraction of changes in the demand for different labour groups (classified by education level). 
Somewhat surprisingly the negative impact of technological change and international trade on 
the demand for workers with a high school degree is larger than the impact on the demand for 
workers without a high school degree. Technological change (proxied by computerization) 
seemed to be biased in favour of college graduates. Outsourcing (proxied by the cost share of 
purchased services) decreased the demand for all labour groups but more substantially for 
workers with little education. The authors found evidence that international trade stimulated 
computerization, arguing that this indirect effect of trade needs to be accounted for. 
 
The demand for production factors can rather straightforwardly be derived from flexible cost 
functions. When extending these functions with external determinants, the elasticity of factor 
demand with respect to the external factors can be estimated. The restrictive Stolper-Samuelson 
assumption of perfectly competitive labour markets does not need to be imposed. If 
international trade with Newly Industrialised Countries would reduce the demand for low-
skilled workers in high-skill abundant countries and wages are not flexible, unemployment of 
low-skilled workers seems likely. The magnitude of the impact can be inferred from the 
estimated labour demand elasticity. Though lacking the well-established coherent framework 
of a perfect competition theory, accounting for downward wage rigidity seems appropriate for 
most EU countries when assessing the labour market impact of international trade.   
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3.2.7 Bargaining Models 
 
 
In section 3.1.6 it was mentioned that collective bargaining is generally considered to be an 
important labour market institution in many EU countries, often evoked to explain the relative 
wage stickiness and high unemployment rates, compared to the United States. As empirical 
evidence indicates that strong unions are successful in reducing wage inequality, the 
suppression of the skill premium could account for the high unemployment rates of low-skilled 
workers. 
When accounting for downward wage rigidity a union bargaining framework clearly specifies 
the labour market mechanism through which international trade could affect wages and 
employment. 
 
As pointed out in section 3.1.6, Lawrence and Lawrence (1985) were among the first to consider 
the impact of import competition within a bargaining framework.  
 
Gaston and Trefler (1995), adopting an efficient bargaining framework (i.e. bargaining for 
wages as well as for employment) combined micro data on individuals‘ characteristics and 
earnings with data on trade flows, tariffs and non-tariff trade barriers for the United States in 
1983.   
In a first step they regressed the wage level of an individual i in industry j on individual 
characteristics Hi and sector dummies Dj (Gaston and Trefler 1995: p. 8): 
 
  ij*jjHiij WDHWlog                                                                                               (3.51) 
 
*
jW is considered as an estimate for the inter-industry wage differential (wage premium) in 
industry j. 
In a second step the estimated wage premium is regressed on a vector of international trade 
(protection) factors Pj and a vector of domestic factors Xj, reflecting union bargaining power, 
product market concentration and the outside options for the firm and the union (Gaston and 
Trefler 1995: p. 9): 
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*
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They used imports from, and employment of, majority-owned foreign affiliates of US firms to 
proxy foreign outsourcing, which they considered as a measure for the bargaining power of a 
firm. If no agreement is reached a firm will lose the rents from the firm-specific capital 
investment. The outside option for the firm is therefore considered by Gaston and Trefler to be 
negatively related to the capital/labour ratio and the profit rate.  As to the outside option for the 
union, i.e. the alternative wage, they considered a number of different measures like the 
union/non-union wage differential and the lowest wage decile, with a preference for the latter.   
Estimation results suggested that the union wage premium is more sensitive to import 
competition than to export success. 
The authors found little support for the endogeneity of trade protection or the endogeneity of 
trade flows.   
They argued that as unions can negotiate low wages in return for employment guarantees, union 
and non-union responses to trade and trade protection could differ fundamentally. 
 
Magnani and Prentice (2003) provided evidence of falling union membership in most OECD 
countries. Import penetration appeared to be a significant though minor determinant of union 
membership in the United States for the period 1973-1994. Skill-biased technological change 
(SBTC) is found to be even less important in explaining falling union membership. The latter 
result conflicts with the claim by Acemoglu, Aghion and Violante (2001) that SBTC caused 
falling union membership, especially in the United States and the United Kingdom, as they 
believed that SBTC increased the outside option of high-skilled workers and undermined the 
coalition between low-skilled and high-skilled workers.  
 
Kramarz (2003) matched firm level data with individual worker level data for the 1980s. At the 
firm level he considered data from the French Customs administration for the period 1986-1992 
on imports by countries of origin and by product. At the level of individuals, data from the 
DADS-EDP (Echantillon Démographique Permanent) were used, providing detailed 
information on the characteristics of a sample of individuals. 
Following Blanchflower, Oswald and Sanfey (1992) and Abowd and Lemieux (1993), Kramarz 
considered an efficient bargaining game between the firm and workers: 
 
    l)ww(ln)I(ln1max 00l,w                                                                           (3.53) 
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θ is the bargaining power of workers, and π0 and w0 denote the threat point of respectively the 
firm and workers. I is the level of a firm’s imports. As Blanchflower, Oswald and Sanfey 
(1992), Kramarz equated w0 to the wage available from temporary work in case of a breakdown 
in the bargaining. )I(0 was considered to be the profit that a firm can generate in the absence 
of a bargaining agreement by employing temporary workers. 
The bargained wage in this model will be (Kramarz 2003: p. 7): 
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                                                                                                                      (3.54) 
 
with w0 the competitive wage level (i.e. equal to the marginal product of labour) and π0 the profit 
evaluated at w0. Kramarz assumed that inputs imported from abroad or the relocation of some 
fragments of the production process will have to be announced in advance. This provides 
workers with hold-up opportunities. Malcomson (1997) stated that turnover costs or firm-
specific investments could imply rents to continue a relationship. These rents can be bargained 
for between the firm and workers. The hold-up opportunity could result in under-investment by 
the firm. Malcomson (1997: p. 1954) believed that with turnover costs, sticky wages and wages 
that respond asymmetrically to upward and downward shocks may actually be efficient 
responses, given well-defined labour contracts, and do not necessarily indicate inefficiencies in 
labour markets.  
In the model by Kramarz (2003) the hold-up opportunities due to the fact that firms have to 
decide on imports before the bargaining game starts results in the level of bargained wages 
being higher the higher a firm’s imports are. 
The impact of imports on the bargained wage is however not unambiguously positive as w0, 
apart from a component that reflects the unconditional opportunity cost of time, also consists 
of an industry-specific component that depends on the demand for labour, which will decrease 
if imports can substitute for domestic labour. This second component of w0 therefore depends 
negatively on the level of imports in the given industry. The sign of the impact of imports on 
wages is an empirical matter, i.e. to assess whether the hold-up effect dominates the substitution 
effect or the other way around.  
This is reflected in the equation that is estimated by Kramarz: 
 
                   
                                                                                               
                                                                                                                                           148 
 )I(wl
)I(
ww 0
0
a
0 
                                                                                                      (3.55) 
πa is the quasi-rents evaluated at the alternative wage of workers wa and I the industry level of 
imports.  
Kramarz found evidence for both the hold-up effect (i.e. firm’s own imports appear to protect 
employees) and the substitution effect (i.e. wages are lower the higher the level of imports in 
the industry) but the net effect seemed to be negative for most workers. 
The hold-up effect was especially important for highly educated workers. Somewhat 
surprisingly the highly educated workers also appeared to be affected the most by the 
substitution effect.  
Kramarz distinguished imports from Europe, other OECD countries, low-wage countries close 
to France (Maghreb and Eastern European countries) and low-wage countries far away from 
France (China, India, NIC). The origin of imports, as well as distance, seemed to matter though 
the latter especially for highly educated workers. 
 
 
Estimating the impact of international trade on wages and employment within a union 
bargaining framework seems an appropriate way to account for a labour market institution that 
is generally acknowledged to play an important role in wage setting and employment growth 
in many EU countries. 
Institutional differences could explain why the development of relative wages and employment 
differs between EU countries. A common shock, e.g. increased trade with NIC, can have a 
different labour market impact depending on the bargaining regime and union preferences. 
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3.2.8 Computable General Equilibrium Models 
 
Krugman (1995 b) argued that Computable General Equilibrium (CGE) models permit a 
complete general equilibrium analysis of the interaction between labour market developments 
in high-wage countries and import competition from low-wage countries.  
He therefore proposed a miniature computable general equilibrium model, which he admitted 
to be too simplified to deliver anything else than glorified back-of-the-envelope estimates. He 
considered an OECD economy producing and consuming a low-skill intensive good XLS and a 
high-skill intensive good XHS. Since the income share of capital hardly changed he only 
considered low-skilled labour LLS and high-skilled labour LHS. The production of both goods 
requires both production factors. Constant returns to scale are assumed under the assumption 
that economies of scale are not important in explaining North-South trade. Product markets 
were assumed to be perfectly competitive.   
To make the model practicable Krugman borrowed some parameter estimates from previous 
studies (e.g. relative wages of high-skilled workers and skill intensity of the high-skill intensive 
sector from Wood 1994).  
 
However, before taking on the CGE model he used World Bank estimates of North-South trade 
to compute the total employment effect of imports from low-skill abundant countries under the 
assumption of sticky wages, i.e. the European model treated in section 3.1.4, where the total 
employment effect can be estimated from the factor content of international trade, combined 
with a general equilibrium multiplier effect accounting for the income effect due to falling 
employment. Krugman found a considerable total employment effect (1.43 per cent fall in 
employment) though he added that this estimate still falls short of the actual decline in 
employment in Europe. Moreover the estimates depend on the assumption that wages are fully 
rigid, which even for Europe seems unlikely. He therefore also considered an American model, 
under the assumption of flexible wages, resulting in a CGE model. Production and utility 
functions were assumed to be Cobb-Douglas.  
With this model one can see what, starting from autarky, the emergence of trade with low-skill 
abundant countries on relative wages in the OECD would be. Krugman found that a 3 per cent 
rise in the relative wage of high-skilled workers would imply that trade with NIC accounted for 
2.2 per cent of OECD output, i.e. larger than the actual share at the time. For elasticity of 
substitution below one the estimate for the impact of trade on wages would be higher. Krugman 
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claimed that the exercise, despite the stylised and simplified model, could explain why studies 
focusing on changes in product prices generally failed to find much indications of Stolper-
Samuelson effects, as the change in product prices associated with the actual growth of trade 
with NIC is likely to fall within the boundaries of measurement error and can therefore not be 
filtered from the noise in data.  
 
Following Krugman (1995 b) several economists proposed more elaborate CGE models, 
introducing aspects like imperfect product market competition (differentiated goods, increasing 
returns to scale), sectors of non-tradables and skill-biased technological change (e.g. Lawrence 
and Evans 1996; Cline 1997; Minford, Riley and Nowell 1997; Cortes and Jean 1998; Nahuis 
1998 and Smith 1999). 
Except for Nahuis (1998) these CGE studies did not provide much evidence of a substantial 
impact of North-South trade on labour markets in the industrialised countries. 
 
Panagariya and Dutta-Gupta (2003) questioned CGE modelling for its black box aspect, making 
it difficult to pinpoint where the results come from. They point out that authors often cannot 
explain their own results intuitively and when pressed to do so provide uninformative answers.  
Neary (2001) judged the assumption of monopolistic competition, used in many CGE models, 
as patently unrealistic as the assumption of perfect competition, as both share the assumption 
of an infinitely elastic supply of atomistic firms that face no entry or exit barriers and do not 
engage in strategic behaviour. He stated that most markets are characterised by oligopoly and 
believed that the large number of difficulties that arise when modelling oligopoly in general 
equilibrium explains why it has not been pursued frequently, in contrast with the flurry of 
general equilibrium monopolistic competition models.   
 
In my view Krugman justifiably questioned the reliability of some empirical studies that 
provided a partial rather than a general equilibrium analysis of the interactions between 
international trade and labour market developments. However, given the rather large number 
of other restrictive assumptions that have to be imposed for CGE models to be practicable they 
often appear to be very specific rather than general. A large number of model parameters, if not 
imposed, are ‘borrowed’ from econometric estimation, the significance of the computed effects 
cannot be tested and the variables considered in the model, though subject to measurement 
error, are required to explain all variance, i.e. there is no residual variance.    
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Table 3.2: Summary of the Main Empirical Studies on the Impact of International 
Trade on Wages and Employment broken by Skill Level 
 
Authors Theoretical 
framework 
Data Results 
 
 
Decomposition analysis 
 
 
Katz and 
Murphy (1991) 
 
Heckscher-Ohlin 
prediction that 
employment will shift 
between rather than within 
industries. 
 
 
US Current Population 
Surveys (1963-1987) 
Between-industry employment shift 
in 1980s too modest to explain rising 
skill premium. The within-industry 
shift is therefore considered more 
important. The authors attribute the 
within-industry shift to skill-biased 
technological change (SBTC).   
 
 
Berman, Bound 
and Griliches 
(1993) 
 
 
 
" 
 
 
US Annual Survey of 
Manufacturing (1959-1987) 
Imports explain a small part of the 
changes in the employment share of 
production workers. In some 
industries (semiconductors and 
motor industry) foreign outsourcing 
explains a very substantial part of the 
shift away from production workers. 
 
Bernd and 
Jensen (1997) 
 
 
" 
 
Plant level data from 
Annual Survey of 
Manufactures -US Census 
Bureau (1967-1987)  
Demand shifts across plants, 
associated with exports, are an 
important source for rising wage 
inequality. Skill-upgrading does not 
seem to be an important determinant 
of employment shifts across plants. 
 
Berman, Bound 
and Machin 
(1998) 
 
 
" 
 
Data on twelve OECD 
countries (1970s and 1980s) 
Within-industry shifts dominate 
between-industry shifts in employ-
ment and wage bill shares of non-
production workers, which the 
authors explain by SBTC. 
 
 
Factor content studies 
 
 
 
Borjas, Freeman 
and Katz (1991) 
Trade flows embody the 
production factors used to 
produce the traded goods. 
The factor content is used to 
estimate the impact of 
international trade on 
relative factor demand. 
 
 
US Current Population 
Surveys (1964-1988) 
 
International trade and immigration 
affected relative labour supply and 
explain a large part of the changes in 
the relative wages of high school 
dropouts in the 1980s. 
 
 
 
Sachs and Shatz 
(1994) 
 
 
 
" 
 
 
Input-output data from US 
Department of Commerce 
(1978-1990) 
Imports from developing countries 
caused a decrease of 6.2 per cent in 
the employment of production 
workers and a decrease of 4.3 per 
cent in the employment of non-
production workers. Low-skill 
intensive industries witnessed the 
sharpest decrease in employment. 
Wood (1994) Net factor content   with as-
sumption of non-competing 
imports and trade-induced 
technological change. 
 
UN, OECD and national 
sources 
For 1990 international trade is 
estimated to have decreased the 
demand for workers with little 
education by 20 per cent and more. 
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Reduced Form Regressions 
 
 
Dewatripont, 
Sapir and Sekkat 
(1999) 
Impact of international 
trade on wages and 
employment, relaxing the 
assumption that production 
factors are perfectly mobile 
across sectors. 
Data for 14 two-digit 
sectors in Belgium-
Luxembourg, Denmark, 
Germany and the United 
Kingdom 
 (1981, 1984 and 1988). 
Results suggest that trade with 
developing countries affected 
relative wages of manual (low-skilled 
workers) rather than relative 
employment in the five EU countries 
considered.  
 
 
 
 
Oscarsson (2000) 
 
 
 
Cobb-Douglas function 
with assumption of Hicks-
neutral technological 
change. 
 
 
 
Four-digit sector level data 
for 63 Swedish 
manufacturing industries 
(1975-1993). 
Import price competition decreased 
employment of production workers 
as well as employment of non-
production workers. Impact on the 
latter surprisingly higher. Imports 
depressed the wages of production 
workers, not those of non-production 
workers but wage effects are smaller 
than employment effects. 
 
 
 
Mandated Wage Regressions 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Leamer (1996) 
 
 
 
 
 
Stolper-Samuelson 
theorem linking changes in 
import prices to changes in 
factor prices, under the 
long-run zero profits 
assumption.  
The pass-through of 
productivity changes to 
domestic product prices is 
accounted for. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
NBER productivity 
database 
450 four-digit SIC 
industries 
US (1961-1991) 
In the 1970s product price changes 
explain a very large part of the 
decrease in the wages of low-wage 
workers. In the 1980s estimations 
suggest that the wages of high-wage 
workers actually decreased primarily 
due to product price changes (if pass-
through is complete) or technological 
change (if pass-through is set to zero). 
Using the distinction non-production/ 
production the wages of production 
workers are estimated to have 
decreased both in the 1970s and the 
1980s due to product price changes (if 
pass-through is complete) or 
technological change (if pass-through 
is set to zero). 
 
 
 
 
 
Baldwin and 
Cain (1997) 
 
 
 
 
Heckscher-Ohlin  with 
varying types of 
technological change 
 
 
 
Bureau of Economic 
Analysis (BEA) input-
output data 
Bureau of Labor Statistics 
 NBER productivity 
database 
79 two-digit industries 
US (1968-1991) 
 
For the period 1967-1973 the 
increased supply of well-educated 
workers explains large part of the 
decreased wage inequality. 
For the period 1979-1991 increased 
imports cannot explain increased 
wage inequality, except for the group 
with less than 11 years of education. 
Technological change with an 
apparent factor bias and a sector bias 
in favour of well-educated workers 
may have been the dominant force of 
increased wage inequality during the 
latter period. 
 
 
Feenstra and 
Hanson (1999) 
The proposed two-step 
mandated wage regression 
procedure accounts for 
large country effects and 
permits to discriminate 
between the factor bias and 
the sector bias of 
technological change. 
 
NBER productivity 
database-Bureau of Labor 
Statistics 
450 four-digit SIC 
industries 
US (1958-1991) 
 
 
Computer investment explains, 
depending on the specification, 35 per 
cent up to 75 per cent and foreign 
outsourcing 15 per cent up to 40 per 
cent of the increase in the relative 
wages of non-production workers. 
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Haskel and 
Slaughter ( 2001) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
" 
 
 
 
 
 
Manufacturing data- 
Census of production 
UK (1958-1986) 
 
Under the small country assumption  
international trade explains rising 
wage inequality in the UK in the 
1980s more than technology does. If 
price changes and TFP changes are 
considered as endogenous, changes in 
OECD prices and UK tariffs 
significantly increased relative wages 
of high-skilled workers. Changes in 
import prices from NIC significantly 
affected TFP growth but not relative 
wages. 
 
Cuyvers, 
Dumont and 
Rayp (2003) 
 
 
" 
 
Unido- Labour Force 
Survey data 
nine EU countries  
(1985-1996) 
Little evidence of significant Stolper-
Samuelson. Import competition of 
South-East Asian NIC significantly 
induced technological change, but 
this effect surprisingly seems to have 
favoured low-skilled workers. 
 
 
 
Flexible Cost Functions 
 
Feenstra and 
Hanson (1996, 
2001) 
Labour demand derived 
from a translog cost 
function reflecting the cost 
minimizing behaviour of 
firms. Exogenous factors 
(e.g. import competition) 
incorporated. 
 
 
US manufacturing 
industries 
(1979-1990) 
Foreign outsourcing explains 15 up to 
24 per cent of the increase in the  
wage bill share of non-production 
workers. In the period 1979-1987 the 
import share explains 15 up to 33 per 
cent of the wage bill share of non-
production workers. 
Anderton and 
Brenton (1999) 
 
" 
Eleven four-digit sectors 
UK (1970-1986) 
Imports of NIC significantly 
increased the demand for non-
manual workers. 
 
Egger and Egger 
(2000) 
 
" 
 
20 manufacturing industries 
Austria (1990-1998) 
Outsourcing towards East European 
countries explains 25 per cent of the 
increased relative employment of 
high-skilled workers. 
 
Anderton, 
Brenton and 
Oscarsson (2002) 
 
 
" 
 
41 four-digit manufacturing 
industries 
Sweden (1975-1993)  
Imports from low-wage countries 
explain up to 25 per cent of the 
increase in the wage bill share and up 
to 15 per cent of the increase in the 
employment share of non-production 
workers. 
 
 
Strauss-Kahn 
(2003) 
 
 
" 
 
 
50 French manufacturing 
industries 
(1977-1993) 
Foreign outsourcing explains 11 up to 
15 per cent of the decreased 
employment share of low-skilled 
workers in the period 1977-1985 and 
up to 25 per cent in the period 1985-
1993. 
 
Morrison Paul 
and Siegel (2001) 
 
Extended generalized 
Leontief cost function 
 
US manufacturing 
industries 
1959-1989 
Impact of technological change on 
the relative demand for high-skilled 
workers higher than impact of 
international trade but indications of 
trade-induced technological change. 
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Bargaining models 
 
Gaston and 
Trefler (1995) 
Efficient bargaining 
framework (unions and 
firms bargain for wages 
and employment) 
 
Data on individuals' 
characteristics and earnings 
US (1983) 
The union wage premium is more 
sensitive to import competition than 
to export performance. 
 
 
Kramarz (2003) 
Efficient bargaining 
framework with outside 
option of firms depending 
on the opportunity to 
relocate or outsource 
activities abroad. 
 
 
French Customs firm level 
data- Data on individuals 
(1986-1992) 
Impact of imports on bargaining 
position of high-skilled workers 
surprisingly higher than impact on 
low-skilled workers. Origin of 
imports matters, especially for high-
skilled workers. 
 
 
 
Computable General Equilibrium (CGE) models 
 
Krugman (1995 b) 
Miniature CGE model 
with high-skill intensive 
and low-skill intensive 
sector. 
 
World bank data 
Small negative impact of trade with 
NIC on the relative wages of low-
skilled workers. 
 
Lawrence and 
Evans (1996) 
CGE model with two 
production factors and 
three sectors (e.g. non-
tradables). 
 
US manufacturing 
industries 
(1990) 
Small impact of international trade 
in the past inferred from simulation 
of a future substantial increase in 
international trade. 
 
 
Cline (1997) 
Trade and Income 
Distribution Equilibrium 
(TIDE) model. Thirteen 
regions considered (e.g. 
US, EU, Asian Tigers).  
 
Five sectors 
(1973, 1984 and 1994 
benchmark years) 
Stolper-Samuelson effects are diluted 
due to the large size of the non-
tradables sector and the home bias in 
consumption and production. 
 
 
 
 
 
Minford, Riley and 
Nowell (1997) 
 
 
 
 
 
North-South CGE model 
based on Heckscher-
Ohlin, expanded to 
account for evolving 
factor and product 
properties. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
OECD/non-OECD (1970-
1990) 
 
About 40 per cent of the decrease in 
employment of low-skilled workers in 
the North (OECD) can be explained 
by technology (60 per cent) and trade 
(40 per cent).  The same proportion 
between technology and trade holds 
for explaining the decrease in relative 
wages and the rising unemployment 
of low-skilled workers. The 
substantial impact of technology and 
trade was counterbalanced by a rise 
in the supply of high-skilled workers 
and productivity growth. 
 
Cortes and Jean 
(1998) 
North-South CGE model 
with imperfect product 
market competition 
(Armington) and capital-
skill complementarity.  
Thirteen sectors (e.g. 
services) 
CHELEM trade data 
International input-output 
data 
Import competition of emerging 
economies can explain a non-
negligible but small part of the rise in 
wage inequality in the EU. 
 
 
Nahuis (1998) 
Worldscan model. 
Heckscher-Ohlin model, 
combined with a Solow 
model of economic 
growth.  
 
Bilateral trade and input-
output data 
(1990 benchmark year) 
Results suggest that international 
trade with developing countries 
explains about half of the increased 
wage inequality in the 1980s. 
 
 
Smith (1999) 
CGE model with imper-
fect product market 
competition (Dixit-
Stiglitz) and capital 
assumed perfectly mobile 
internationally. 
 
64 three-digit sectors for 
eleven EU countries 
(1991 benchmark year) 
 
Not much evidence that EU trade 
with developing countries can explain 
substantial part of EU 
unemployment. 
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3.3 General Conclusions part I 
 
In the 1980s, the skill premium and the relative employment of high-skilled workers started to 
increase dramatically in the United States. Data for the European Union provide a mixed image 
of the evolution of wage inequality, with a sharp increase in the United Kingdom and a moderate 
increase in a number of other EU countries but also stable if not declining inequality in some 
EU countries. In a number of EU countries unemployment of low-skilled workers rose 
considerably in this period. Overall the stylised facts show a deterioration of the labour market 
position of low-skilled workers in most industrialised countries. 
International trade with Newly Industrialised Countries (NIC) increased at about the same time 
that the labour market position of the low-skilled started to deteriorate. Among academics the 
traditional Heckscher-Ohlin model and more specific the Stolper-Samuelson theorem was 
considered as a relevant theoretical framework to assess the impact of trade between developed 
and developing countries on income distribution. 
The Stolper-Samuelson theorem predicts that if a high-skill abundant country opens up to trade 
with a low-skill abundant country, the fall in the relative price of low-skill intensive goods will 
shift production from the low-skill intensive sector(s) to high-skill intensive sectors. As the 
latter have a higher ratio of high-skilled to low-skilled workers, general equilibrium with full 
employment can only be ensured if the wages of low-skilled workers fall, allowing for the 
substitution of low-skilled workers for high-skilled workers.  
 
In chapter 3 I elaborated the Heckscher-Ohlin model and argued that the Stolper-Samuelson 
theorem is relatively robust to relaxing some of the restrictive Heckscher-Ohlin assumptions 
(e.g. no technological differences between countries). The theorem therefore seems a logical 
benchmark for the empirical assessment of the impact of trade with Newly Industrialised 
Countries on wage inequality in high-skill abundant countries.  
The assumption that labour markets are perfectly competitive is however necessary even for 
the Stolper-Samuelson theorem to hold and seems rather unrealistic, especially for the European 
Union, given the common belief of downward wage rigidity in many EU countries.  
I therefore also discussed some more European models that allow for sticky wages in general 
or consider specific labour market institutions like collective bargaining that play an important 
role in wage setting in the European Union. 
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In section 3.1 some theoretical mechanisms that account for a labour market impact of 
international trade outside the Heckscher-Ohlin framework have been presented. 
Foreign outsourcing, i.e. the contracting out to low-wage countries of labour-intensive 
fragments of production processes in high-wage countries, is widely seen as an increasingly 
important aspect of globalisation and models that focus on this phenomenon predict an impact 
on labour markets though the predictions are more ambiguous than the predictions of the 
Heckscher-Ohlin model.   
 
In section 3.2 I reviewed the empirical work on the link between international trade and labour 
market developments. 
 
Most of the early empirical work, which mainly considered the situation in the United States, 
tested some of the predictions of the Stolper-Samuelson theorem, e.g. the link between prices 
of imported goods and domestic goods. The empirical tests did not seem to provide much 
evidence of considerable Stolper-Samuelson effects. The increase in skill intensity in most 
industries was seen as evidence that skill-biased technological change (SBTC) was a more 
likely determinant as the Heckscher-Ohlin model actually predicts a fall in skill intensity in 
high-skill abundant countries.   
The results of decomposition analysis, which overall indicated that, in contrast with the 
Heckscher-Ohlin prediction, employment shifted within industries rather than between 
industries was trotted out as additional incriminating evidence against SBTC, further 
discharging international trade.  
 
However, some of the non-Stolper-Samuelson theoretical models that were presented in section 
3.1 predict an impact of international trade on wages without necessarily affecting relative 
product prices and allow for within-industry changes due to international trade as much as for 
between-industry shifts. 
 
A number of factor content calculations, which inferred the impact of international trade on 
jobs or wages from the assumed amount of production factors embodied in trade flows, 
provided substantial estimates of the impact of North-South trade but were harshly criticised 
for lacking any appreciable theoretical justification. 
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The mandated wage regression procedure was a distinct methodological improvement as it was 
more closely linked to the Stolper-Samuelson than any previous method and moreover 
permitted to discern the impact of international trade from the impact of skill-biased 
technological change, accounting for the interlinkage. 
Estimations for the United States suggested that Stolper-Samuelson effects were significant and 
relatively substantial but for EU countries generally no significant effects were found.   
 
If some of the early empirical work was waved aside for lack of a clear theoretical framework, 
the mandated wage procedure has, on the contrary, been charged for obstinately clinging to the 
Heckscher-Ohlin model in spite of some rather restrictive assumptions. 
 
Relaxing the Stolper-Samuelson assumption that wages are fully flexible, the impact of 
international trade and technological change on the demand for production factors can be 
derived from extended flexible cost functions, modelling the cost-minimizing behaviour of 
firms. The estimated elasticity of labour demand gives an indication of the impact of 
international trade on wages or- if wages are sticky- on employment.  
Most flexible cost function estimations suggested a significant impact of trade with the Newly 
Industrialised Countries on wages and/ or employment. 
 
A union bargaining framework specifies a labour market institution, i.e. collective bargaining, 
believed to be important in wage setting in the European Union. If international trade weakens 
the bargaining position of unions, wages and employment will be affected in a way that depends 
on the bargaining regime and union preferences. The rare estimations using a bargaining 
framework found an impact of trade on wages and employment. 
 
Krugman, arguing that most previous empirical work only provided a partial analysis of the 
interaction of labour market developments and international trade, proposed a miniature 
Computable General Equilibrium (CGE) model.  
More elaborated CGE models have since been proposed, incorporating sectors of non-tradables 
and intermediate inputs, differentiated goods, increasing returns to scale, capital mobility, 
technological catch-up and relative factor supply.  
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The results of CGE modelling are clearly sensitive to the specific structure that is imposed but, 
with some exceptions, suggested a rather limited role of North-South trade in labour market 
development. 
Summing up, the methodological assessment of how much international trade with Newly 
Industrialised Countries affected wages and employment in industrialised countries has been 
refined considerably since the early empirical work.  
Though the mid-1990s consensus view that international trade only played a limited role in the 
rise in the skill premium or in the high unemployment rates of low-skilled workers was 
overhasty it seems only fair to say that more recent empirical studies overall failed to find 
overwhelming evidence that international trade has been the dominant determinant of labour 
market developments.   
However, most of the empirical work focused on the United States, to some extent explained 
by data availability, whereas for the European Union only a relatively small number of single 
country studies have been carried out.  
As stylised facts for the United States differ from those in most EU countries, conclusions of 
US-based work cannot simply be carried over to the European Union.       
Intra-EU heterogeneity also warns for the generalization of the results for single EU countries. 
 
In part II, I report the results of own empirical work for a panel of EU countries. 
Having reviewed the theoretical and empirical literature I would now like to justify why some 
methodologies have been considered and why others have not.  
 
My main premise for the empirical work is a very distinct preference for multiple regressions, 
as these allow to test, within a well-defined theoretical framework, a number of hypotheses and 
thereby, in my view, seem to join in the recommendation of Leamer and Levinsohn (1995) not 
to take trade theory too seriously, nor to treat it too casually. 
Panel data regressions moreover allow to account and test for the degree of heterogeneity across 
countries. 
By only considering simple correlations or mechanically decomposing employment and wage 
shifts much of the early empirical studies provided circumstantial evidence, at best. 
Given the relatively high level of industry aggregation of the available data for EU countries, a 
decomposition of overall shifts into within-industry and between-industry shifts does not seem 
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very informative. Moreover, a number of non-Heckscher-Ohlin theoretical models clearly 
allow for international trade to induce within-industry shifts as much as between-industry shifts. 
 
Though Krugman tried to rehabilitate the factor content calculations, vilified by many trade 
economists for their lack of theoretical justification, I fully endorse the view of Panagariya 
(2000) that the assumptions required to implement these calculations are much too strong to 
inspire confidence in the estimates they generate.  
 
The first empirical methodology that is considered in part II is the two-step mandated wage 
regression procedure, which given its close link to the well-established Stolper-Samuelson 
theorem seems a logical starting-point for the assessment of the impact of international trade 
on wage inequality. The procedure moreover discriminates between the impact of the two main 
explanations put forward to explain rising wage inequality, i.e. international trade and skill-
biased technological change, explicitly accounting for the interlinkage between both. The 
possible indirect impact of international trade has been ignored in most of the early studies 
despite the general perception of trade as an important spillover channel or as a stimulus for 
defensive innovation.  
The mandated wage regression procedure and its results for a panel of nine EU countries is 
reported in chapter 4. 
 
One of the Heckscher-Ohlin assumptions that is necessary even for the robust Stolper-
Samuelson theorem to hold, namely that labour markets are perfectly competitive, is rather 
problematic for the European Union given the general belief that labour market institutions 
intervene with wage setting in many EU countries. If wages are not fully flexible, a fall in the 
relative demand for low-skilled workers could result in unemployment. 
There is no generally accepted comprehensive general equilibrium framework to assess the 
impact of international trade under the assumption of labour market rigidity.   
Therefore two alternative approaches have been used in part II. 
 
First, in chapter 5, following the European model proposed by Krugman (1995 b), elasticity of 
the demand for low-skilled and high-skilled workers with respect to international trade and 
other external determinants is estimated using extended flexible cost functions. If trade lowers 
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relative labour demand but wages are sticky, the elasticity estimates provide an indication of 
how much unemployment of low-skilled workers could be explained by international trade.     
The European model allows for sticky wages but does not really specify what might cause 
wages to be sticky. 
Therefore, a relatively novel two-step estimation procedure that considers the important role 
that unions are assumed to play in European labour markets is proposed in chapter 6. 
There is ample empirical evidence that strong labour unions are successful at confining wage 
inequality. If globalisation weakens the strength of unions this could explain the rise in wage 
inequality or unemployment of low-skilled workers.   
In the first step of the proposed procedure, bargaining power is estimated for five EU countries, 
using firm-level data. At the same time, hypotheses with respect to the bargaining regime and 
union preferences can be tested. In a second step the estimated bargaining power is regressed 
on international trade and other potential determinants of union bargaining power. 
If international trade is found to weaken the bargaining position of labour unions, the first-step 
results with respect to the bargaining regime and union preferences can be invoked to infer the 
impact of international trade on wages and employment. 
 
I would like to believe that the combination of the three empirical procedures yields 
methodologically sound and relatively robust conclusions with respect to the impact of 
international trade with Newly Industrialised Countries, on wages and employment of low-
skilled and high-skilled workers in the European Union.   
 
Somehow I am inclined to conclude part I here, hopping to part II, but I am afraid that this will 
elicit the question why didn’t you … do some CGE modelling?  
Though I agree with Krugman that a general equilibrium analysis of the interactions between 
international trade and labour market developments is called for I consider most of the CGE 
models as very specific and restrictive.  
 
My main objection is that CGE models torture the elected variables, afflicted with measurement 
error, until there is no residual variance left.  
The results of panel data estimations, though obviously also affected by measurement errors 
and omitted variables, partially absorb these deficiencies by capturing them in the error term 
or in the country-specific intercepts. 
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Somehow I am inclined to conclude part I here. The chances are that this will elicit the question 
why didn't you ... but anyhow concluding part I is just what I am going to do now. 
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PART II 
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4. Two-Step Mandated Wage Panel Regressions 
  
 
""A rise in any single commodity price will cause the reward of some factor to rise in terms of 
all other goods and to fall in terms of none, and it will cause the reward of some other factor 
to fall in terms of all goods- provided that the good is initially produced and that every factor 
which it employs is subsequently also employed elsewhere in the economy."  
 
Ethier (1984: pp. 165-166). 
 
4.1 Introduction 
 
In this chapter the results of two-step mandated wage regressions for a panel of EU countries 
are reported. The methodology has already been discussed extensively in section 3.2.5 but some 
additional methodological and econometric issues will be dealt with. 
As argued by Slaughter (2000) the mandated wage regression procedure comes closer than 
simple consistency checks to testing the correlation version of the Stolper-Samuelson theorem 
(see quote of Ethier 1984) which he considered the most suited version of the theorem to assess 
increased wage inequality.  
The Stolper-Samuelson theorem implies two predictions linking changes in import prices to 
changes in factor prices: 
 
 Changes in domestic product prices will be positively correlated with changes in import 
prices. 
 Changes in factor prices will be positively correlated with changes in the relative 
domestic prices of those goods that relatively require much of the given production 
factor. 
 
The first correlation is estimated in the first step and the second correlation in the second step 
of the two-step procedure. 
For a large economy or countries with substantial international technology spillovers an 
additional prediction is given: 
 
 Changes in total factor productivity will be negatively correlated with changes in 
domestic product prices. 
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This prediction can be tested with the estimation of the TFP pass-through in the first step 
product price regression 
Leamer (1996 a: pp. 25-26) justified the mandated wage approach as a second best to a world-
wide general equilibrium input-output model, which given the lack of data is not within reach.  
The procedure has the additional advantage that it permits to disentangle the impact of 
international trade from the impact of technological change (i.e. the main alternative 
explanation for increased wage inequality), while explicitly accounting for the interlinkage 
between both explanations (e.g. trade-induced technological change, trade-related spillovers). 
 
The results discussed in this chapter are to a large extent based on Cuyvers, Dumont and Rayp 
(2003) with extensions with respect to foreign outsourcing, an update of the data set and some 
alternative specifications and robustness tests. 
In most mandated wage estimations a single country is considered (e.g. the United States in 
Leamer 1996 a, Baldwin and Cain 1997 and Feenstra and Hanson 1999 and the United Kingdom 
in Haskel and Slaughter 2001). Given the general view of substantial institutional differences 
between the United States, the United Kingdom and continental EU countries and the high 
degree of intra-EU heterogeneity that became apparent from the stylised facts reported in 
chapter 2, the results for single countries cannot simply be carried over to all EU countries. 
Performing panel estimations, the impact of international trade on wage inequality can be 
established, accounting for the degree of heterogeneity among EU countries, to find out whether 
international trade with Newly Industrialised Countries (NIC) affected EU countries in an 
asymmetric way (e.g. due to differences in skill abundance, specialisation patterns, trade flows 
or labour market institutions).  
Previous mandated wage estimations considered a single aggregate NIC group. However, 
Newly Industrialised Countries from (South-) East Asia, Central and Eastern Europe and Latin 
America are unlikely to be similar with regard to skill-abundance, technological level, 
transportation and communication costs and even import tariffs (regulated in regional trade 
agreements with the European Union) and can therefore questionably be merged into a single 
group of homogenous countries.  A geographical breakdown of the Newly Industrialised 
Countries can account for intra-NIC heterogeneity. 
 
As explained in section 3.2.5, the pass-through of total factor productivity to domestic product 
prices reflects the impact of the country considered on world market prices (i.e. country size) 
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or the extent to which technological change spills over between countries. The two-step 
mandated wage procedure proposed by Feenstra and Hanson (1999) permits the estimation of 
the pass-through rather than arbitrarily fixing it at a given level as in Leamer (1996 a). Feenstra 
and Hanson (1999) used data on outsourcing, computer equipment and other high-tech capital 
and Haskel and Slaughter (2001) data on innovation counts, industry concentration, union 
density, computer use and foreign prices to construct independent variables for the TFP 
regression.  
 
Using domestic and foreign R&D stocks as structural determinants, Cuyvers, Dumont, Rayp 
and Stevens (2003) and Cuyvers, Dumont and Rayp (2003) accounted for the role of R&D 
spillovers.  
As mentioned in section 3.1.1.2, Grossman and Helpman (1991) perceived international trade 
as an important spillover mechanism though they explicitly considered the possibility that free 
trade can actually slow down economic growth in some countries. In their endogenous growth 
model the impact of technology and trade policies will depend upon whether knowledge 
spillovers are local or global in scope.  
Analysis of competing products and contacts with clients are two channels for learning through 
trade that are frequently mentioned in a survey of innovative firms. Exporters appear to learn 
from their foreign buyers and importers from their foreign suppliers (MacGarvie 2003).  
Coe and Helpman (1995) and Lichtenberg and Van Pottelsberghe de la Potterie (1996) found 
evidence of substantial trade-related international R&D spillovers between OECD countries 
and Coe, Helpman and Hoffmaister (1995) considering 77 developing countries in the period 
1971-1990, found evidence of substantial trade-related R&D spillovers from industrialised 
countries to the developing countries.  
The impact of international spillovers provides an alternative mechanism for defensive 
innovation, induced by import price competition, raised by Wood (1994). 
Both indirect effects of international trade need not have the same sign and the latter effect is 
likely to be more factor-biased. 
Incorporating spillovers will improve the econometric specification and hence the estimation 
of the direct and indirect effect of international trade on wages. Large international spillovers 
would point at the pervasiveness of technological change, which should be reflected in a large 
TFP pass-through, even for small countries as the latter are often found to be the most important 
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beneficiaries of international knowledge spillovers (e.g. Coe and Helpman 1995; Dumont and 
Tsakanikas 2001, 2004).   
In the following section I will describe the data sources that were used to construct the panel of 
EU countries. In section 4.3 some issues regarding the estimation procedure are discussed and 
the estimation results are reported. 
 
4.2. Data20 
 
The panel that has been constructed reflects a trade-off between the need to consider 
manufacturing industries at a sufficiently low level of sector aggregation- to account for sector 
heterogeneity- and the objective to cover a reasonable number of EU countries.  For a small 
number of EU countries data are available on most variables to perform estimations at a more 
disaggregated level but this would not add much insight to previous single country studies. Data 
were gathered for the period 1985-1996, later extended with more recent data for the second 
half of the 1990s. For each variable the data sources and some of their limitations are listed 
below:  
 
 
 Wages  
 
 
For the wages of low-skilled and high-skilled workers it was necessary to proxy low-skilled 
workers by manual workers (operatives) and high-skilled workers by non-manual workers 
(non-operatives) (see section 2.1 on the appropriateness of this proxy). The Harmonized Gross 
Earnings data from EUROSTAT (NewCronos) provide hourly wages of manual workers and 
monthly wages of non-manual workers. For the period 1985-91 the UNIDO General Industrial 
Statistics give the wage sum of operatives and the number of operatives, which allows for a 
straightforward way of computing monthly wages of operatives. From 1992 onwards, monthly 
wages of manuals were computed with the wage sum of manual workers (total wage sum minus 
the wage sum of non-manual workers (NewCronos) and the rescaled number of manual 
workers, taken from the European Union Labour Force Survey (LFS) database. Data on wages 
following the International Standard Classification of Occupation (ISCO- see section 2.2.1) are 
not provided by EUROSTAT, which makes it impossible to estimate a mandated wage 
                                                 
20 The data description is to a large extent based on Cuyvers, Dumont and Rayp (2003). 
                   
                                                                                               
                                                                                                                                           167 
regression for high-skilled and low-skilled workers.  Given that the LFS data are open to 
suspicion (see section 2.1), whenever available more reliable national data were used or data 
from the OECD International Sectoral Database (ISDB).  
For Belgium social security data on the number of manual and non-manual workers are 
provided by the National Office for Social Security (RSZ) for the entire period. 
For Sweden, Eva Oscarsson from the Department of Economics at the University of Stockholm 
kindly provided data on employment and wages for the period 1970-1993, as used in e.g. 
Oscarsson (2000). 
 
 
 Labour shares 
  
 
UNIDO data on the wage sum of operatives are available for Denmark, Finland, Germany, 
Italy, Spain and the United Kingdom though not always for all years.  The breakdown by 
operatives/ non-operatives is no longer provided by UNIDO after 1991. From 1992 onwards, 
albeit only from 1993 onwards for most countries, the Labour Force Surveys provide 
information on the number of white-collar and blue-collar workers. As mentioned in section 
2.2.1, the LFS data do not match the official OECD data on total employment.  The OECD 
adjusted the data to the Structural Analysis industrial (STAN) database or OECD National 
Accounts data (OECD 1998: p.5).  As the LFS data are the results of surveys, the OECD STAN 
data on total employment can be considered to be more reliable and were therefore used to 
rescale the ISCO numbers, following the white-collar/ blue-collar ratio of LFS.  
The value added share of labour was taken from STAN. 
The value added share of non-manuals was computed using the monthly wages of non-manuals 
and the rescaled numbers of white-collar workers.  From this the value added shares of manuals 
were computed.  In general this led to intuitively acceptable results, except for Italy.  For Italy, 
data on the number of hours worked by operatives were taken from the OECD Industrial Survey 
results, which for Italy is given only for 1992-1994. The number of hours worked by operatives 
(i.e. blue-collar workers in the ISCO classification), the gross hourly wages of manuals from 
NewCronos and the total wage sum from OECD STAN permitted to compute the value added 
share of manuals. The results appeared to be more reliable. For a number of countries UNIDO 
and LFS data overlap for one or two years. This permitted for these countries to smooth the 
time series on value added shares, which sometimes showed substantial breaks at the partition 
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year of both distinct data sources. The smoothed time series are used in alternative estimations 
to test the robustness of the results. 
 Domestic prices 
 
 
Domestic prices at the sector level were computed from the OECD STAN data on sector value 
added in current prices and value added in constant prices. 
 
 
 Unit value import prices 
 
 
Unit value import prices were computed at the sector level. Data on bilateral imports were taken 
from the OECD International Trade by Commodities Statistics (ITCS) and aggregated into 
seven geographical groups of trade partners: high-skill EU countries (Austria, Belgium-
Luxembourg, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Italy, the Netherlands, Sweden and the 
United Kingdom); low-wage EU countries (Ireland, Greece, Portugal and Spain); non-EU 
OECD countries (Australia, Japan, New Zealand, Norway and the United States); Asian Tigers 
(Hong Kong, South Korea and  Singapore); Asian Pussycats (Indonesia, Malaysia, the 
Philippines and Thailand); Central and Eastern European emerging economies (Czech 
Republic, Hungary and Poland) and Latin American NIC (Argentina, Brazil, Chile and 
Mexico). 
As ITCS data are given for Standard International Trade Classification (SITC) commodity 
classes and the estimation is done for International Standard Industrial Classification (ISIC) 
sectors, the data had to be converted from SITC to ISIC, using correspondence tables from the 
RAMON EUROSTAT classifications server (http://europa.eu.int/comm/eurostat/ramon).  
 
Freeman and Revenga (1999) pointed out that unit value prices are a ‘mishmash’ of aggregate 
prices of commodities. However, they found that sectors that experienced increased import 
penetration showed relative price declines, which suggests that imports price changes are good 
proxies for import pressure. A caveat of unit value price changes that is often put forward is 
that as it concerns aggregates, the changes might reflect a change of the commodity mix rather 
than a change of commodity prices. To preclude this possibility unit value prices were 
computed, following the shift-share approach, keeping the commodity structure fixed. Using a 
shift-share approach changes in unit value prices can be decomposed into three components.  A 
first component measures the part due to changes in the commodity mix, keeping commodity 
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prices fixed at their begin of period values.  A second component measures the part of unit 
value price changes that can be explained by changes in commodity prices, keeping the 
commodity mix fixed at its begin structure. Finally, the interaction component measures the 
changes of the commodity mix and commodity prices. The second component is considered as 
a measure for unit value price changes. 
Given the measurement problem with import prices, import volumes have been considered as 
an alternative measure for import competition. 
 
 Total Factor Productivity 
 
Total factor productivity (TFP) was taken from the OECD International Sectoral Database 
(ISDB). For those countries for which ISDB did not provide data on TFP it was computed from 
data on gross fixed capital formation and employment (STAN/ ISDB) using the formula given 
in OECD (1994): 
  
0
w1w
TFP
GCSET
VA
TFP

  
VA: Value added 
ET: Total employment 
GCS: Gross capital stock 
w: Value added share of labour (standardized at 70 per cent for all sectors and countries) 
TFP0: Total factor productivity in reference year (1985) 
 
In OECD (1994) total factor productivity was computed, using a Cobb-Douglas production 
function, as output growth minus the weighted growth of input factors (i.e. capital and labour) 
with the value added shares of the production factors taken as the weights. The OECD 
considered a standardized labour share of 70 per cent for all sectors and countries, which is said 
to be close to the actual measured labour shares in most sectors and countries. The use of actual 
labour shares is considered to be unreliable as inspection of the data seems to suggest that 
measured differences reflect differences in the coverage of individual categories of data rather 
than actual differences in factor shares (OECD 1994: appendix 5).   
TFP is considered as a proxy for technological change. The appendix to this chapter contains a 
note on the appropriateness of TFP as a measure for technological change. 
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 R&D stock 
 
Haskel and Slaughter (1999) used innovation counts as a determinant of total factor 
productivity.  This information is not available for enough EU countries to be used. Instead 
R&D stocks are used. National R&D stocks are computed from data on R&D expenditures 
provided by the OECD Analytical Business Enterprise Research and Development (ANBERD) 
database, completed with BERD data. The 1973 stock was taken as the initial stock and 
computed with the formula given by Coe and Helpman (1995). For each sector, three R&D 
stocks were computed: the national R&D stock of the given sector; the total national R&D stock 
(minus the sector R&D stock) to estimate national inter-sector spillovers and a foreign R&D 
stock which was weighted according to the procedure proposed by Lichtenberg and van 
Pottelsberghe de la Potterie (1996). As it concerns sector R&D stocks the foreign R&D stocks 
were weighted by total imports over the GDP of the exporting country times the share of the 
sector in the national output. 
 
 
 Concentration 
 
 
To control for the effects of imperfect competition on price setting, the share of the four largest 
firms in the output of a given sector (C4) was computed, using firm level data from the Amadeus 
database (provided by Bureau Van Dijk) and data on sector output from STAN. To correct for 
errors due to the use of consolidated data, an alternative measure of concentration, using STAN 
data, was also computed.  
 
 
 Capital/labour ratio 
 
 
As an alternative control variable for imperfect competition the capital/labour ratio was 
computed from OECD STAN data. The capital/labour ratio is a measure of capital intensity and 
thus can be seen as a proxy for returns to scale and entry barriers, i.e. it is more difficult for a 
new firm to enter an industry that is capital-intensive and for a given market size a high 
investment level implies a small number of viable firms.  
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In European Communities (2003) a positive correlation between market concentration and 
capital intensity (measured by the capital/labour ratio) is found. 
The initial data set covers the period 1985-1995. From figure 4.1, which shows average EU 
growth of real GDP per capita, taken from the Penn World Tables 6.1, it can be seen that 1985 
and 1995 are very similar points in the business cycle21. This is convenient as mandated wage 
regressions consider changes over long time periods and business cycle effects can be 
important, e.g. the cyclical nature of factor utilisation not accounted for in traditional TFP 
estimates (Larsen, Neiss and Shortall 2002).     
 
Figure 4.1: Average Real GDP per Capita Growth in the European Union (1980-2000) 
       
          Source: Own calculations from data in Heston, Summers and Aten (2002). 
 
 
The Central and Eastern European countries and China only became active exporters in the 
1990s, as shown in section 2.2. Extending the data set for more recent years proved even more 
difficult than the construction for the period 1985-1995. EUROSTAT no longer provides data 
on wages at the sector level, broken down by manual and non-manual workers and for most 
countries 1998 is the most recent year for which this breakdown is available. For the 1990s, the 
Labour Force Survey data on employment by ISCO 88 are the only source for internationally 
comparable data on employment by skill level. In section 2.1, I argued that the reliability of 
these data could be questioned. For the most recent years in the 1990s, data on total factor 
productivity are difficult to find as well, for a number of EU countries in the panel. 
                                                 
21 Peirό (2004) found indications for seven EU countries, in the period 1957-1998, that business cycles are not asymmetric. 
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For the 1990s data on China were added to account for the emergence of this country as an 
important exporter to developed countries. 
 
 
4.3 Estimation Procedure and Results  
 
 
A panel of nine EU countries (Belgium, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Italy, Spain, 
Sweden and the United Kingdom) and twelve sectors [Food, drink & tobacco (ISIC 31), 
Textiles, footwear & leather (ISIC 32), Wood, cork & furniture (ISIC 33), Paper, printing & 
publishing (ISIC 34), Chemicals (ISIC 35), Non-metallic mineral products (ISIC 36), Basic 
Metal Industries (ISIC 37), Fabricated metal products (ISIC 381), Non-electrical machinery 
(ISIC 382), Electrical equipment (ISIC 383), Transport equipment (ISIC 384) and Precision 
instruments (ISIC 385)] has been constructed. 
As discussed in section 3.2.5, a two-step mandated wage estimation consists in regressing, in a 
first step, domestic price changes and total factor productivity on structural determinants. The 
estimated impact of each determinant (computed as the variable multiplied by its estimated 
coefficient) is then, in the second step, regressed on the value added shares of the different 
production factors. The estimated coefficients of the factor shares are then considered as an 
estimate of the changes in the rewards of the respective production factors, mandated  by the 
structural determinants. 
 
 
4.3.1 First Step Estimation 
 
 
The first step specification, with all seven countries groups distinguished, for the domestic price 
regression and the TFP regression are given as (cf. equations 3.36 and 3.37 in section 3.2.5): 
 
pr,iitfplat,ilatcee,iceeasl,iasl
ash,iashoere,ioereeul,ieuleuh,ieuhi,0dom,i
TFPlogplogplogplog
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Where dom,iplog denotes the change in domestic product prices of sector i over a period of time. 
Considering changes over a relatively long period is justified as Stolper-Samuelson effects bear 
upon the long run.  
I performed panel unit roots tests using the TSP panunit procedure22. This procedure runs the 
unit roots tests proposed by Im, Pesaran and Shin (1997), which allow for some of the individual 
time series to have unit roots in the alternative hypothesis. The tests suggest that none of the 
time series of the variables are stationary in the levels. Considering first differences, the null 
hypothesis of unit roots could not always be rejected, indicating that even after differencing the 
time series are not stationary. The tests seem to indicate that there is actually no long-run 
cointegration relationship between the variables considered in levels nor in first differences. 
However, as pointed out by Baltagi and Kao (2000) these tests critically rely on the length of 
the time series for observational units being large and Breitung (2000) showed that the tests by 
Im, Pesaran and Shin (1997), as well as other panel unit roots tests, tend to have a very low 
power, i.e. small probability that a false null hypothesis is rejected. Baltagi and Kao (2000) 
concluded their overview of the econometrics of non-stationary panels by pointing out that 
although several issues have been resolved, a large number of issues remain unresolved. 
Considering changes in variables over a long time period reduces the probability of spurious 
correlation at the expense of dropping information on short- and medium-run effects.      
 
Import price changes are considered for the seven distinct country groups: the high-skill EU 
countries (Δlog peuh), the low-wage EU countries (Δlog peul), the non-EU OECD countries (Δlog 
poere), the Asian Tigers (Δlog pash), the Asian Pussycats (Δlog pasl), Central and Eastern 
European NIC (Δlog pcee) and the Latin American NIC (Δlog plat): see section 4.2 (unit value 
import prices) for an enumeration of the countries in these seven country groups. TFP denotes 
total factor productivity and SRD, NSRD and FRD are respectively the domestic sector, the 
domestic inter-sector and the foreign R&D stocks. 
The impact of international trade competition on technological change is accounted for by 
considering import price changes relative to the domestic price level in the base period (i.e. 1/ 
pdom, I, 85) in the first step TFP regression.  
 
                                                 
22 Unit roots tests assess the stationarity of time series. If a variable is generated by a non-stationary process, the characteristic equation will 
have a root equal to 1. Testing the hypothesis of a unit root is therefore a test of stationarity. Regressions with non-stationary variables may 
provide spurious results, i.e. results driven by the underlying time trend rather than by a true relationship between the variables.   
                   
                                                                                               
                                                                                                                                           174 
The descriptive statistics of the variables in the first step price and TFP regressions are given 
in table 4.1. 
 
Table 4.1: Descriptive Statistics of Variables in First Step Regressions 
 
 Mean Standard Deviation Minimum Maximum 
log pi,dom 0.32 0.25 -0.74 1.42 
log pi,euh   0.37 0.35 -1.47 1.33 
log pi,eul 0.42 0.27 -0.40 0.93 
log pi,oere 0.40 0.30 -0.33 1.40 
log pi,ash 0.44 0.38 -0.72 1.43 
log pi,asl   0.09 0.50 -1.33 1.35 
log pi,cee 0.55 0.56 -4.13 1.49 
log pi,lat 0.32 0.30 -0.55 1.29 
log TFPi 0.18 0.24 -0.30 1.32 
 log SRDi 0.61 0.55 -0.29 3.16 
 log NSRDi 0.68 0.46 -0.30 2.17 
 log FRDi 0.44 0.24 -0.11 0.90 
 
 
In table 4.2 the correlation matrix for the variables in the first step price regressions is given.  
As the reported correlations are simple correlations one should not read too much into it. 
 
 
Table 4.2: Correlation Matrix of Variables in First Step Price Regressions 
 
 log pi,dom log pi,euh   log pi,eul log pi,oere log pi,ash log pi,asl log pi,cee log pi,lat log TFPi 
log pi,dom 1.00         
log pi,euh   -0.24 1.00        
log pi,eul 0.19 0.00 1.00       
log pi,oere -0.36 0.02 0.19 1.00      
log pi,ash 0.21 0.05 0.18 0.08 1.00     
log pi,asl   -0.03 -0.12 0.12 0.21 0.09 1.00    
log pi,cee 0.03 0.16 0.04 0.14 0.15 -0.10 1.00   
log pi,lat -0.02 0.05 -0.04 0.12 0.18 -0.03 0.02 1.00  
log TFPi -0.68 0.29 -0.02 0.32 -0.17 -0.02 -0.19 0.02 1.00 
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Only import price changes of the low-wage EU countries and the Asian Tigers appear to be 
positively correlated with domestic price changes. Total factor productivity is highly correlated 
with domestic price changes. Import price changes from the high-skill countries (euh and oere), 
i.e. the most important sources of knowledge spillovers for most EU countries, are positively 
correlated with total factor productivity. Correlation between the import price changes is fairly 
low, which supports the distinction between the countries groups considered and does not 
warrant aggregation of country groups because of potential multicollinearity.  
 
 
In table 4.3 the correlation matrix for the variables in the first step TFP regressions is given. 
All price changes of the NIC groups are negatively correlated with total factor productivity, 
which could be an indication of import competition inducing technological change, though it 
should again be pointed out that the matrix reports simple rather than partial correlations. All 
R&D stocks are positively correlated with total factor productivity. 
 
 
Table 4.3: Correlation Matrix of Variables in First Step TFP Regressions 
 
 log TFPi  log SRDi  log NSRDi  log FRDi  log peuh,i  log peul,i  log poere,i  log pash,i  log pasl,i  log pcee,i  log plat,i 
log TFPi 1.00           
 log SRDi 0.17 1.00          
 log NSRDi 0.01 0.22 1.00         
 log FRDi 0.07 0.21 0.01 1.00        
 log peuh,i  0.18 0.01 0.04 -0.02 1.00       
 log peul,i  -0.15 -0.31 -0.05 0.04 0.11 1.00      
 log poere,i 0.18 -0.04 0.02 0.12 -0.06 0.18 1.00     
 log pash,i -0.26 -0.14 -0.16 -0.11 0.11 0.32 0.02 1.00    
 log pasl,i -0.07 0.23 0.13 0.04 -0.10 0.11 0.19 0.08 1.00   
 log pcee,i -0.31 -0.15 -0.08 -0.11 0.16 0.15 0.10 0.29 -0.05 1.00  
 log plat,i -0.11 0.01 -0.11 0.03 0.06 0.02 0.05 0.31 0.05 0.16 1.00 
Note: The changes in import prices are divided by the domestic price level in 1985, as indicated in equation 4.2. 
 
 
With a panel estimation the heterogeneity between observational units (e.g. countries) with 
respect to the relationship between variables can be tested. Differences between units can be 
captured in the intercept and/or the slope of the regression. If units are homogenous, a 
specification with a common intercept and common slopes (i.e. a plain Ordinary Least Squares 
(OLS) estimation on pooled data) will fit the data well. A fixed effects or least squares dummy 
variables (LSDV) specification assumes that differences between units can be captured in unit-
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specific intercepts, given common slopes. Rejection of both a common intercept and common 
slopes points at a high degree of heterogeneity. 
F-tests can be used to test the null hypothesis that a specification is more appropriate than a 
given alternative specification. 
Three F-tests will be reported. For the first F-test, the null hypothesis is that a pooled OLS 
specification (common intercept and slopes) fits the data well, compared to a specification with 
country-specific intercepts and slopes. The second F-test compares a fixed effects specification 
(country-specific intercepts but common slopes) to a specification with country-specific 
intercepts and slopes, whereas the last F-test is a consistency check. 
The results of the first step price regression for the period 1985-1995 are given in table 4.4. 
In the first column the results are given for a specification with a TFP pass-through.  
Only for imports from low-wage EU countries and the Asian Tigers a positive correlation 
between import price changes and domestic product prices is found, as expected from the 
correlation version of Stolper-Samuelson theorem. Only for the first country group this effect 
is statistically significant. 
Table 4.4: First Step Price Regression (1985-1995) 
Dependent variable : log pi,dom  
log pi,euh   -0.04 (-0.72)                  -0.16  (-2.10) ** 
log pi,eul 0.18 (2.22) **                 0.23  (2.56) ** 
log pi,oere -0.09 (-1.38)                   -0.34  (-2.73) *** 
log pi,ash 0.05 (1.14)                      0.14  (2.46) ** 
log pi,asl   -0.02 (-0.65)                     0.01  (0.11) 
log pi,cee -0.01 (-0.73)                     0.02   (1.11) 
log pi,lat 0.03 (0.48)                       0.06  (0.87) 
log TFPi -0.77 (-7.96) *** 
R2adjusted         0.57                                     0.25 
F-test: common intercept and slopes versus 
country-specific intercepts and slopes  
(p-values in brackets) 
1.39 [0.20]                             1.66 [0.05] ** 
F-test: common slopes versus country- 
specific intercepts and slopes, given 
country-specific intercepts  
(p-values in brackets) 
1.18 [0.35]                             1.64 [0.06]* 
F-test: common intercept versus country- 
specific intercepts, given common slopes 
(p-values in brackets) 
2.71 [0.01] **                        1.34 [0.23] 
                        Note:  The table reports the results of a fixed effects estimation. White heteroskedastic-consistent t-statistics in  
                                   brackets.  *- **-** denotes significance at respectively 10%- 5% and 1 % level. 
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The pass-through of total factor productivity is highly significant and clearly dominates the 
impact of import price competition23. 
The results of the estimation of a specification without a TFP pass-through as e.g. Baldwin and 
Cain (1997) and Haskel and Slaughter (2001), are reported in the second column 
This specification seems to suffer from an omitted variable bias. Subject to the caveat of the 
omitted variable bias, results suggest a significant positive correlation for the Asian Tigers (ash) 
and a significant negative correlation for the high-wage EU countries (euh) and the high-skill 
OECD countries (oere). The pass-through of total factor productivity, be it because of the size 
of EU countries or because of international knowledge spillovers, clearly needs to be 
considered. 
 
For the specification with a TFP pass-through, a pooled OLS estimation (i.e. assuming common 
intercepts and common slopes for all EU countries) is not rejected, suggesting that there is 
actually not much heterogeneity between the EU countries considered, with respect to the 
impact of international trade competition on domestic price changes. The table however reports 
the results of the fixed effects estimation (i.e. with common slopes but country-specific 
intercepts) as this performs better in terms of goodness-of-fit, indicating some level 
heterogeneity. 
 
Slaughter (2000) pointed out that the results of mandated wage regressions are found to be 
rather sensitive to whether observations are weighted or not. Leamer (1996 a) reported results 
for weighted mandated wage regressions with the average employment of each sector used to 
weigh. Using value added to weigh apparently gives similar results but both are “entirely” 
different from the unreported results of un-weighted regressions (Leamer 1996 a: p. 29). 
Baldwin and Cain (1997) using employment and output as weights also found substantially 
different results with respect to un-weighted regressions. 
Slaughter (2000) argued that according to the logic of the Stolper-Samuelson theorem, all 
sectors should be weighed equally as the link between product prices and factor rewards 
depends on the existence of sectors, not on their size. Given the assumption of perfect factor 
                                                 
23 A specification with common slopes for all countries is rejected in favour of a specification with common slopes for all variables except for 
the TFP pass-through. The country-specific slopes of the TFP pass-through show no straightforward relation with country size. The results of 
a specification with country-specific TFP pass-throughs do not alter the main conclusions of the first- and second-step estimations.  
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mobility, changes in product prices in a given sector will, irrespective of sector size, affect 
factor prices in all sectors. Therefore Slaughter reasoned that weighing the observations 
requires empirical justification. Baldwin and Cain (1997) weighed industries by size as they 
believed data for small sectors were of poor quality. Another reason could be that smaller 
sectors are residual product categories (Slaughter 2000: p. 156). 
In table 4.5 the results of weighted fixed effects regressions are reported. Sectors are 
alternatively weighted by employment, the wage sum and value added. 
 
 
The main difference is that for all three alternative weights the coefficient of price competition 
of the high-wage EU countries is significant, as in the un-weighted first step regression without 
a TFP pass-through. 
The conclusions of the un-weighted two-step estimation are not affected by weighing the 
observations (i.e. the second step results of weighted regressions do not differ in terms of 
significance from the results of un-weighted regressions). 
 
Table 4.5: Weighted First Step Price Regression (1985-1995) 
 
Dependent variable : log pi,dom (weight) Employment Wage Sum Value Added 
log pi,euh   -0.15   (-2.31) ** -0.20  (-3.19) *** -0.19  (-3.00) *** 
log pi,eul  0.14  (2.49) **  0.14  (2.64) ***  0.12  (2.23) ** 
log pi,oere -0.04  (-0.83) -0.06  (-1.17) -0.05  (-91) 
log pi,ash  0.00  (0.01)  0.01  (0.31) -0.01 (-0.22) 
log pi,asl   -0.02  (-0.69)  -0.03 (-0.93) -0.03 (-0.98)  
log pi,cee -0.01  (-0.24) -0.00  (-0.03) -0.00 (-0.02) 
log pi,lat  0.02  (0.43)  0.04  (0.72) 0.03 (0.31) 
log TFPi -0.68  (-7.30) *** -0.67  (-7.67) *** -0.63 (-6.90) *** 
R2adjusted 0.52 0.55 0.53 
 Note:  The table reports the results of a fixed effects estimation with observations weighted respectively by the sector share of total employ- 
             ment (first column), the share of the total wage sum (second column) and the share of total value added (third column). White hetero- 
            skedastic -consistent t-statistics are given in brackets. *- **-** denotes significance at respectively 10%, 5% and 1 % level. 
 
 
Moreover, given the rather high two-digit industry level, the two empirical arguments for 
weighted regressions mentioned by Slaughter (2000) do not seem very clinching. Therefore, 
the results of weighted regressions are no longer reported hereafter.  
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As mentioned in section 3.2.5, Feenstra and Hanson (1999) pointed out that by assuming wages 
are the same across sectors, which is clearly not supported by the data, the mandated wage 
regression could suffer from an omitted variable bias.  
 
They proposed to use effective total factor productivity, defined as the difference between TFP 
and a residual term, reflecting the factor share-weighted difference between industry-specific 
wages and the mean across sectors for the respective production factors (see equation 3.39 in 
section 3.2.5). Table 4.6 reports the results of the first step price regression with effective TFP 
rather than plain TFP as right-hand side variable.     
The results do not differ substantially from those with plain TFP, except that the negative 
coefficient of import price changes of the high-skill OECD countries (oere) is now significant. 
Although the specification with effective TFP is purported to remove an omitted variable bias, 
the R2 is lower than in the specification with plain TFP.  
 
Table 4.6: First Step Price Regression with Effective TFP (1985-1995) 
 
Dependent variable : log pi,dom  
log pi,euh   -0.08 (-1.25)                  
log pi,eul  0.19 (2.23) **              
log pi,oere -0.16 (-2.03)**                 
log pi,ash 0.05 (0.97)                  
log pi,asl   0.01 (0.04)                 
log pi,cee -0.01 (-0.75)                  
log pi,lat 0.04 (0.48)                  
ETFPi -0.63 (-6.87) *** 
R2adjusted         0.50             
F-test: common intercept and slopes versus 
country-specific intercepts and slopes  
(p-values in brackets) 
1.30 [0.26] 
F-test: common slopes versus country- specific 
slopes, given country specific intercepts  
(p-values in brackets) 
1.21 [0.32] 
F-test: common intercept versus country- specific 
intercepts, given common slopes 
 (p-values in brackets) 
1.70 [0.11] 
                                              Note: See table 4.4 
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The Stolper-Samuelson theorem assumes perfect competition on product and labour markets. 
Haskel and Slaughter (2001) referred to the imperfect competition modelling of international 
trade in Helpman and Krugman (1985). Helpman and Krugman argued that economies of scale 
provide additional gains from trade, which, if large enough, could outdo the Stolper-Samuelson 
corrosion of the scarce factors’ income. The scarce production factors will not lose from trade 
if trade partners are similar with respect to relative factor endowment and economies of scale 
are important. In a market with differentiated goods- invoking the Contestable Markets theory 
proposed by Baumol, Panzar and Willig (1982)- firms will enter until profits are zero, so a 
market which is not perfectly competitive does not need to be inconsistent with the zero-profits 
assumption, as pointed out by Haskel and Slaughter (2001). The more dissimilar countries are 
in terms of factor endowment, the smaller elasticity of substitution between the differentiated 
goods has to be for the scarce factor not to suffer from international trade (Helpman and 
Krugman 1985: pp. 194-195).  
 
As the main focus in this research is on the impact of EU trade with Newly Industrialised 
Countries, which will be relatively dissimilar from EU countries, the bias due to imperfect 
competition is probably not that important. Moreover, models that incorporate imperfect 
competition, if they have any explicit implication for income distribution at all, are very difficult 
if not impossible to use empirically, given the lack of data.        
 
However, in the two-step mandated wage procedure it is feasible to account for the impact of 
imperfect competition in the goods markets by including proxy variables reflecting market 
structure. Market power of domestic firms could, to some extent, shield domestic firms from 
import competition and thus reduce the link between import price changes and domestic product 
price changes, which can be incorporated in the econometric specification as follows: 
 
   
   
   
  pr,iitfplat,IClatlat,i
cee,ICceecee,iasl,ICaslasl,i
ash,ICashash,ioere,ICoereoere,i
eul,ICeuleul,ieuh,ICeuheuh,ii,0dom,i
TFPlogIC*plog
IC*plogIC*plog
IC*plogIC*plog
IC*plogIC*plogplog








                          (4.3) 
 
IC is a proxy for industry concentration. If market power does indeed dampen the impact of 
import competition, the respective coefficients of the interaction between import prices and the 
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IC variable should be significant and negative, which can be tested using an F-test of the 
hypothesis that IC, i (i = euh, eul, oere, ash, asl, cee, lat) are jointly zero.  
In table 4.7 the results of a first step price regression with variables reflecting market structure 
are shown. 
 
 
Table 4.7: First Step Price Regression with Variables reflecting Imperfect Product Market 
Competition (1985-1995) 
 IC = C4a IC = C4b IC = K/L 
log pi,euh   -0.05 (-0.48) -0.11 (-1.33) 0.04 (0.43) 
log pi,eul -0.06 (-0.47) 0.12 (1.08) 0.11 (0.95) 
log pi,oere 0.24 (1.97) * 0.07 (0.60) -0.03 (-0.18) 
log pi,ash -0.14 (-1.55)  0.01 (0.07)  0.03 (0.39) 
log pi,asl   -0.06 (-0.85) -0.08 (-1.37)  -0.03 (-0.48) 
log pi,cee 0.06 (0.60) -0.01 (-0.04) -0.09 (-1.61) 
log pi,lat -0.02 (-0.23) -0.03 (-0.29)  -0.12 (-0.86) 
IC * log pi,euh 0.11 (0.29) 0.26 (1.00) -0.00 (-0.76) 
IC * log pi,eul  0.64 (1.86) * 0.11 (0.36) 0.00 (0.16) 
IC * log pi,oere -1.13 (-2.27) ** -0.77 (-1.42) 0.00 (0.00) 
IC * log pi,ash 0.55 (2.09) ** 0.11 (0.58) 0.00 (0.52) 
IC * log pi,asl   0.19 (0.81) 0.22 (0.98) 0.00 (0.36) 
IC * log pi,cee -0.20 (-0.63) -0.02 (-0.10) 0.00 (1.30) 
IC * log pi,lat 0.10 (0.38) 0.27 (0.78) 0.00 (1.02) 
log TFPi -0.65 (-6.52) *** -0.74 (-7.46) *** -0.85 (-7.47) *** 
R2adjusted 0.63 0.58 0.58 
F-test IC, i = 0  3.67 (0.00) 1.39 (0.22) 1.60 (0.14) 
Note: See table 4.4. The reported F-statistic tests the null hypothesis that all pass-through variables are jointly   
           zero. 
 
 
 
In the first column the IC variable is the share of the cumulative turnover of the four largest 
companies in the sector turnover (C4a), given by the STAN or ISDB sector aggregate. In the 
second column it is the share of the cumulative turnover of the four largest companies in the 
sector turnover (C4b), computed from the Amadeus database, which was the source for the 
company turnover figures (see data description in section 4.2) and in the last column the capital-
labour (K/L) ratio, taken from STAN or ISDB, is considered as a proxy for industry 
concentration. 
 
The hypothesis that the IC, i are jointly zero cannot be rejected for two out of the three proxies 
of market structure.  The first proxy (C4a), for which the null hypothesis is rejected, is of all IC 
proxies most likely to suffer from measurement error as it combines data from two sources 
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(firm level Amadeus data and sector level ISDB-STAN data) and does not correct for the 
consolidation of the company figures that are used for the computation of the cumulative output 
of the four largest companies.   
The evidence of a dampening effect of market power therefore is far from convincing. For 
import price changes from (South-) East Asian NIC and the low-wage EU countries the first 
column actually suggests a reinforcing of the impact due to market power. A specification with 
the market power proxy variables included (alternatively) as simple right-hand side variables, 
as Haskel and Slaughter (2001) did for the United Kingdom with a concentration measure (C5), 
results in a significant coefficient for K/L only.  
 
Overall the alternative first step price regressions only provide evidence for the prediction of a 
positive correlation between import prices and domestic product prices with respect to imports 
from the low-wage EU countries. The correlation between import prices of the Asian Tigers 
and domestic product prices in the EU is also found to be positive in most specifications but is 
in most cases not significant.  
 
The results of the first step TFP regression are shown in table 4.8. 
 
Table 4.8: First Step TFP Regression (1985-1995) 
Dependent variable: log TFPi  
 log SRDi 0.02 (0.37) 
 log NSRDi 0.01 (0.11) 
 log FRDi 0.24 (2.32) ** 
( log peuh,i) /pdom,i,85 0.16 (2.26) ** 
( log peul,i) /pdom,i,85 -0.11 (-1.35) 
( log poere,i) /pdom,i,85 0.24 (3.13) *** 
( log pash,i) /pdom,i,85 -0.13 (-2.57) ** 
( log pasl,i) / pdom,i,85 -0.02 (-0.51) 
( log pcee,i)/ pdom,i,85 -0.09 (-1.86) * 
( log plat,i)/ pdom,i,85 -0.05 (-0.74) 
R2adjusted 0.34 
F-test: common intercept and slopes versus country specific 
intercepts and slopes (p-values in brackets) 
     1.21  [0.37] 
F-test: common slopes versus country specific slopes, given 
country specific intercepts (p-values in brackets) 
0.97  [0.56]    
F-test: common intercept versus country specific intercepts, 
given common slopes (p-values in brackets) 
3.31  [0.00] *** 
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                   Note: See table 4.4 
 
 
As in previous studies (e.g. Coe and Helpman 1995, Lichtenberg and van Pottelsberghe de la 
Potterie 1996) trade-related international R&D spillovers are found to be significant. 
International trade is clearly an important spillover channel. In the estimations only North-
North spillovers are considered. Coe, Helpman and Hoffmaister (1995) found evidence of 
substantial technology spillovers from the North to the South. From a dynamic perspective these 
spillovers could be an important determinant of import competition of the emerging economies 
if they allow these countries to close the technology gap.  
This would imply that import prices are not necessarily exogenous. However, a validity of 
instruments test (GMM estimation) suggests that import prices are not endogenous. The closing 
of the technology gap is not necessarily reflected in falling product prices but could also be 
reflected in a shift in the comparative advantage of the NIC towards more skill-intensive goods.  
 
With respect to trade-induced technological change, i.e. technology activities induced in the 
North due to import competition from the South, changes in import prices of high-skill countries 
(euh and oere) seems to have had a negative impact on technological change (i.e. the lower 
import prices the lower TFP) whereas import price competition from the low-wage countries 
and NIC appears to have induced technological change and with respect to the Asian Tigers 
significantly.  
The coefficients of the import prices are higher than the coefficients in the first step price 
regressions and are for more country groups found to be significant.  
 
These findings support the view that international trade can have a substantial impact on 
technological change, be it as a spillover mechanism or as a stimulus for productivity improving 
activities.   
Import competition from the NICs appears to have affected EU countries through induced 
technological effects rather than through a direct Stolper-Samuelson relation between import 
prices and domestic product prices. 
This in line with previous studies in which little support is found for Stolper-Samuelson effects 
as well as with some of the studies which indicate significant effects of trade-induced 
technological change and international technology spillovers. 
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In a similar way as for the first step price regression import prices of the different country 
groups can be interacted with variables reflecting market structure in the first step TFP 
regression. The results of this estimation for the three alternative proxies of industry 
concentration can be found in table 4.9.  
Overall, the results do not convincingly show a substantial impact of market power on the link 
between import competition and technological change. 
 
Table 4.9: First Step TFP Regression with Variables reflecting Imperfect Product Market 
Competition (1985-1995) 
 IC = C4a IC = C4b IC = K/L 
 log SRDi 0.04  (0.94) 0.01  (0.15) 0.03  (0.69) 
 log NSRDi 0.02  (0.25) 0.02  (0.15) -0.02  (-0.17) 
 log FRDi 0.14  (1.15) 0.24  (1.89) * 0.24  (2.01) ** 
( log peuh,i) /pdom,i,85 0.06  (0.43) 0.22  (2.14) ** 0.15  (1.10) 
( log peul,i) /pdom,i,85 -0.19  (-1.30) -0.18  (-1.35) -0.38  (-2.56) ** 
( log poere,i) /pdom,i,85 0.02  (0.16) 0.26  (2.13) ** 0.48  (2.41) ** 
( log pash,i) /pdom,i,85 0.08  (0.56) -0.10  (-0.91) -0.02 (-0.21) 
( log pasl,i) / pdom,i,85 -0.06  (-0.67) 0.00  (0.03) -0.08 (-0.98) 
( log pcee,i)/ pdom,i,85 -0.13  (-0.99) -0.12  (-1.37) -0.13 (-1.39) 
( log plat,i)/ pdom,I,85 0.06  (0.47) -0.02  (-0.17) -0.24  (-1.46) 
IC *( log peuh,i) /pdom,i,85 0.24  (0.55) -0.27  (-0.86) -0.00 (-0.06) 
IC *( log peul,i) /pdom,i,85 0.37  (0.80) 0.26  (0.68) 0.00 (2.17) ** 
IC *( log poere,i) /pdom,i,85 0.61  (1.28) -0.06  (-0.20) -0.00 (-1.38) 
IC *( log pash,i) /pdom,i,85 -0.58  (-1.30) -0.15  (-0.58) -0.00 (-1.46) 
IC *( log pasl,I) / pdom,i,85 0.06  (0.26) -0.10  (-0.56) 0.00 (1.61) 
IC *( log pcee,i)/ pdom,i,85 0.14  (0.36) 0.13  (0.52) 0.00 (0.53) 
IC *( log plat,I)/ pdom,I,85 -0.39  (-0.78) -0.08  (-0.30) 0.00 (0.90) 
R2adjusted 0.35 0.29 0.39 
F-test IC,i = 0  1.35 (0.24) 0.22 (0.98) 2.49 (0.02) ** 
Note: See table 4.7.  
 
 
 
Feenstra and Hanson (1999) did not estimate the price and TFP regression separately but 
combined domestic price and TFP changes as the dependent variable in a single first step 
specification (i.e. equation 3.43 in section 3.2.5) and considered the estimated coefficients 
multiplied by the respective right-hand side variables as the part of the change in domestic 
prices and TFP that can be explained by changes in the structural determinants. 
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They argued that considering the price and TFP regressions separately will result in a bias of 
the TFP pass-through toward –1 (they actually estimate the pass-through to be –1.01), given 
the fact that TFP and value added prices will be correlated by construction. 
Instrumental variables estimation, which could be used to obtain consistent estimates of the 
pass-through, is not obvious as the variables that could be used as instruments (i.e. the structural 
determinants) for TFP are very likely to be correlated with value added price changes. Feenstra 
and Hanson regressed domestic price changes on effective TFP using the structural 
determinants as instruments. A test of over-identifying restrictions did indeed suggest the poor 
validity of these variables as instruments24. 
Feenstra and Hanson therefore preferred a combined estimation that did not contain the TFP 
pass-through. Although they rightly pointed out the potential endogeneity bias, their bypass 
implies that the sector-bias and the factor bias of technological change cannot be disentangled 
and that the impact of the structural determinants on domestic prices and TFP get mingled. 
Haskel and Slaughter (2001), in their main mandated wage specification for the United 
Kingdom estimated the first step price and TFP regressions separately, without a TFP pass-
through in the price regression. As a robustness test they estimated a price regression with a 
pass-through and found a significant estimate of - 0.62 (t-value= -11.50) but it did not seem to 
have mandated a significant rise in wage inequality in the United Kingdom in the 1970s nor in 
the 1980s.  
 
Table 4.10: First Step Regression with Domestic Price Changes and (E)TFP as the Combined 
Dependent Variable (1985-1995) 
Dependent variable: log pi,dom+ log TFPi           log pi,dom+ ETFPi 
log pi,euh   0.00 (0.01)                              -0.02 (-0.46) 
log pi,eul 0.12 (1.80) *                             0.14 (1.91) * 
log pi,oere -0.03 (-0.55)                              0.07 (-1.22)  
log pi,ash -0.03 (-0.73)                            -0.08 (-1.77) * 
log pi,asl   0.00 (0.10)                                0.03 (0.78) 
log pi,cee -0.02 (-1.12)                            -0.03 (-1.82) * 
log pi,lat 0.04 (0.67)                                0.06 (1.02) 
 log SRDi -0.05 (-1.68) *                         -0.03 (-0.83) 
 log NSRDi 0.33 (4.33) ***                         0.41 (4.57) *** 
 log FRDi 0.04 (0.46)                                0.10 (1.16) 
                                                 
24 A GMM estimation of the first step price regression with R&D stocks used as instruments for TFP provides no significant coefficients.  The 
test of over-identifying restrictions is not rejected which would indicate that the R&D variables are good instruments. The test also suggest 
that import prices can be considered as exogenous as these have been used in the GMM estimation as their own instruments. 
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R2adjusted         0.47                                     0.45 
F-test: common intercept and slopes versus 
country-specific intercepts and slopes  
(p-values in brackets)       2.40 [0.04] **                        4.46 [0.00] *** 
F-test: common slopes versus country- 
specific slopes, given country specific 
intercepts (p-values in brackets)        1.37 [0.27]                            2.66 [0.03]** 
F-test: common intercept versus country- 
specific intercepts, given common slopes 
(p-values in brackets)      8.74 [0.00] ***                        8.33 [0.00] *** 
                 Note: The table reports the results of the reduced form specification 3.43 in section 3.2.5. White heteroskedastic  
                                    -consistent t-statistics are given in brackets. *- **-** denotes significance at respectively 10%, 5% and  
                                     1 % level. 
The first column in table 4.10 gives the results of the estimation with domestic price changes 
plus plain TFP, as dependent variable, and the second column the results when domestic prices 
plus effective TFP, which is the specification Feenstra and Hanson (1999) considered, is used.   
 
4.3.2 Second Step Estimation 
 
 
In the second step, the estimated contribution of each structural determinant j,ijz
  is regressed 
on the value added factor shares, in order to estimate its contribution to the change in wage 
inequality between high- and low-skilled workers: 
 
 
)lat,cee,asl,ash,oere,eul,euhj(
wlogVwlogVwlogVz j,iKi,KLSi,LSHSi,HSj,ij

  (4.4) 
 
 
The variables Vf,i represent the value added shares of factor f (high-skilled labour HS, low-
skilled labour LS and capital K) in sector i.  Following Leamer (1996 a) Δlog wf are the 
parameters to be estimated in this specification, reflecting the wages changes mandated by 
trade-induced price changes.   Taking account of the fact that factor shares sum to one (VK,i= 1 
VHS,i + VLS,i ) equation (4.4) can be written as (Lücke 1998): 
 
j,iKLSi,LSKHSi,HSKj,ij )wlogwlog(V)wlogwlog(Vwlogz 

 (4.5) 
 
The coefficient estimate of Vf,i indicates to what extent the remuneration of factor f diverged 
from that of capital.  A comparison of the estimated coefficients of VHS,i and VLS,i gives an 
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indication of the change in wage inequality between high-skilled and low-skilled workers in the 
period considered. 
 
The relationship between domestic product price changes, total factor productivity and changes 
in factor rewards, as given in equation (3.29) in section 3.2.5, is derived by differentiating the 
zero profit condition in continuous time. For empirical purposes, data availability obviously 
only allows for discrete time changes. For the latter, the interaction effect between the changes 
in factor input requirements ( jialog ) and the changes in factor rewards have to be accounted 
for, as pointed out by Leamer (1996 a). The discrete time equivalent of (3.29) is: 
 
 
  ij jijjii TFPalog1wlogVplog                                                           (4.6) 
 
 
Estimation of the discrete time changes specification (4.5) could be biased due to the omitted 
variable if the changes in factor input requirements are not accounted for. If the residuals of 
(4.5) are regressed on the interaction terms of the value added shares and the unit factor input 
requirement changes, F-tests on the significance of these residuals can be regarded as a test of 
the importance of the omitted variable bias.  These F-tests are, in addition to the three panel F-
tests, reported in tables 4. 11 and 4.12 which show the results of the second step regressions. 
 
A final econometric consideration concerns the nature of the left-hand side variables in the 
second step specifications. As observed by Slaughter (2000) mandated wage regressions might 
strike as somewhat odd, as the exogenous variables (i.e. the structural determinants) are used 
as regressand rather than as regressor whereas the dependent variables (i.e. changes in factor 
rewards) are the coefficients to be estimated. This follows from the fact that the technology 
matrix, reflecting the cost shares of production factors, cannot be inverted if the number of 
sectors (goods) does not equal the number of factors and therefore no system of equations with 
the changes in factor rewards as left-hand side variables can be obtained.  
A more fundamental observation is that the left-hand side variables are, rather than true 
variables, generated using the coefficients estimated in the first step. 
Feenstra and Hanson (1997) pointed out that the standard errors of the second step estimates 
should be corrected to account for additional variance due to the use of the first step estimates.  
They proposed a procedure to recover the true variances.  However, their correction method 
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does not warrant positive variances, as a result of which in a number of cases standard errors 
cannot be determined (e.g. Feenstra and Hanson 1997, 1999 and Haskel and Slaughter 2001).  
Dumont, Rayp, Thas and Willemé (2003) showed that the correction procedure proposed by 
Feenstra and Hanson (1997) suffers from a negative bias, which can be substantial in small 
samples. They proposed a procedure that guarantees positive variances. The estimates of the 
second step regressions have been corrected using this procedure. The proposed alternative 
correction, which can be derived rather straightforwardly by applying the method of moments 
procedure proposed by Newey (1984) is given in the statistical appendix to this chapter.  
In table 4.11 the results of the second step price regression are shown, using the estimates 
reported in the first column of table 4.4.  
 
The F-tests show that a plain OLS specification (i.e. common intercept and slopes) is rejected 
in five out of seven cases, in particular for trade with the EU and non-EU OECD countries and 
the Asian Tigers25.   
The F-test on the last row test the importance of the omitted variable bias due to the use of 
discrete time changes as explained above. The bias does not appear to be important. 
As shown in equation (4.5) the change in capital return ( log wK) is the intercept estimated in 
the econometric specification. For the determinants for which a fixed effects specification is 
not rejected this intercept is country-specific and therefore not reported in table 4.11. 
Overall, the direct influence of trade liberalisation on income distribution in the European 
Union seems limited. 
 
Only when allowing for a 10 per cent error level, trade with the Asian Tigers can be said to 
have mandated a profit-clearing increase in the relative wages of high-skilled workers by 9 per 
cent.   
 
Apparently, increased trade with the Asian Pussycats, the Central and Eastern European 
countries nor the Latin-American emerging economies seems to have affected wage inequality. 
The significant impact of import prices of the Southern European countries (eul) on domestic 
                                                 
25 The F-statistics only test for the specification in the second step conditional regression. The variance of the first step estimated coefficients 
does not affect the F-statistic. Changing the value of the constant coefficient in the dependent variable results in the variation of the sum squared 
residuals by the same multiplicative factor for both the restricted and the unrestricted specification, which appears both in the nominator and 
the denominator of the F-statistic and can therefore be divided away. 
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prices, found in the first step regression, does not seem to carry over in changes in factor 
rewards. 
 
Table 4.12 reports the results of the second step TFP regression. For the estimation of the impact 
on wages of the R&D determinants (e.g. the significant international R&D spillovers) both a 
plain OLS and a fixed effects specification are rejected, suggesting substantial heterogeneity. 
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Table 4.11: Second Step Price Regression (1985-1995) 
Dependent variable: euhpeuh eulpeul oerepoere ashpash aslpasl ceepcee 
 log wHS -  log wK -0.00  (-0.20) -0.09  (-1.12) -0.10  (-1.62) 0.09  (1.83)* 0.01  (0.29) 0.02  (0.80) 
 log wLS -  log wK -0.01  (-0.35) 0.02  (0.21) -0.04  (-0.91) -0.00  (-0.10) 0.00  (0.28) 0.01  (0.78) 
 log wK F.E. F.E. F.E. F.E. -0.01  (-0.12) 0.00  (0.06) 
R2 0.21 0.23 0.22 0.26 0.02 0.03 
       
F-test: common intercept and slopes versus country-specific 
intercepts and slopes (p-values in brackets) 
2.31  (0.00)*** 1.55  (0.08)* 1.52  (0.09)* 1.39  (0.14) 1.21  (0.26) 0.97  (0.52) 
F-test: common slopes versus country-specific slopes, given 
country specific intercepts (p-values in brackets) 
1.16  (0.32) 0.91  (0.56) 0.88  (0.59) 0.65  (0.83) 1.30  (0.22) 0.80  (0.69) 
F-test: common intercept versus country-specific intercepts, 
given common slopes (p-values in brackets) 
4.48  (0.00)*** 2.86  (0.01)*** 2.84  (0.00)*** 3.04  (0.00)*** 0.97  (0.46) 1.35  (0.23) 
F-test on zero slopes of Vji Δlog aji 1.49  (0.23) 1.31  (0.28) 0.16  (0.85) 0.40  (0.67) 0.27  (0.77) 0.17  (0.84) 
                             Note: White heteroskedastic-consistent t-statistics in brackets, corrected with the formula A-14 derived in the statistical appendix. *-**-*** denotes significance at respectively 10%-  
                             5 % and 1%. F.E.: fixed effects (i.e. country-specific intercepts). For the estimation with respect to Latin American countries, both a plain OLS and a fixed effects specification are rejected. 
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Table 4.12: Second Step TFP Regression (1985-1995) 
Determinant Meuh Meul Moere Mash Masl Mcee Mlatin 
 log wHS -  log wK -0 00  (-0.03) 0.04  (0.69)  0.16  (1.85) * -0.23 (-2.81) **  0.01 ( 0.39) -0.08  (-1.40) -0.01  (-0.51) 
 log wLS -  log wK  0.06  ( 0.87)  -0.01  (-0.16)  0.12  (1.72) * 0.01 (0.12)  0.01 ( 0.49) -0.06  (-1.34) -0.01  (-0.53) 
 log wK F.E. F.E. F.E. F.E. -0.01 (-1.56) -0.00  (-0.07) -0.01  (-0.54) 
R2 0.32 0.19 0.19 0.26 0.01 0.04 0.02 
F-test: common intercept and 
slopes versus country specific 
intercepts and slopes  
(p-values in brackets) 
2.25  (0.00)***  1.44  (0.12)  1.16  (0.30)  1.28  (0.20) 1.26  (0.22) 1.26  (0.22) 1.17  (0.30) 
F-test: common slopes versus 
country specific slopes, given 
country specific intercepts  
(p-values in brackets) 
 0.89  (0.58)  1.09  (0.38)  0.69  (0.79)  0.54  (0.92) 1.44  (0.15) 0.92  (0.55) 1.43  (0.15) 
F-test: common intercept versus 
country specific intercepts, given 
common slopes 
(p-values in brackets) 
 5.06  (0.10)*  2.10  (0.04)** 2.20 (0.03)** 3.00 (0.01)***      0.85  (0.56) 1.97  (0.06) * 0.60  (0.78) 
        
F-test on zero slopes of Vji Δlog 
aj i    (p-values in brackets) 
 
 0.21  (0.81)  1.59  (0.21)  0.04  (0.97)  1.10  (0.44) 1.21  (0.30) 0.35  (0.71) 3.63  (0.03)** 
                             Note: Meuh, Meul, Moere, Mash, Masl, Mcee and Mlatin denote the part of TFP that can be explained by changes in import prices (relative to the domestic price level in 1985), as esti- 
                                       mated in the first step TFP regression reported in table 4.8. White heteroskedastic-consistent t-statistics in brackets are corrected with the formula A-14 derived in the statistical 
                                       appendix. *-**-*** denotes significance at respectively 10 %- 5 % and 1%. F.E.: fixed effects (i.e. country-specific intercepts).  
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Import competition of non-EU OECD countries (oere), allowing for a 10 per cent error level, 
induced changes in total factor productivity that were favourable to both low-skilled and high-
skilled workers with a bias towards the latter. Import competition of the Asian Tigers appears 
to have induced technological change, biased against high-skilled workers.    
This somewhat surprising result lends some support to the theoretical model by Acemoglu 
(2002), in which labour market institutions in Europe are assumed to stimulate investment in 
technologies that increase the productivity of low-skilled workers. 
 
In table 4.13 the results of the first step price regression, using the extended data set, for the 
period 1990-1996 and 1990-1998 are reported. As shown in figure 4.1 in section 4.2 the years 
1990 and 1996 appear to be at the same point in the business cycle though growth in 1996 was 
substantially lower than in 1990. Economic growth after 1993 behaved somewhat different 
from the pattern in the period 1980-1993, as GDP per capita did not grow as fast and as long 
after the 1993 through than it did after the 1981 through but rather started to oscillate around 
two per cent up till 2000.  
 
Table 4.13: First Step Price Regression (1990-1998) 
 
Dependent variable : log pi,dom 1990-1996                 1990-1998 
log pi,euh   0.002 (0.08)              0.04 (0.45) 
log pi,eul 0.01 (0.40)               -0.06  (-1.00) 
log pi,oere -0.05 (-2.08) **       -0.09  (-1.49) 
log pi,as -0.01 (-0.52)            -0.06  (-1.52) 
log pi,china   0.01 (0.46)              -0.04  (-1.15) 
log pi,cee -0.003 (-0.13)          -0.02  (-0.54) 
log pi,lat -0.06 (-1.65)              0.03  (0.56) 
log TFPi -0.77 (-5.80) ***      -0.29  (-2.40)*** 
Number of observations          95                            43 
R2adjusted        0.59                          0.26                  
F-test: common intercept and slopes versus country- 
specific intercepts and slopes.  (p-values in brackets)   1.77 [0.07]*              0.92 [0.65]  
F-test: common slopes versus country-specific intercepts 
and slopes, given country-specific intercepts.  
(p-values in brackets) 
   1.28 [0.26]               0.73 [0.73]                  
F-test: common intercept versus country-specific inter-
cepts, given common slopes (p-values in brackets)    4.77 [0.00] ***        2.95 [0.04] **                
                         Note: The table reports the results of a fixed effects estimation. White heteroskedastic-consistent t-statistics in  
                                    brackets.  *- **-** denotes significance at respectively 10%- 5% and 1 % level.  
 
                    
 
                                                                                               
                                                                                                                                           193 
In 1998, GDP per capita growth was closer to the 1990 level, but whereas 1990 was a point at 
the downhill of the business cycle, 1998 appears to be a point at the moderate plateau-like uplift. 
The data set with an update for the years 1997 and 1998 has more missing values and is probably 
flawed by more substantial measurement error.   
For both the period 1990-1996 and 1990-1998 unit value import prices have, in addition to the 
previously groups considered, been computed for China as this country became a mayor 
exporter in the 1990s as pointed out in section 2.3. 
 
Specification tests for the period 1990-1998 indeed suggest that the updated data may be of 
poor quality. For the period 1990-1996 the results are rather similar with the results for the 
period 1985-1995, especially with respect to the TFP pass-through. The positive correlation 
between import prices of the Southern European EU countries (eul) and domestic prices is no 
longer significant whereas the negative correlation of import prices of the high-skilled OECD 
countries (oere) is now significant. The coefficient for China has the expected positive sign but 
is not significant. The second step estimations give no significant coefficients.  
 
To test the robustness of the previous results, a number of sensitivity checks have been 
performed. For the first and the second step, regressions have been estimated by alternatively 
omitting one of the nine EU countries. All estimations have been carried out, weighing the 
observations by shares in employment, the wage sum and value added and with effective total 
factor productivity as suggested by Feenstra and Hanson (1999). In addition to the country-
specific intercepts sector dummies have been used in alternative estimations. All estimations 
have been replicated with the proxy variables for market power (e.g. C4).  Instead of using unit 
value import prices, which are sensitive to measurement error, import volumes have been used 
as a proxy for import competition. For those cases for which a plain OLS specification has not 
been rejected the second step estimations have been performed using the first step OLS 
estimates. Following the results of a Hausman test, a random effects specification (i.e. a 
specification in which the country-specific intercepts are assumed to be distributed randomly 
across countries) could not always be rejected in favour of a fixed effects specification. If so, 
the two-step estimation has also been performed with a random effects specification. 
The original data, as well as the data smoothed to account for the structural breaks in the data 
sets have been used alternatively. Instead of using the variables for 1985 and 1995 as the begin 
and end point, averages for the years 1984-1986 and 1994-1996 were considered to compute 
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the differences for the period 1985-1995. As an alternative to using the begin-of-period value 
for the factor shares (e.g. Leamer 1996 a), the average factor shares over the period have been 
considered (Feenstra and Hanson 1999 and Haskel and Slaughter 2001). For total factor 
productivity the original data, using a standardized labour share of 70 per cent, as well as 
estimates using actual labour shares have been considered.  
 
Though the results appear to be rather sensitive to alternative specifications, the conclusion that 
there is little evidence to support substantial Stolper-Samuelson effects for EU countries, in the 
period considered, is consistently confirmed. The indication of technological change induced 
by trade with Asian Tigers, as found in table 4.12, is not always supported by other estimations, 
even at the 10 per cent error level. 
 
 
4.4 Mandated Wage Estimation with Foreign Outsourcing  
 
 
Although the mandated wage procedure is developed as a tool to estimate Stolper-Samuelson 
effects (i.e. the impact of changes in import prices on wage inequality through changes in 
domestic prices), Feenstra and Hanson (1999) did not consider import prices but variables 
reflecting foreign outsourcing as determinants of domestic price changes and TFP.  
In the model proposed by Feenstra and Hanson (see section 3.1.2), foreign outsourcing will 
actually increase the domestic prices of intermediate inputs as these will become more skill-
intensive, after the production of less skill-intensive inputs have been outsourced to low-skill 
abundant countries. They defined a modified Stolper-Samuelson theorem linking relative prices 
of intermediate inputs to relative wages. In their empirical work they considered volumes of 
imported intermediate inputs, derived from input-output tables. They defined foreign 
outsourcing as (Feenstra and Hanson 1999: p. 924): 
 
  




 jgoodofnconsumptio
jgoodofimports.iindustrybyjgoodofpurchasesinput
j
                                                   (4.7) 
 
If all non-energy intermediate inputs (i.e. inputs from all manufacturing industries j) are 
considered, (4.7) gives a broad measure of foreign outsourcing whereas if only those 
intermediate inputs from the same two-digit industry are considered Feenstra and Hanson 
defined the measure as foreign outsourcing in the narrow sense.  
                    
 
                                                                                               
                                                                                                                                           195 
As pointed out in section 3.1.2, whereas Feenstra and Hanson concluded that foreign 
outsourcing harms low-skilled workers, other theoretical models have more ambiguous 
conclusions as to the impact on the position of low-skilled workers.   
 
To estimate the impact of foreign outsourcing on wage inequality in the European Union the 
dataset used for the previous mandated wage regressions was extended with data from the 
OECD Input-Output database. At present the OECD data cover the period 1973-1990 but the 
OECD is in the process of updating the database. The database contains separate matrices of 
flows of imported intermediate inputs. For Belgium the input-output data of the Federal 
Planning Bureau were used. Bilateral import shares were considered to decompose flows of 
imported intermediate inputs into flows imported from six country groups: Central- and Eastern 
European emerging economies, (South-) East Asian Newly Industrialised Countries, Latin-
American Newly Industrialised Countries, low-wage EU countries, high-wage EU countries 
and non-EU OECD countries (see section 4.2 for a detailed list of the countries considered). 
There were sufficient data to construct all necessary variables for Belgium, Denmark, France, 
Germany and the United Kingdom for the period 1985-1995. The flow matrices of imported 
intermediate inputs of 1990 are used as no more recent data were available. 
 
Table 4.14 shows the results of the first step price regression, with foreign outsourcing variables 
as determinants.  
The first column reports the results of a specification in which plain TFP is used and which 
considers foreign outsourcing in the narrow sense (i.e. intra-sector). 
For an estimation at the two-digit sector level this measure of outsourcing seems more 
appropriate than using the broader definition. In the second column effective TFP is used 
instead of plain TFP and in the final column a specification with plain TFP and variables 
reflecting foreign outsourcing in the broad sense.  
None of the outsourcing variables appears to have had a significant impact on domestic prices 
in the period considered. The TFP pass-through is again highly significant and very close to the 
estimate reported in table 4.4. 
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Table 4.14: First Step Price Regression- Foreign Outsourcing (1985-1995) 
         Note: The dependent variable is the change in domestic value added prices. All variables are changes over the period 1985-1995,  
                    except for France for which changes over the period 1990-1996 have been rescaled (omitting France gives similar results ).  
                    The table reports results of fixed effects estimations. The first column reports results for a specification with plain total factor  
                    productivity and variables reflecting outsourcing in the narrow sense, the second column reports a specification with narrow 
                    outsourcing and effective TFP and the last column reports the results of a plain TFP specification with outsourcing in the broad 
                    sense. White heteroskedastic-consistent t-values are reported in brackets. ***- **-* denotes significance at respectively  1%-5%  
                    and 10% level. 
 
 
 
In table 4.15 the results of the first step TFP regression, with outsourcing variables in the narrow 
sense, are reported.  
As in the first step price regression with import prices as determinants, international R&D 
spillovers are found to be significant as is the negative sign of the (South-) East Asian NIC trade 
variable. However, where the negative sign in table 4.8 is supportive of trade-induced 
technological change (i.e. decreasing import prices increase TFP) a negative sign in a 
specification with outsourcing variables as determinants does not seem to support the model by 
Feenstra and Hanson (1996) as in this model it is assumed that low-skill activities will be 
transferred abroad, thus lifting the domestic skill level. Foreign outsourcing with (South-) East 
Asian NIC actually would have decreased TFP.  
The second step mandated wage regressions with foreign outsourcing variables do not result in 
any significant coefficient.  
 
 
 
Dependent variable: Δln pVA Narrow (TFP) Narrow (ETFP) Broad (TFP) 
Independent variables:    
High-wage EU Countries  -0.32 (-0.36) -0.35  (-0.38) 0.02 (0.02) 
Low-wage EU countries  -1.53 (-0.23) -1.68    (-0.23) 0.08 (0.02) 
Non-EU OECD  -0.21 (-0.06) -0.15    (-0.04) -0.78 (-0.45) 
(South-) East Asia  -0.11 (-0.97) -0.13    (-1.08) -0.12 (-1.43) 
Central and Eastern Europe  0.04 (0.47) 0.5    (0.56) 0.03 (0.43) 
Latin America  0.02 (0.13) 0.07    (0.56) 0.30 (0.26) 
(E)TFP -0.75 (-9.38) ***    -0.72   (-8.98) *** -0.76 (-8.35) *** 
R2adjusted 0.66 0.65 0.66 
F-test: common intercept and slopes versus 
country-specific intercepts and slopes  
(p-values in brackets) 
1.16 (0.37) 
 
1.13 (0.39) 
 
1.10 (0.43) 
F-test: common slopes versus country-specific 
slopes, given country specific intercepts  
(p-values in brackets) 
0.55 (0.93) 
 
0.53 (0.94) 
 
 0.52 (0.94) 
F-test: common intercept versus country-
specific intercepts, given common slopes 
 (p-values in brackets) 
      7.44 (0.00)***        7.32 (0.00)***         7.19 (0.00) *** 
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Table 4.15: First Step TFP Regression- Foreign Outsourcing (1985-1996) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                  
                              
 
 
 
 
 
 
                              Note:  The table reports results of a fixed effects estimations with foreign outsourcing in  
                                          the narrow sense as determinant. White heteroskedastic-consistent t-values in  
                                           brackets.  ***- **-* denotes significance at respectively  1%-5%  and 10% level. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Dependent variable:  TFP 
Independent variables:  
Domestic R&D stock (intra-sector)  0.08 (0.86) 
Domestic R&D stock (inter-sector) -0.08 (-0.58) 
Foreign R&D stock  0.25 (2.42) ** 
High-wage EU Countries  -0.55 (-0.23) 
Low-wage EU countries   10.58 (-1.57) 
non-EU OECD  -5.25 (-1.25) 
(South-) East Asia  -0.35 (-3.44) *** 
Central and Eastern Europe -0.22 (-0.71) 
Latin America  -0.18 (-0.30) 
R2adjusted 
0.11 
F-test: common intercept and slopes versus country-specific 
intercepts and slopes. (p-values in brackets) 
1.91 (0.10) * 
F-test: common slopes versus country-specific slopes, given 
country specific intercept. (p-values in brackets) 
1.75 (0.14) 
F-test: common intercept versus country-specific intercepts, 
given common slopes. (p-values in brackets) 
2.09 (0.10)* 
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4.5 Conclusions 
 
 
The two-step mandated wage regression procedure, proposed by Feenstra and Hanson (1999) 
and Haskel and Slaughter (2001), is a convenient tool to disentangle the impact of international 
trade on wage inequality from the impact of technological change, accounting for the potential 
indirect impact of international trade, i.e. technological change induced by international trade 
or trade-related R&D spillovers. The procedure sets off with the zero profit condition of perfect 
competition to derive a relationship between changes in domestic product prices, total factor 
productivity (TFP) and changes in factor rewards. 
In a first step estimation, the changes in product prices and TFP are regressed on a number of 
potential determinants like import prices. 
In a second step the estimated contributions of the exogenous determinants are regressed on 
factor shares. The estimated coefficients in the second step provide an estimate of the changes 
in factor rewards that were mandated by the changes in domestic product prices, caused by the 
respective determinants. 
The procedure is closely linked to the Stolper-Samuelson theorem, which states that changes in 
import prices will, through their impact on domestic product prices, cause changes in factor 
rewards. 
 
Two-step mandated wage estimations for a panel of nine EU countries, in the period 1985-1998, 
provide little support for Stolper-Samuelson effects of international trade with Newly 
Industrialised Countries (NIC). If there is some evidence that import competition of low-wage 
EU countries affected domestic product prices in the period 1985-1995 this effect does not seem 
to have carried over in factor price changes. Import competition of the Asian Tigers increased 
the relative wages of high-skilled workers in the European Union, as expected, but this effect 
is only significant at the 10 per cent error level and it is moreover not consistently confirmed in 
alternative specifications.  
The impact of technological change on factor prices, through R&D activities, is rather country-
specific and the panel estimations do not provide evidence of skill-biased technological change 
having caused a common drop in the relative wages of low-skilled workers. 
International trade-related knowledge spillovers are, in line with previous studies, consistently 
found to be significant. In addition, import price competition of the Asian Tigers appears to 
have caused technological change which decreased the relative wages of high-skilled workers, 
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i.e. seems to point at technological change biased in favour of low-skilled workers though the 
latter result is not very robust. 
 
As foreign R&D activities appear to affect technological change to a larger extent than domestic 
R&D activities, which undoubtedly have an important role in reinforcing a country's 
technological absorptive capacity, the indirect impact of international trade may be quite 
substantial and clearly needs to be accounted for.  
The evidence of trade-related North-South spillovers (e.g. Coe, Helpman and Hoffmaister 
1995) moreover shows that international trade may help Southern countries to raise their 
technological level, thereby inducing Northern countries to invest in R&D activities to maintain 
their technological lead. 
International trade and technological change are clearly intertwined and the exclusive focus on 
either one to explain changes in the labour market does not seem warranted.   
The lack of evidence of the impact of import price changes of Newly Industrialised Countries 
in the European Union is probably not that surprising given the mixed evidence of changes in 
wage inequality and the institutional differences between EU countries. It does however not 
imply that international trade did not have any labour market impact. The assumption of perfect 
labour markets, which contrary to most other assumptions of the Heckscher-Ohlin model is 
essential for the Stolper-Samuelson theorem to hold, is probably too heroic.  
In the next two chapters this assumption is relaxed, allowing for unemployment to arise due to 
a fall in labour demand, if wages are sticky.  
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Appendix: Note on TFP as a Proxy for Technological Change 
 
 
Leamer (1996 a) pointed out that the mandated wage regression procedure in which the pass-
through of total factor productivity, i.e. the part of productivity changes that are passed on to 
product prices, is pegged down at a certain value works in the opposite direction of most 
previous studies. In these studies (e.g. Bound and Johnson 1992, Berman, Bound and Griliches 
1993: see section 3.2.2) the impact of globalisation was first estimated and the residual was 
entirely attributed to technological change, whereas Leamer first considered the impact of 
technological change and then attributed the residual to globalisation. 
Lack of a worldwide general equilibrium input-output model Leamer assumed that all sectors 
have the same rate of technological pass-through.  
Feenstra and Hanson (1999) estimated the pass-through in the first step price regression but 
given the indications of an endogeneity bias preferred a reduced form specification of the price 
and TFP regression. 
Haskel and Slaughter (2001) also estimated the TFP pass-through but, similar to Baldwin and 
Cain (1997), preferred a specification of the first step price regression without TFP.  
Haskel and Slaughter argued that skill-biased technological change could be considered as a 
part of TFP.  
Assuming a CES production function: 
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                                                                  (A 4.1) 
 
with Y denoting output, A an Hicks-neutral technological parameter, HS and LS the skill-
biased technology parameters of respectively high-skilled labour LHS and low-skilled labour 
LLS and σ elasticity of substitution, TFP is given as (Haskel and Slaughter 2001: p. 167): 
   
Δln TFP = Δln A + VHS Δln λHS+ VLS Δln λLS                                                                              (A 4.2) 
 
with VHS and VLS the wage bill shares of respectively high-skilled labour and low-skilled labour. 
Haskel and Slaughter quoted Johnson and Stafford (1998) who reasoned that skill-biased 
technological change (SBTC) does not necessarily raise TFP. Moreover, extensive SBTC, i.e. 
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technological change that increases the productivity of high-skilled workers but reduces 
productivity of low-skilled workers could actually raise costs. 
Though Haskel and Slaughter considered a CES production function to point out that SBTC 
may be part of total factor productivity they computed TFP in the usual way as output changes 
minus the share-weighted changes in input factors. This is the traditional Cobb-Douglas based 
TFP measure as a proxy for disembodied (i.e. skill-neutral) technological change. 
Haskel and Slaughter (2002) estimated the sector bias of SBTC. They derived the relative 
demand for high-skilled labour from (A 4.1), assuming constant returns to scale (i.e. 
HSLS 1  ): 
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Multiplying both terms with the relative wages of high-skilled workers (
LS
HS
w
w ) and adding 
capital (assumed quasi-fixed) provided Haskel and Slaughter with the following empirical 
specification (Haskel and Slaughter 2002: p. 1767): 
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where ωk denotes the share of non-production workers (proxy for high-skilled workers) in the 
total wage bill in sector k and K/Y the capital output ratio. 
The authors argued that by estimating this specification on pooled sectors a0 + εk is an estimate 
of skill-biased technological change in sector k but also considered a number of alternative 
estimates for SBTC (e.g. by excluding relative wages from the specification). The sector bias 
of SBTC is then estimated by regressing the estimate of SBTC on the begin-of-period skill 
intensity (Haskel and Slaughter 2002: p. 1768): 
 
k
kLS
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biask uL
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

                                                                                (A 4.5) 
 
 The coefficient bias is the estimate of Haskel and Slaughter for the sector bias of SBTC. 
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Using UNIDO data for ten OECD countries they found indications of a significant sector bias 
in SBTC in the 1970s and the 1980s. In countries that witnessed a decrease in the skill premium 
SBTC appears to have been concentrated in low-skill intensive sectors, whereas in countries 
that witnessed increased wage inequality, SBTC seems to have been concentrated in high-skill 
intensive sectors26. Haskel and Slaughter concluded that the sector bias of skill-biased 
technological change could help to explain changes in the skill premium.  
In table A 4.1 the sector bias of SBTC is estimated following the two-step procedure proposed 
by Haskel and Slaughter (2002) for six EU countries in the period 1985-1995. Two alternative 
estimates of skill-biased technological change are considered: SBTC1 is the estimate of (a0 + 
εk) from estimating equation (A 4.4) and SBTC2 is the residual of estimation of this equation 
when relative wages are dropped.  
 
In line with the positive estimate for the sector bias for Denmark, Portugal and the United 
Kingdom, found by Haskel and Slaughter for the 1980s, the sector bias estimate is positive for 
these countries in the period 1985-1995 though the coefficient for Denmark and Portugal is 
only significant for the second alternative estimate of skill-biased technological change and for 
the United Kingdom it is not significant at all. The evidence of a sector bias does not seem very 
strong for the six EU countries considered. 
 
Table A 4.1: The Sector Bias of Skill-Biased Technological Change in Six EU Countries  
(1985-1995) 
 SBTC1 SBTC2 
Belgium 0.003 (0.09) -0.05 (-1.13) 
Germany -0.01 (-1.17) -0.01 (-0.98) 
Italy  0.01 (0.12) 0.02 (0.15) 
United Kingdom 0.02 (0.42) 0.07 (1.52) 
Denmark 0.01 (0.22) 0.11 (1.93) * 
Portugal 0.77 (1.58) 0.90 (1.98) ** 
                          Note: The sector bias of SBTC is estimated following the two-step procedure pro- 
                                    posed by Haskel and Slaughter (2002). The t-values reported in brackets 
                                    have been corrected using the procedure proposed by Dumont, Rayp, Thas  
                                    and Willemé (2003) to account for additional variance due to the use of genera- 
                                    ted regressands. SBTC1 is the estimate of skill-biased technological change  
                                   (a0 + εk) from estimating equation (A 4.4). SBTC2 is the residual of estimation 
                                   of equation (A 4.4) excluding relative wages.  
                                                 
26 As the dependent variable in the second step estimation is an estimated rather than a true variable, Haskel and Slaughter (2002) applied the 
correction procedure proposed by Feenstra and Hanson (1997). Dumont, Rayp, Thas and Willemé (2003) showed that this procedure suffers 
from a bias and replicated the estimates of the sector bias of SBTC for the United Kingdom and the United States. Though the conclusions by 
Haskel and Slaughter generally hold, the t-values differ substantially.   
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In his biography of Total Factor Productivity, Hulten (2000) argued that identifying the Hicks-
neutral factor (i.e. the traditional TFP measure) of a production function with technological 
change is generally inappropriate. The main reason is that the shift parameter only reflects 
productivity increases that are costless. Technological progress that results from R&D activities 
will not be captured by TFP unless it is considered as an input factor of its own right as in some 
endogenous growth models. Another reason is that changes in the organization of production 
or worker effort will shift the production function as well. 
If input factors do not instantaneously adjust to their desired demand levels, TFP provides a 
biased estimate of technological change (Nadiri and Prucha 1999).  
 
Primal Total Factor Productivity is traditionally, starting from a production function: 
 
Yt = At F(Kt , Lt)                                                                                                  (A 4.6) 
 
computed as the change in the Hicks-neutral parameter At, or the difference between real output 
growth and the growth rates of input factors (in this example capital K and labour L) weighted 
by their respective output elasticities (Hulten 2000: p. 10): 
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A                                                                        (A 4.7) 
 
As the output elasticities are not directly observable, production factors are assumed to be 
competitively paid the value of their marginal product, such that factor income shares can 
replace the elasticities. The TFP measure as a residual is a measure of our ignorance as phrased 
by Abramovitz (1956). The residual, apart from technological and organizational innovation, 
also captures measurement error, omitted variables, aggregation bias and other model 
specification errors. The latter unwanted components of TFP as residual might cancel if 
randomly distributed, which is however not guaranteed  
The assumption of constant returns to scale is strictly only necessary when the return to capital 
is estimated as a residual. If some independent measure of the return to capital could be used, 
the TFP measure would not imply constant returns to scale. 
As shown by Hall (1988), the assumption of perfect competition is a necessary assumption for 
the TFP measure to be unbiased (Hulten 2000: pp. 10-12). 
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With respect to the nature of technological change, the TFP measure as the change in the Hicks 
parameter only holds insofar that innovation increases the marginal productivity of all 
production factors equally, i.e. technological change is Hicks-neutral (no factor bias). 
Innovation affecting the production factors in a distinct way can be modelled by a factor-
augmentation production function (Hulten 2000: p. 13): 
 
Yt =  F(atKt , btLt)                                                                                                (A 4.8) 
 
This results in the following TFP measure as the factor share weighted average of the rates of 
factor augmentation: 
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                                                                                              (A 4.9) 
 
If the rates of factor augmentation of the production factors differ, technological change is 
Hicks-biased. 
As changes in the income shares of the production factors will change TFP, even if the 
underlying factor-augmentation does not change, the TFP measure cannot simply be identified 
with technological change (Hulten 2000: p. 13). 
 
Equation (A 4.7) can be considered as a growth rate of a Divisia index, which allows for a 
continuous-time formulation, using discrete-time data. However, the index is only unique if 
there is a production function for which the partial derivatives equal the prices that are used to 
compute the index. Moreover, the necessary production function exists only under very 
restrictive assumptions, e.g. that all units (plants, firms) have identical functions up to some 
constant multiplier (Hulten 2000: p. 14). 
 
Jorgenson and Griliches (1967) argued that in order to avoid the aggregation bias due to changes 
in the composition of inputs, capital and labour should be decomposed (e.g. long-lived versus 
short-lived capital stock, workers with different educational level). 
Inklaar et al. (2003) decomposed physical capital into a ICT component (software, computers 
and communications equipment) and a non-ICT component (equipment, structures and 
vehicles) and labour into a volume component (hours worked) and a component measuring 
labour quality, based on data by skill category. The procedure involved aggregation of two-
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digit sectors and only the United States and four EU countries (France, Germany, the 
Netherlands and the United Kingdom) were considered, as few countries appear to provide data 
on prices of computers and semiconductors needed to compute deflators that account for the 
increase in quality of ICT goods. 
  
Instead of computing TFP as a residual, a function specification representing the production 
technology could be estimated econometrically, accounting for imperfect competition, non-
constant returns to scale and factor-biased technological change. 
However, the results of these estimations have often been questioned for their robustness and 
sufficient data are needed for unrestricted specifications. As the production factors are the right-
hand side variables these regressions may moreover suffer from endogeneity bias. 
Nadiri and Prucha (1999) argued that a dynamic factor demand model has the advantage over 
a static factor demand model (i.e. the one underlying traditional TFP measurement) that it does 
not impose a priori that all production factors are in long-run equilibrium. 
This approach requires an extensive data set and poses considerable estimation challenges. 
Estimation of a dynamic factor demand model for the electrical machinery industry in the 
United States, in the period 1960-1980, suggested that the traditional TFP estimate is three 
times larger than the estimate of pure technological change as estimated with the econometric 
model27. The difference is explained by substantial scale effects and adjustment costs that seem 
to account for 21 per cent of TFP growth. The residual following the econometric approach is 
small, i.e. about 1.5 % of TFP growth (Nadiri and Prucha 1999: p. 60). 
Nadiri and Prucha concluded that although dynamic factor demand models are rather 
challenging in terms of complexity and data requirements, they provide an important instrument 
to measure technological change properly, accounting for the adjustment of factor demands and 
the impact of exogenous variables.  
 
As capital is often considered as a quasi-fixed input factor, i.e. it does not adjust 
instantaneously, throughs in the business cycle will often be characterized by low levels of 
capital utilization, as a result of which the residual computed with capital stock data will 
                                                 
27 According to Hulten (2000), as part of capital accumulation will be induced by TFP growth, i.e. by increasing investment, this part should 
be counted along with TFP as technological innovation. 
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fluctuate procyclically along with capacity utilization, obscuring actual productivity changes 
(Hulten 2000: p. 29). 
Hulten considered New Growth Theory, with its focus on imperfect competition, increasing 
returns to scale, spillovers and endogeneity of innovation as a driving force in the recent shift 
from traditional non-parametric growth accounting towards econometric modeling. 
New Growth Theorists do not consider technological change as an exogenously determined 
residual but as the result of an endogenous deliberate investment process. However, innovation 
may appear as an increase in productivity but also as an increase in quality of existing products 
(i.e. the quality ladder argument of Grossman and Helpman 1991) or the introduction of new 
products. The latter forms of innovation are not covered by the TFP measure though they could 
be incorporated by measuring output in efficiency units, reflecting the marginal rate of 
substitution between old and new goods. The problem with the efficiency approach is its 
subjective nature (Hulten 2000: pp. 28-40). 
 
From the foregoing it should be clear that Total Factor Productivity, measured as a residual, 
cannot simply be equated to technological change. Procedures that could correct the TFP 
measure for other factors than technological change have their own drawbacks and require large 
data sets.  
For the conclusions of the mandated wage regressions, the different TFP components are not 
that relevant, as the aggregate TFP measure permits to discriminate between the impact of 
international trade and the impact of the different factors captured by TFP growth. It should 
only warn against equating the impact of TFP growth to the impact of technological change and 
thus overestimating the impact of technological change.  
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Statistical Appendix  
 
 
This appendix is taken from Dumont, Rayp, Thas and Willemé (2003), in which the variance 
of the second step estimates in two-step estimations, corrected for the fact that the regressand 
in the second step is a generated variable, is derived using the method of moments procedure 
proposed by Newey (1984). In the paper it is shown why the procedure proposed by Feenstra 
and Hanson (1997) suffers from a bias and a more elaborate derivation of the corrected variance 
is proposed. 
 
The properties of the method of moments estimator of the asymptotic covariance matrix have 
been studied by Hansen (1982). Newey (1984) and Pagan (1986) have applied Hansen’s results 
in two-step regression models.  
The two equations to be estimated in the generated regressand problem are: 
 
y= Zβ + δ                                                                                                         (A-1)   
 
Zβ= Xω+ε                                                                                                       (A-2)   
 
 
Where the estimated β from the first step (

) is used to estimate the second regression equation 
parameters (ω)28. 
A method of moments estimator uses moment conditions to estimate the parameters of a model. 
An Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) estimator is a specific method of moments estimator which 
uses the assumption of the classical linear regression model that the independent variables 
should not be correlated with the disturbance term (i.e. covariance is zero), which is another 
way of saying that the expected value of the disturbance term, conditional upon the observations 
of the independent variables should be zero.  
The (OLS) moment conditions of (A-1) and (A-2):  
 
E[g(Z, β)] = 0                                                                                                         (A-3)   
                                                 
28 It should be noted that the generated regressand problem is not strictly identical to the generated regressor problems considered by Newey 
and Pagan since the generated variables from the first step estimates enter the second step equation as the dependent rather than as the 
independent variables. This distinction does not affect the results obtained. 
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E[h(X, ω, 

 )] = 0                                                                                                  (A-4)   
 
 
for this problem are: 
 
 
E[Z’(y- Zβ)] = 0                                                                                                     (A-5)   
 
E[X’(Z

- Xω )] = 0                                                                                               (A-6)   
 
 
i.e. the covariance of the vector of independent variables and the distrurbance term is zero. 
 
Defining: 
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 )',Z(g).,Z(gEVgg                                                                                               (A-10) 
 
 
 )',,X(h).,Z(gEVgh                                                                                            (A-11) 
 
 
 )',,X(h).,,X(hEVhh                                                                                         (A-12) 
 
 
The moment condition of the second step equation (A-2) depends upon the specific first-step 
estimate of β. The derivative of the second-step moment condition with respect to β can be 
computed and should be accounted for, given the conditionality. 
(Hansen 1982)  showed that a consistent estimator of the asymptotic covariance matrix of ω, 
i.e. the vector of parameters in the second step is F-1V F-1’ with: 
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and 
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The square matrices F and V have been partitioned as in Newey (1984). Applying these results 
gives: 
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with Vgh= Vhg= 0 under the assumption of independence between δ and ε. 
 
The corrected covariance matrix for the second step coefficients is given by (Newey 1984): 
 
  '1''1gg11'1hh1 HHGVGHHHVH                                                                    (A-13) 
 
Inserting the appropriate sub-matrices of F and V, yields: 
 
  121 )X'X(X'ZZ'XX'X)X'X()(Var                                                                 (A-14) 
 
which is the equation for the unbiased corrected variance. 
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5.  Sticky Wages and Labour Demand  
 
 
"A lack of desire to spend money becomes a symptom of disease that requires expensive 
medication." 
- Jonathan Frantzen The Corrections. 
 
 
5.1 Introduction 
 
 
The results of the two-step mandated wage regressions reported in the previous chapter suggest 
a limited impact of international trade with the Newly Industrialised Countries on income 
distribution in the European Union, in the 1980s and the 1990s.  
 
One of the fundamental assumptions in the Heckscher-Ohlin framework is that labour markets 
are perfectly competitive. If this assumption holds, wages, being fully flexible will adjust to 
market-clearing levels, guaranteeing full employment of all production factors. The Stolper-
Samuelson theorem to which the mandated wage regression procedure adheres is, as argued in 
section 3.1.1.4, more than the other core theorems of the Heckscher-Ohlin model robust to 
relaxing some of the restrictive HO assumptions. However, the theorem is indissolubly linked 
to the assumption of perfectly competitive labour markets. If wages are sticky, full employment 
of the relatively scarce production factor is no longer ascertained as raised by e.g. Brecher 
(1974) and Krugman (1995 b) (see section 3.1.4).  
 
The sticky wage model of international trade proposed by Krugman (1995 b) implies three basic 
predictions regarding the influence of trade on employment: 
 
 Full employment of the relatively abundant factor and a decline in the demand for the 
relatively scarce production factor at the aggregate level, i.e. an increase in relative demand 
for the relatively abundant production factor. 
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 An increase in the demand for the relatively abundant as well as the relatively scarce 
production factor in sectors in which the country has a comparative advantage. 
 A decline in the demand for the relatively abundant as well as the relatively scarce 
production factor in sectors in which the country has a comparative disadvantage. 
As shown in section 3.2.6, the demand for production factors can be derived from a flexible 
cost function, which characterizes the cost-minimizing behaviour of firms. Extending the 
flexible cost function with external factors, the elasticity of production factors (e.g. low-skilled 
and high-skilled labour) with respect to international trade can be estimated.  
 
In this section the assumption that wages are fully flexible, which as pointed out by 
Blanchflower, Oswald and Sanfey (1992) even for the United States does not seem to be 
supported by the data, is abandoned. 
In section 5.2 a flexible cost function framework is considered to estimate the impact of EU 
trade with Newly Industrialised Countries on the demand for low-skilled and high-skilled 
workers. If wages are sticky changes in labour demand will affect employment rather than 
wages, which implies that North-South trade could have caused unemployment among low-
skilled workers rather than wage inequality. This section draws extensively upon Cuyvers, 
Dumont, Rayp and Stevens (2003) and Cuyvers, Dumont and Rayp (2004).  
 
 
5.2 Flexible Cost Functions 
 
Flexible function specifications impose as little restrictions as possible (e.g. with respect to the 
substitution between the production factors or returns to scale).  
Barnett, Lee and Wolfe (1985: p. 6) defined a function as flexible if it can attain arbitrary level 
and first- (second-) order derivatives at a predetermined single point. Most flexible functions 
are second-order expansions of known first-order functional forms. In section 3.2.6 the two 
most popular flexible cost function specifications, i.e. the translog and the generalized Leontief, 
have been discussed.  
The generalized Leontief specification has the advantage over a translog specification that it 
allows for a closed form solution of the long-run equilibrium, i.e. where account is taken of the 
quasi-fixity of certain production factors due to adjustment costs.  
In section 3.2.6, the extended generalized Leontief cost function proposed by Morrison and 
Siegel (1997) has been elaborated. In an extended cost function, external factors, i.e. factors not 
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explicitly under control of the firm, which can affect the cost-output relationship, are 
considered. The impact of import competition is most often thought of in terms of international 
rivalry in a given industry. Increased competition of foreign competitors will reduce the market 
share (output) of domestic firms. The domestic demand for production factors will fall and 
result in falling wages or falling employment if wages are not flexible. Including import 
competition as an external factor accounts for its impact on the cost-output relationship and 
permits to estimate its impact on the derived demand for production factors. 
In this section an extended generalized Leontief cost function is considered with three 
production factors: low-skilled labour (LS), high-skilled labour (HS) and capital (K). 
The demand for input factors, as well as the elasticity of factor demand with respect to external 
factors, can be derived as shown by equations (3.48)-(3.50) in section 3.2.6.  
 
For the empirical implementation a more convenient expression for factor demand is obtained 
by dividing (3.49) by Y, which yields an input-output equation for high-skilled labour, low-
skilled labour and capital: 
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From these three equations, the elasticity of the demand for production factors with respect to 
the input prices can be derived: 
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    with i and j : HS, LS, K                                                                     (5.4) 
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The sensitivity of the demand for high- and low-skilled labour with respect to the exogenous 
parameters can be expressed as29: 
 
i
m
m
i
m
i
im X
s
s
X
sln
Xln



          with  sm = (mOEHW, mEULW,  mNIC, tech)                                         (5.5) 
 
Import competition and technological change will be used as external factors that may affect 
costs and the demand for production factors.   
A panel of ten EU countries and twelve ISIC sectors is constructed for the period 1985-199530.  
The data sources for the variables used in these estimations have been described in section 4.2, 
except for the price of capital, which was not required for the mandated wage estimations but 
is necessary for flexible cost function estimations. 
In Berndt and Hesse (1986) the price of capital is calculated as: 
 
 PKi,t = qi,t*(rt +i)                                                                                                                   (5.6) 
 
Where qi,t denotes the investment deflator of the i-th type capital (e.g. capital in sector i) in year 
t,  rt is the long-term government bond yield and i the depreciation rate of the i-th type of 
capital.  
Data on long-term government bond yields were taken from the IMF International Financial 
Statistics. The same source contains data on fixed capital consumption from which depreciation 
rates can be computed.  Unfortunately this information is given for few countries, sectors and 
years. Rather than using the sector depreciation rate for just a couple of observations and 
disregarding it for most observations only rt has been considered. 
For qi,t sector-specific deflators were computed from the value added data given in the OECD 
Structural Analysis industrial (STAN) database. 
As in the sticky wage model (see section 3.1.4) sector factor demand is linked to the trade 
volume at the aggregate level, import competition is measured as the national average of sector 
imports relative to GDP.   
                                                 
29 If at least one input factor were quasi-fixed in the short-run these expressions would apply to the short-run.  Long-run elasticity would 
follow from the equilibrium value of the quasi-fixed inputs, obtained by equating the price of the quasi-fixed input and its shadow value.  They 
can be calculated by determining the short-run elasticity and adding the associated long-run adjustment.  The latter comprises the effect of a 
change in the exogenous variable on the equilibrium stock of the fixed input factor and the effect of the latter on factor input demand.  See also 
Morrison (1988). 
30 The nine countries included in the two-step mandated wage regressions reported in chapter 4, and Portugal. 
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Grouping more or less homogenous countries, in terms of factor endowment, product 
specialisation and differences in natural or legal trade barriers, again differentiates trade 
partners.  Technological change is proxied by the knowledge capital stock, i.e. cumulative 
(discounted and depreciated) R&D expenditures31.  Iterative three-stages least squares was used 
to estimate the system of equations (5.1) up to (5.3) for the twelve individual ISIC sectors at 
the EU level, i.e. for all countries included.  Lagged values of the variables were used as 
instruments.  
 
Table 5.1 gives the elasticity estimates of respectively high-skilled labour and low-skilled labour, 
derived from the estimation of the system of factor demand equations.  
 
High-wage OECD countries (oehw), low-wage EU countries (eulw) and NIC (nic) are 
considered as distinct groups32. Elasticity has been evaluated at the means33 and the ANALYZ 
procedure in TSP has been used to compute standard errors, as elasticities are combinations of 
parameter estimates for which the “delta method” has to be used (which the ANALYZ 
procedure performs).  
For all estimates, own price elasticity has the right sign and in most sectors significantly so.  In 
addition, cross price elasticity is positive with respect to at least one production factor, which 
implies that input factors are never all complements.  
 
The cross elasticity estimates provide little evidence for capital-skill complementarity. 
If anything, cross elasticity estimates suggest that low-skilled and high-skilled labour are 
complements whereas both appear to be substitutes for capital. 
Frondel and Schmidt (2003) listed some caveats with respect to capital-skill complementarity 
(CSC), which is supported in some studies but clearly rejected in other studies. Frondel and 
Schmidt showed how, using a static translog specification as in most studies on CSC, the 
conclusions strongly depend on the cost share of capital and they argue that a static translog 
specification is a questionable basis to address the CSC issue. They defined relative capital-
                                                 
31 Inter-sector and foreign knowledge stocks were not included in order to limit the loss of degrees of freedom in this framework were each 
variable, its square and all its cross-products enter the specification. Estimation with foreign R&D stocks gives similar results as with domestic 
R&D stocks. 
32 See section 4.2 for details on country groups.  
33 Anderson and Thursby (1986) show that for a translog demand model only elasticities evaluated on the means of actual cost shares are 
likely to satisfy a normal distribution. 
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skill complementarity as the case where the elasticity of the demand for high-skilled labour 
with respect to the return to capital, when not negative, is smaller than the elasticity of low-
skilled labour. According to this criterion high-skilled labour and capital are relative 
complements in six industries.    
International trade is clearly found to affect the demand for high-skilled and low-skilled labour 
in a significant way. EU trade with high-wage OECD countries apparently decreased the 
demand for high-skilled workers and increased the demand for low-skilled workers.   
Table 5.1: Estimated Elasticity of the Demand for Labour at Sector Level (1985-1996) 
 
 
High-skilled labour 
 
  HS,wHS HS,wLS HS,wK HS,Moehw HS,Meulw HS,Mnic HS,RDS 
ISIC 31 -0.25  *** -0.19  *** 0.44 *** -0.35 *** -0.31 * 0.48 *** 0.34 *** 
ISIC 32 -0.93  *** -0.01 0.94 *** -0.84 *** -1.46 *** 1.72 *** 0.24 *** 
ISIC 33 -0.58  *** -0.32 *** 0.90 *** -1.21 *** -0.92 *** 1.24 *** 0.37 *** 
ISIC 34 -0.47  *** 0.09  ** 0.37 *** -0.51 *** -0.74 *** 0.81 *** 0.10 *** 
ISIC 35 -0.10 -0.17 *** 0.27 *** -0.28 *** -0.57 *** 0.58 *** 0.08 *** 
ISIC 36 -0.43  * -0.03 0.46 *** -0.35 *** -0.67 *** 0.96 *** 0.06 
ISIC 37 -0.23  ** -0.06 0.30 *** -0.50 *** -0.62 ** 0.83 *** 0.10 
ISIC 381 -0.17 -0.14 0.31 0.22 -0.26 -0.07 0.13 
ISIC 382 -0.07 -0.40 * 0.46 ** -0.29 *** -0.36 * 0.26 -0.06 
ISIC 383 -0.64  *** -1.49 10-3 0.65 *** -0.60 *** -0.54 *** 1.05 *** 0.39 *** 
ISIC 384 -0.51  *** 0.06 0.46 *** 0.16 -0.59 *** 1.15 *** 0.65 *** 
ISIC 385 -0.15 -0.04 0.19 *** -0.59 *** -0.47 *** 0.67 *** 0.19 *** 
 
 
 
 
Low-skilled labour 
 
  LS,wHS LS,wLS LS,wK LS,Moehw  LS,Meulw LS,Mnic LS,RDS 
ISIC 31 -0.20  *** -0.27 *** 0.47 *** 0.33 *** -0.36 *** -0.05 0.29 *** 
ISIC 32 -6.62 10-3 -0.39 *** 0.40 *** 0.22 *** -0.24 *** -0.19 *** -6.60 10-3 
ISIC 33 -0.24  *** -0.43 *** 0.67 *** -0.17 * -0.25 *** 0.23  ** -5.93 10-3 
ISIC 34 0.11 ** -0.42 *** 0.30 ** 0.109 -0.59 *** 0.07 0.02 
ISIC 35 -0.31  *** -0.61 *** 0.92 *** 0.49 *** -0.95 *** 0.33  ** 0.22 ** 
ISIC 36 -0.02 -0.35 *** 0.37 *** 0.43 *** -0.08 -0.24 *** 0.11 *** 
ISIC 37 -0.08 -0.36 *** 0.43 *** 0.36 ** -0.54 * 0.42 ** 0.05 
ISIC 381 -0.11 -0.31 *** 0.42 *** 0.68 *** 0.17 ** -0.53 *** -0.34 *** 
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ISIC 382 -0.44 * -0.24 *** 0.68 *** -4.10 10-3 -0.36 *** 0.21 -0.27 *** 
ISIC 383 -2.11 10-3 -0.43 *** 0.44 *** 0.01 -0.23 * -0.03 0.47 *** 
ISIC 384 0.05 -0.35 *** 0.29 *** 0.98 *** -0.18 * 0.37 *** 0.45 *** 
ISIC 385 -0.09 -1.09 *** 1.17 *** -0.19 -0.47 ** 0.13 0.54 *** 
Note: *- **- *** denotes an error level of respectively 10%- 5% and 1%. 
 
 
 
This is in line with the expectation that similar high-skill abundant countries compete in high-
skill intensive activities. Increased OECD competition is therefore more likely to affect the 
position of high-skilled workers. 
 
Trade with the so-called low-wage EU countries depressed the demand for both skill groups. 
For this country group too the high-skilled workers seem to have been affected more than low-
skilled workers. 
Three countries in this joined the European Union (Portugal and Spain) or had only been a 
member for a short time (Greece) at the beginning of the period considered. Apparently, 
integrating these relatively low-skill abundant countries in the European Union had a negative 
impact on labour demand in general in the other EU countries.  
 
Import competition of the NIC group had a significant positive impact on the demand for high-
skilled workers in ten out of twelve sectors considered and a significant negative impact on the 
demand for low-skilled workers in three sectors. The Newly Industrialised Countries 
significantly increased the demand for low-skilled workers in four sectors but comparing with 
the estimates for high-skilled labour the relative demand for low-skilled workers seems to have 
dropped in all sectors due to imports from the NIC. 
In the textiles industry, i.e. a sector that is generally viewed as vulnerable to competition from 
low-wage countries, imports from the NIC had a very considerable positive impact on the 
demand for high-skilled workers and a significant negative impact on the demand for low-
skilled workers.  Moreover, R&D activities in this industry were apparently biased in favour of 
high-skilled workers. In response to the fierce competition of low-wage NIC, textiles firms in 
the European Union focused on the high-tech end of the market, investing in R&D and 
technological innovation. Both the direct impact of NIC competition, i.e. shifting the 
comparative advantage of high-skill abundant countries to more skill intensive textiles activities 
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and the possible indirect impact through induced R&D activities are considerable and raised 
the average skill intensity of the shrinking textiles industry in most EU countries. 
R&D activities were apparently also significantly biased against low-skilled workers in the 
sectors fabricated metal products and non-electrical machinery. In the first sector imports from 
the NIC significantly reduced the demand for low-skilled workers. 
Though the impact of NIC competition seems to have been most outspoken for the textiles 
industry the positive impact on the demand for high-skilled workers is substantial in many other 
sectors considered. 
In most industries R&D activities appear to increase significantly the (relative) demand for 
high-skilled workers 
 
The significant positive impact of trade with the Newly Industrialised Countries on the relative 
demand for high-skilled labour seems to support the first prediction of a sticky wage model, i.e. 
an overall decline in the demand for the relatively scarce production factor. 
However, the impact of imports from NIC, as the impact of the other country groups for that 
matter, seems rather homogenous across sectors. Demand for low-skilled workers seems to 
have been affected in a similar way, irrespective of the skill intensity of the sector. So the sticky 
wage model prediction of an overall increase (decrease) in labour demand in high-skill (low-
skill) intensive sectors is not supported by the data.   
This could be an indication of foreign outsourcing, where in all sectors the low-skill intensive 
fragments of the production process are vulnerable to being relocated or outsourced to low-
wage countries. 
 
In table 5.2, elasticity estimates for the entire manufacturing industry, i.e. pooling data over 
industries, are reported. 
 
Table 5.2: Estimated Elasticity of the Demand for Labour at Manufacturing Industry Level 
(1985-1996) 
 
 High-skilled labour Low-skilled labour 
Wages high-skilled workers -0.48 (-8.38) *** -0.12 (-2.44) ** 
Wages low-skilled workers -0.12 (-2.44) ** -0.59 (-12.00) *** 
Return to capital 0.60 (17.2) *** 0.70 (11.1) *** 
Trade high-wage OECD -0.80 (-13.30) *** 0.08 (1.28) 
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                      Note: **- *** denotes an error level of respectively 5% and 1%. 
 
The results confirm the general results of the estimations at sector level. 
Trade with the non-NIC OECD countries decreased the absolute and relative demand for high-
skilled workers and NIC trade increased the demand for both low-skilled and high-skilled 
workers but decreased the relative demand for low-skilled workers. 
The skill-bias in technological activities is more outspoken and significant. 
 
When using Generalized Method of Moments (GMM)34 to estimate the system of equations, a 
Sargan test on over-identifying restrictions is systematically rejected, suggesting that the 
instruments used are not valid. When using lags of four years the Sargan test is no longer 
rejected but most coefficients become insignificant. Griliches and Mairesse (1995: p. 12) argued 
that lagged variables are often poor instruments without much power and concluded that 
whereas GMM estimations could alleviate the endogeneity bias by reducing the variance in the 
variables used to identify the relevant coefficients, other misspecification problems could start 
to overwhelm the remaining signal in the data. They questioned the incredible low coefficients 
in estimations of production functions that try to account for endogeneity or omitted variables 
biases, such as differencing the data.   
Blundell, Bond and Windmeijer (2000: p. 86) found that the Sargan test tends to over-reject in 
small samples. Bowsher (2002) also instanced the poor quality of the Sargan test of over-
identifying restrictions in samples of the size that are commonly encountered in econometric 
analysis.  
                                                 
34 GMM is a generalization of the method of moments procedure. A system of equations that has more moment restrictions than parameters 
(i.e. overdetermined) is estimated.  A test of over-identifying restrictions provides an indication of the validity of the instruments used, as the 
assumption of zero correlation between the instruments and the error terms is used to construct moment restrictions in a GMM estimation  of 
a system of equations (Greene 2000: pp.474-488). 
Trade low-wage EU -0.69 (-10.3) *** -0.38 (-5.22) *** 
Trade NIC 1.26 (18.2) *** 0.37 (5.20) *** 
R&D stock 0.09 (6.90) *** -0.12 (-6.36) *** 
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Rather than assuming that all production factors can be adjusted instantaneously to their optimal 
levels, which especially for capital is questionable, the model has been re-estimated, taking 
account of adjustment costs (time) for capital, i.e. not imposing an instantaneous shift to a new 
equilibrium. Morrison Paul and Siegel (2001) also considered a specification with capital as a 
quasi-fixed production factor. This long-run estimation implies that the equilibrium value of 
the quasi-fixed input (i.e. capital) is equated to its shadow value (i.e. the reduction in variable 
costs following a unit increase in the quasi-fixed input factor). Long-run elasticity is computed 
by adding the associated long-run adjustment to the short-run elasticity where the long-run 
adjustment reflects the effect of a change in an exogenous variable on the equilibrium stock of 
the fixed production factor and the effect of the latter on factor input demand (e.g. Morrison 
1988). 
This estimation gives similar results and does not alter the overall conclusions. 
 
An extended version of the model, in which the national average imports to GDP ratio, broken 
down by region (i.e. South–East Asia, Latin-America and the Central and Eastern European 
Countries) instead of the (average) imports to GDP ratio for the aggregate NIC group has also 
been estimated.  
High-skilled and low-skilled labour demand elasticity for trade with (South-) East Asia closely 
mirrors the global pattern, but a rather diverging pattern for trade with Latin America and the 
Central and Eastern European Countries is found.  Whereas increased trade with (South-) East 
Asia would have a positive effect on the relative demand for high-skilled workers in most 
sectors, increased trade with the two other NIC regions would have the opposite effect. 
Estimation with China included for the 1990s, suggests that imports from China decreased the 
demand for low-skilled as well as high-skilled workers, but surprisingly affected the latter more 
substantially.    
 
Slaughter (2001) tested the claim by Rodrik (1997) that labour demand may have become more 
elastic due to increased import competition. Higher elasticity will result in a more volatile 
response of wages or employment to exogenous shocks in labour demand and will shift the 
bargaining power for supernormal rents in favour of the firm. Slaughter estimated the demand 
for production and non-production labour. Lack of sufficient data at the firm level he used data 
from the NBER Productivity database for 450 manufacturing industries, covering the period 
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1958-1991.  The results suggested that the demand for production workers became increasingly 
more elastic throughout the period considered. The demand for non-production workers, on the 
other hand, did not appear to have become more elastic. 
When controlling for time, Slaughter did not find a substantial impact of trade variables on the 
elasticity of the demand for production workers and concluded that a large part of the changes 
in labour demand elasticity remains unexplained. 
 
To find out whether for the panel of EU countries there are indications that the elasticity of the 
demand for low-skilled and high-skilled workers increased over time, elasticity has been 
estimated for the periods 1985-1992 and 1989-1996. There are not sufficient data for reliable 
estimation of labour demand elasticity for each single year. These periods were considered as 
they resulted in convergence of the iterative three-stages least squares estimation. 
In table 5.3 elasticity estimates for the period 1985-1992 and in table 5.4 the estimates for the 
period 1989-1996 are reported. In contrast with Slaughter’s findings for the United States,  
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Table 5.3: Estimated Elasticity of the Demand for Labour at Sector Level (1985-1992) 
 
 
High-skilled labour 
 
  HS,wHS HS,wLS HS,wK HS,Moehw HS,Meulw HS,Mnic HS,RDS 
ISIC 31 -0.04 -0.07 0.10 -0.28 *** -0.80 *** 0.92 *** 0.13 ** 
ISIC 32 -0.88 *** -0.08  0.95 *** -0.48 *** -1.80 *** 2.10 *** 0.20 *** 
ISIC 33 -0.87 *** -0.14 1.01 *** -0.72 *** -3.37 *** 3.42 *** -0.04 
ISIC 34 -0.43 *** 0.22 *** 0.21 *** -0.32 *** -0.21 0.29 * 0.01 
ISIC 35 -0.24 *** -0.8. 10-3 0.24 *** -0.04 -0.98 *** 0.79 *** 0.28 *** 
ISIC 36 -0.56 *** 0.28 *** 0.28 *** -0.40 *** -1.43 *** 1.70 *** 0.38 *** 
ISIC 37 -0.51 *** 0.17 *** 0.34 *** -0.53 *** -0.94 *** 1.2 *** 0.03 
ISIC 381 -0.68 *** 0.14 * 0.55 *** -0.26 *** -1.07 *** 1.12 *** 0.32 *** 
ISIC 382 -0.30 0.06 0.24 -0.10 -1.03 *** 0.95 *** 0.04 
ISIC 383 -0.95 *** 0.16 *** 0.78 *** -0.50 *** -0.61 *** 1.20 *** 0.11 
ISIC 384 -0.31 *** 0.19 *** 0.12 0.50 *** -1.11 *** 0.74 *** 0.44 *** 
ISIC 385 -0.69 *** 0.53 *** 0.16 *** -0.50 *** -1.03 *** 1.24 *** 0.31 *** 
 
 
Low-skilled labour 
 
  LS,wHS LS,wLS LS,wK LS,Moehw  LS,Meulw LS,Mnic LS,RDS 
ISIC 31 -0.07 -0.13 ** 0.19 *** 0.35 *** -0.62 *** 0.16 0.15 *** 
ISIC 32 -0.04 -0.25 ** 0.29 *** 0.27 *** -0.05 -0.33 *** -0.03 
ISIC 33 -0.11 -0.76 *** 0.87 *** 0.04 -1.65 *** 1.42 *** -0.16 * 
ISIC 34 0.26 *** -0.29 *** 0.02 *** 0.17 *** 0.36 *** -0.79 *** -0.07 * 
ISIC 35 -2. 10-2 -0.38 *** 0.38 *** 0.70 *** -0.47 *** -0.13 0.08 
ISIC 36 0.23 *** -0.26 *** 0.03 -0.35 ** -0.03 -0.21 ** 0.23 *** 
ISIC 37 0.23 *** -0.47 *** 0.24 *** -0.36 ** -0.22 0.57  -0.22 
ISIC 381 0.12 * -0.43 *** 0.31 *** 0.42 *** 0.28 *** -0.34 *** -0.26 *** 
ISIC 382 0.07 -0.43 *** 0.36 *** 0.25 *** -0.09 -0.09 -0.13 
ISIC 383 0.25 *** -0.61 *** 0.36 *** 0.11 0.39 * -0.40 -0.02 
ISIC 384 0.19 *** -0.15 ** -0.04 1.23 *** -0.45 * -0.12 0.22 *** 
ISIC 385 1.14 *** -1.57 0.42 *** -0.31 * -0.54 *** -0.54 *** 0.39 *** 
Note: *- **- *** denotes an error level of respectively 10%- 5% and 1%. 
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Table 5.4: Estimated Elasticity of the Demand for Labour at Sector Level (1989-1996) 
 
 
High-skilled labour 
 
 
  HS,wHS HS,wLS HS,wK HS,Moehw HS,Meulw HS,Mnic HS,RDS 
ISIC 31 -0.17 -0.22 *** 0.39 *** -0.98 *** 0.30 ** 0.93 *** 0.2.10-2 
ISIC 32 -2.34 *** 0.65 ** 1.69 *** -0.63 *** -0.49 ** 1.93 *** 0.09 
ISIC 33 -0.36 *** -0.24 *** 0.61 *** -0.71 *** -0.52 ** 1.17 *** 0.28 *** 
ISIC 34 -0.61 *** 0.13 *** 0.48 *** -0.51 *** -0.24 0.58 *** 0.16 *** 
ISIC 35 -0.31 *** -0.12 * 0.42 *** -0.51 *** -0.34 *** 0.91 *** 0.14 
ISIC 36 -1.00 *** 0.06 0.94 *** -0.05 -0.50 *** 0.98 *** 0.24 
ISIC 37 -0.75 *** -0.11 * 0.87 *** -0.32 -0.42 * 1.04 *** 0.21 
ISIC 381 -0.64 *** 0.13 0.51 *** -0.11 -0.25 0.97 *** 0.40 *** 
ISIC 382 -0.74 *** -0.01 0.75 *** 0.17 -0.32 0.29 0.27 ** 
ISIC 383 -0.99 *** -0.04 1.03 *** -0.46 * -0.61 ** 1.49 *** 0.10 
ISIC 384 -0.49 *** -0.03 0.52 *** -0.24 -0.21 0.73 *** 0.29 ** 
ISIC 385 -0.43 *** 0.05 0.39 *** -0.92 *** -0.40 *** 0.94 *** 0.52 *** 
 
 
Low-skilled labour 
 
 
  LS,wHS LS,wLS LS,wK LS,Moehw  LS,Meulw LS,Mnic LS,RDS 
ISIC 31 -0.21 *** -0.25 *** 0.46 *** -0.09 0.02 0.25 0.12 
ISIC 32 0.32 ** -0.47 *** 0.16 *** 0.28 *** 0.23 *** -0.38 -0.16 *** 
ISIC 33 -0.17 *** -0.35 *** 0.52 *** 0.28 ** -0.14 0.11 **** -0.10 
ISIC 34 0.16 *** -0.16 *** 0.5.10-2 0.20 * -0.16 -0.06 -0.02 
ISIC 35 -0.20 * -0.60 *** 0.80 *** 0.42 -0.64 *** 0.26 0.57 ** 
ISIC 36 0.05 -0.16 ** 0.11 *** 0.65 *** 0.11 *** -0.31 * 0.14 
ISIC 37 -0.13 * -0.31 *** 0.44 *** 0.41 -0.34 0.42 ** 0.27 
ISIC 381 0.09 -0.22 *** 0.13 ** 0.42 *** 0.30 -0.07 -0.27 *** 
ISIC 382 -0.01 -0.12 0.14 0.20 -0.04 0.28 -0.32 ** 
ISIC 383 -0.05 -0.34 *** 0.40 *** 0.16 -0.33 0.41 0.01 
ISIC 384 -0.03 -0.02 0.06 0.56 ** 0.14 0.11 0.13 
ISIC 385 0.09 -0.47 0.38 ** -0.26 -0.28 0.38 ** 0.68 *** 
Note: See table 5.2. 
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overall, the estimates for the two periods suggest that if anything, it is the elasticity of the 
demand for high-skilled workers that has become more elastic.  
Only in three sectors (food, drink and tobacco; textiles, footwear and leather and chemicals) 
did the elasticity of the demand for low-skilled workers increase whereas the elasticity of the 
demand for high-skilled workers appears to have increased in nine out of the twelve sectors 
considered. 
 
Data for France and Spain only cover the period 1990-1996. This could bias the estimates for 
the two sub-periods. An estimation of elasticity for the two periods, omitting France and Spain 
in both sub-periods gives rather similar results and does not change the main conclusions. 
 
The estimation of the extended model is used to compute the average factor demand elasticity 
for the period 1985-199635.  When multiplying the estimate for the elasticity by the cumulative 
percentage change of the imports to GDP ratio by region and the basic period employment level 
of high- and low-skilled labour, the sector effect on the demand of high-skilled and low-skilled 
labour of increased international trade can be estimated.   
 
Aggregating the latter over all sectors and NIC regions results in an estimation of the aggregate 
impact of North-South trade on the demand for high-skilled and low-skilled workers.  The 
results are reported in table 5.5. 
Relative demand for low-skilled workers seems to have decreased in all EU countries 
considered, in line with the predictions of the sticky wage model.  Aggregating the estimated 
change in the demand for low-skilled labour at the national level, results in an estimated 
cumulative fall of 3.6 per cent of relative demand due to increased trade with the Newly 
Industrialised Countries, between 1985 and 1996.   
 
This is somewhat higher though of comparable impact than the value reported by Krugman 
(1995 b) for the OECD as a whole36. 
 
 
                                                 
35 In the case of France and Spain 1990-1996. 
36 The negative effect on labour demand from import competition found for the United Kingdom, is in line with the findings of Greenaway, 
Hine and Wright (1999).  The negative effect reported for Sweden by Oscarsson (2000) is not confirmed. 
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Table 5.5: The Impact of Import Competition from the Newly Industrialised Countries on the 
Demand for High-skilled (HS) and Low-Skilled (LS) Workers  
 (annual percentage change in labour demand 1985-1996) 
 
Country HS/HS LS/LS 
Germany 1.5% 0.4% 
France* 0.3% -0.6% 
Italy 0.2% 0.0% 
Belgium 2.2% -1.1% 
United Kingdom 0.8% -1.1% 
Denmark 2.0% 0.4% 
Sweden 1.1% 0.1% 
Finland 1.7% -1.4% 
                                                     Note:   The annual percentage change in employment over the period 1985- 
                                                     1996 is given, except for * for which the average over the period 1990-1996  
                                                     is given.   
 
 
5.3 The Choice of the Cost Function Specification 
 
Using the well-known KLEM database of US manufacturing industries in the period 1947-
1971, Berndt and Khaled (1979) rejected models that are close to the translog specification, as 
they failed to satisfy the regularity (e.g. concavity) conditions that are expected of a well-
behaving function37. Berndt and Wood (1982) and Diewert and Wales (1987) found that 
imposing concavity on a translog form substantially reduces the goodness of fit.  
Barnett (1985) and Barnett, Lee and Wolfe (1985) have shown that both a generalized Leontief 
(GL) function and the translog (TL) function tend to violate regularity conditions within the 
data region. The GL function has good regional properties when substitution is low and the TL 
function has good regional properties when elasticity of substitution is close to one. This is not 
entirely surprising given that the GL function is a second-order Taylor series expansion of a 
Leontief function for which elasticity of substitution equals zero and the TL function is a 
second-order Taylor series expansion of a Cobb-Douglas function for which elasticity of 
substitution equals one (Barnett, Lee and Wolfe 1985: p. 4). Adding this to the finding by Caves 
and Christensen (1980) that the performance of both functional forms deteriorates rapidly as 
elasticity moves away from their respective specific values of global well-behaviour Barnett, 
Lee and Wolfe (1985: pp. 4-5) concluded: "As a result, neither model is attractive when little 
                                                 
37 The usual properties required from a cost function are that it is non-decreasing in the factor prices, that the function is homogenous of degree 
one as well as concave and continuous in the factor prices. 
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prior knowledge exists about the relevant elasticities, and the selection between models 
requires very strong prior knowledge about elasticities."    
They proposed to use second-order Laurent expansions of the TL and GL functions as Monte 
Carlo simulations show that these functional forms perform better, especially for time series.  
 
 
 
A Laurent expansion results in the following expressions: 
 
Laurent translog cost function (LTL): 
 
Xln
1
pln
1
pln
1
pln
1
2
1
Xlnplnplnpln2
1XlnplnCln
i
I
1i
iX
ji
I
1i
J
ij
ij
i
I
1i
iXji
I
1i
J
1j
ij
I
1i
ii0


 
 


                                   (5.7) 
 
Laurent generalized Leontief cost function (LGL): 
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The remainder term of a Laurent expansion is the sum of two terms which by definition always 
move in opposite directions and therefore varies more smoothly than the remainder term of a 
Taylor series expansion, which is close to zero at the centre of approximation but rapidly 
increases outside the radius of convergence (Barnett, Lee and Wolfe 1985: p. 9). A minflex 
Laurent function is obtained by imposing, on a full second-order Laurent expansion, the 
minimality property, which states that functions should have just enough parametric freedom 
to satisfy the definition of a flexible functional form. Minimality is obtained by imposing ij .
ij  = iX . iX = 0 for all i-j combinations (Barnett 1985: pp. 35-38). 
 
Laurent flexible functional forms have not been applied frequently in empirical work. 
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Le Compte and Smith (1990) compared the results of the estimation of a translog cost function 
to the results of a minflex Laurent translog cost function estimation for the US savings and 
loans industry. When using the latter functional form the hypothesis of constant returns to scale 
could not be rejected, contrary to when a traditional translog function was used.  
 
More recently Giannakas, Tran and Tzouvelekas (2003) compared a number of production 
function forms, nested within a generalized quadratic Box-Cox model (e.g. GL and TL) with a 
minflex LTL and a minflex LGL production function specification in an estimation of technical 
efficiency in 125 Greek olive growing farms. The functional forms nested within the 
generalized quadratic Box-Cox model can be tested against the Box-Cox specification with 
likelihood ratio tests and against one another with the likelihood dominance criterion proposed 
by Pollak and Wales (1991). As the minflex Laurent functional forms are not nested within the 
generalized quadratic Box-Cox, Giannakas, Tran and Tzouvelekas used the non-nested 
hypothesis tests developed by MacKinnon, White and Davidson (1983) to discriminate pair-
wise between the different non-nested functional forms. The non-nested hypothesis tests 
strongly favoured the minflex LTL and LGL functional forms over the generalized quadratic 
Box-Cox function, which in its turn is favoured over any of its considered nested functional 
forms, including the traditional TL and GL forms. The minflex Laurent functional forms are 
superior to the Box-Cox functional forms but both Laurent functions fit the data comparably 
well and it is therefore not possible to favour one over the other.  
 
Given the aforementioned caveats of the traditional GL and TL specifications, the alternative 
minflex Laurent (LTL and LGL) specifications have been estimated to assess the sensitivity of 
the elasticity estimates with respect to the choice of function specification and to find out 
whether tests allow to favour one specification over another.  
The elasticity estimates, reported in tables 5.1-5.4, indicate that labour demand has been 
affected in most industries in a similar way. The results seem to be supportive of a sticky wage 
model, albeit a model of foreign outsourcing, i.e. where the low-skill intensive activities in all 
industries are outsourced to low-skill abundant countries. Therefore the estimations have been 
performed with data on foreign outsourcing (see section 4.4)38 with the estimation using the 
final goods trade variables as a robustness check.  
                                                 
38 Given the high level of aggregation, only foreign outsourcing in the narrow sense (see section 4.4) has been considered. 
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The translog cost (TL and LTL) functions appear to perform very bad on the data set (e.g. 
significant wrongly signed own price elasticity and often a failure to converge). This seems in 
line with previous results. Berndt and Wood (1982) found, for US manufacturing industries in 
the period 1948-1971, that imposing global concavity conditions on a TL cost function ensured 
that the cost function was well-behaved but resulted in poor goodness of fit and suggested that 
the trade-off between conditions of well-behaviour and goodness of fit could be less severe for 
other functional forms like the generalized Leontief (Berndt and Wood 1982: p. 219). Overall, 
the GL cost functions appear to be well behaved even without imposing restrictions. 
For each industry considered, both an extended GL specification (Morrison and Siegel 1997) 
and an extended minflex LGL specification are considered. J-tests, proposed by Davidson and 
MacKinnon (1981) are used to discriminate between both specifications.  
They considered two non-nested model specifications: 
 
H1: y = x (α) + ε1                                                                                                                                                                             (5.9) 
H2: y = z (β) + ε2                                                                                                                  (5.10) 
 
With  and  the respective parameter vectors. 
The two models are artificially nested within a compound model: 
 
HC: y = (1-δ) x (α) + δ z (β) + ε                                                                                           (5.11) 
 
As generally δ, α and β are not identifiable, Davidson and MacKinnon proposed a J-test in 
which β (i.e. the parameter vector of the hypothesis specification that is not tested) is replaced 
by its least squares estimate  . They showed that if hypothesis H1 holds, the t-statistic of 
 will 
be asymptotically standard normally distributed. To test hypothesis H2 , α is replaced by its least 
squares estimate ˆ  in (5.11). The pair of non-nested hypotheses tests can have four outcomes 
(Davidson and MacKinnon 1993: p. 383): 
 
 H1 is rejected but H2 not  H2 preferred model 
 H2 is rejected but H1 not  H1 preferred model 
 H1 and H2 both rejected  H1 nor H2 satisfactory specification 
 H1 nor H2 rejected  Both specifications are similar (or data set is not very informative) 
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Table 5.6 shows the results of elasticity measures derived from the GL and LGL specification 
for each individual industry, estimated for the panel of five EU countries for which input-output 
data allowed to construct the outsourcing variables.  
As before, elasticity has been evaluated at the means and the ANALYZ procedure in TSP has 
been used to compute standard errors. 
 
For all industries, except for high-skilled labour in ISIC 35 (chemicals) and ISIC 385 (precision 
instruments) own price elasticity of input factors has the right sign and is mostly highly 
significant.     
The results of the J-tests show that in eight out of the twelve industries considered the traditional 
GL specification is rejected whereas a Laurent GL specification is not, albeit in five industries 
GL is only rejected at the 10 per cent level.  
 
Only in two industries (ISIC 34: paper, printing and publishing and ISIC 37: basic metal 
industries) GL is clearly preferred to LGL. For ISIC 35 both a GL and a LGL specification are 
rejected and for ISIC 383 (electrical equipment) the J-test is inconclusive.  
 
Given the rather substantial differences in estimated elasticity, in some cases even with 
contradictory conclusions, the choice of functional form seems to matter. Moreover, the 
appropriate functional form appears to be industry specific. 
 
Trusting in the results of the preferred specification, the positive estimates of εLS, whs suggest 
that low-skilled and high-skilled labour are substitutes in nine industries and significantly so in 
five industries. This is in contrast with the estimates reported in table 5.1.  
However, the main difference does not appear to be the specification, as the results of the 
estimation using a traditional generalized Leontief specification suggest substitution between 
low-skilled and high-skilled workers as well. 
The difference therefore seems to be explained more by the use of foreign outsourcing variables 
as external determinants.  
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Table 5.6: Elasticities from Generalized Leontief (GL) and Minflex Laurent Generalized Leontief (LGL) Cost Function 
Specification (1985-1996) 
 
                      ISIC 31 ISIC 32 ISIC 33 ISIC 34 
  GL LGL GL LGL GL LGL GL LGL 
 LS,wls -0.89 (-5.88) *** -0.58 (-4.13) *** -1.00 (-5.69) *** -1.01 (-5.58) *** -0.43 (-4.30) *** -0.43 (-4.46) *** -1.27 (-15.1) *** -0.44 (-5.57) *** 
 HS,whs -0.61 (-6.89) *** -0.45 (-4.72) *** -1.11 (-5.36) *** -1.25 (-4.30) *** -0.41 (-5.92) *** -0.27 (-4.15) *** -1.04 (-8.05) *** -0.78 (-7.83) *** 
 K,wk -0.16 (-5.58) *** -0.11 (-6.89) *** -0.24 (-6.22) *** -0.08 (-3.48) *** -0.08 (-3.48) ***  -0.03 (-1.29) -0.44 (-7.93) *** -0.22 (-7.44) *** 
 LS,whs 0.17 (1.86) * 0.11 (1.36) 0.19 (1.06) 0.15 (0.82) 0.21 (2.79) *** 0.27 (4.07) *** -0.22 (-2.44) ** -0.03 (-0.35) 
 LS,wk 0.72 (5.71) *** 0.47 (5.40) *** 0.81 (9.17) *** 0.86 (8.71) *** 0.22 (3.10) *** 0.15 (2.13) ** 1.49 (9.63) *** -0.16 (-3.34) *** 
 HS,wk 0.47 (4.08) *** -0.12 (-4.40) *** 0.90 (4.39) *** 0.77 (3.67) *** 0.21 (2.35) ** 0.00 (.02) 1.19 (6.59) *** 0.80 (9.17) *** 
 LS,oehw 0.69 (2.41) ** 1.06 (4.51) *** 0.08 (0.45) 0.21 (1.04) 0.45 (6.63) *** 0.48 (7.80) *** 0.24 (1.34) 0.24 (1.83) * 
 HS,oehw -0.58 (-1.86) * -0.14 (-0.58) -1.30 (-5.24) *** -1.12 (-4.09) *** -0.23 (-2.90) *** -0.23 (-2.69) *** -0.67 (-4.00) *** -0.41 (-2.68) *** 
 LS,eulw -1.93 (-7.73) *** -1.34 (-5.91) *** 0.01 (0.04) -0.12 (-0.45) -0.42 (-5.20) *** -0.36 (-4.24) *** -0.77 (-3.04) *** -0.18 (-1.05) 
 HS,eulw -1.12 (-4.81) *** -0.38 (-1.51) 0.28 (0.75) 0.12 (0.32) -0.31 (-2.76) *** -0.15 (-1.19) 0.07 (0.29) -0.05  (-0.19) 
 LS,nic 0.92 (3.64) *** 0.60 (2.97) *** -0.30 (-2.00) ** -0.13 (-0.92) 0.69 (5.85) *** 0.68 (5.88) *** 0.92 (4.74) *** -0.12 (-0.96) 
 HS,nic 0.87 (4.20) *** 0.71 (3.80) *** 0.48 (2.02) ** 0.85 (3.91) *** 0.92 (4.97) *** 0.92 (4.18) *** 1.22 (6.30) *** 0.39 (1.94) * 
 LS,rds 0.63 (3.13) *** 0.57 (3.45) *** -0.43 (-2.69) *** -0.33 (-2.15) ** 0.09 (1.30) 0.14 (2.27) ** -0.02 (-0.09) -1.67 (-1.12) 
 HS,rds 0.36 (1.69) * 0.23 (1.38) -0.72 (-3.11) *** -0.61 (-2.56) *** 0.44 (6.21) *** 0.48 (6.36) *** -0.44 (-2.70) *** -0.10 (-0.54) 
 P-test 
 
GL vs. LGL 
1.82 * 
LGL vs. GL 
0.89 
GL vs. LGL 
1.91 * 
LGL vs. GL 
0.85 
GL vs. LGL 
2.87 *** 
LGL vs. GL 
1.21 
GL vs. LGL 
-1.49 
LGL vs. GL 
4.79 *** 
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Table 5.6: Continued 
 
  ISIC 35 ISIC 36 ISIC 37 ISIC 381 
  GL LGL GL LGL GL LGL GL LGL 
 LS,wls -0.36 (-1.44) -0.20 (-0.99) -0.30 (-3.10) *** 0.03 (0.28) -0.45 (-3.54) *** -0.54 (-5.93) *** -0.26 (-2.54) ** -0.22 (-2.05) ** 
 HS,whs .08 (0.59) 0.38 (3.96) *** -0.58 (-4.78) *** -0.51 (-5.65) *** -0.36 (-4.39) *** -0.41 (-6.01) *** -0.24 (-2.50) ** -0.23 (-1.68) * 
 K,wk -0.01 (-0.25) 0.07 (3.13) *** -0.06 (-4.69) *** 0.01 (0.76) -0.04 (-3.87) *** 0.04 (1.58) -0.04 (-0.82) -0.07 (-1.36) 
 LS,whs 0.01 (0.07) 0.22 (1.17) -0.01 (-0.14) 0.29 (3.86) *** 0.14 (1.04) -0.30 (-4.51) *** 0.16 (1.36) 0.12 (0.99) 
 LS,wk 0.35 (3.43) *** 0.01 (0.25) 0.32 (3.30) *** 0.11 (2.81) *** 0.31 (4.10) *** -0.36 (-1.91) *** 0.10 (0.95) 0.10 (0.89) 
 HS,wk -0.08 (-0.58) -0.46 (-3.54) *** 0.59 (4.74) *** 0.21 (2.95) *** 0.10 (1.04) -0.21 (-1.29) 0.09 (0.65) 0.22 (1.23) 
 LS,oehw 1.09 (6.68) *** 1.30 (6.42) *** 0.35 (2.37) ** 0.48 (1.75) * 0.60 (3.07) *** 0.43 (1.41) 0.68 (8.09) *** 0.78 (7.95) *** 
 HS,oehw 0.56 (2.03) ** 0.71 (2.28) ** -0.46 (-3.29) *** -0.17 (-0.56) -0.31 (-2.29) ** -0.50 (-2.67) *** 0.11 (0.86) 0.30 (2.32) 
 LS,eulw -0.38 (-1.67) * -0.38 (-1.31) -1.76 (-6.13) *** -3.35 (-6.75) *** -0.48 (-1.47) 0.48 (0.57) -0.23 (-1.74) * -0.31 (-2.33) ** 
 HS,eulw -0.82 (-1.88) * -0.84 (-1.71) * -1.94 (-6.04) *** -4.14 (-7.06) *** -0.53 (-1.66) * 0.24 (0.58) -0.39 (-2.12) ** -0.57 (-3.26) *** 
 LS,nic 0.33 (1.83) * 0.03 (0.13) 1.64 (7.01) *** 2.75 (6.87) *** 0.08 (0.29) 0.52 (0.78) -0.06 (-0.40) 0.02 (014) 
 HS,nic 0.01 (0.02) -0.20 (-0.64) 2.44 (12.00) *** 4.15 (9.55) *** -0.09 (-0.39) 0.30 (1.04) 0.06 (0.32) 0.15 (0.62) 
 LS,rds 0.39 (1.60) 0.80 (2.41) ** 1.66 (6.95) *** 3.10 (9.02) *** -0.30 (-1.62) -1.71 (-2.95) *** 0.20 (2.51) ** 0.35 (3.49) *** 
 HS,rds 1.08 (2.41) ** 1.38 (2.93) *** 1.52 (4.62) *** 3.21 (6.80) *** 0.22 (1.21) -0.94 (-3.71) *** 0.89 (6.91) *** 1.16 (5.45) *** 
 P-test 
 
GL vs. LGL 
-2.03 ** 
LGL vs. GL 
2.56 *** 
GL vs. LGL 
2.49 ** 
LGL vs. GL 
0.78 
GL vs. LGL 
-1.45 
LGL vs. GL 
4.57 *** 
GL vs. LGL 
2.75 *** 
LGL vs. GL 
0.44 
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Table 5.6: Continued 
  ISIC 382 ISIC 383 ISIC 384 ISIC 385  
  GL LGL GL LGL GL LGL GL LGL 
  LS,wls -0.61(-3.77) *** -0.02 (-0.23) -0.05 (-1.03) 0.01 (0.02) -1.16 (-4.70) *** -1.25 (-4.97) *** 0.40 (2.27) ** 0.19 (1.11) 
 HS,whs -0.66 (-7.63) *** -0.46 (-7.05) *** -0.40 (-6.91) *** -0.27 (-4.29) *** -0.72 (-4.99) *** -0.81 (-5.41) *** 0.26 (2.55) ** 0.39 (2.34) ** 
 K,wk -0.08 (-4.82) *** -0.08 (-3.51) *** -0.19 (-9.50) *** -0.27 (-8.37) *** -0.14 (-6.88) *** -0.15 (-5.43) *** -.09 (-2.89) *** -0.05 (-1.85) * 
 LS,whs 0.39 (2.93) *** 0.01 (0.15) -0.21 (-6.18) *** -0.28 (-6.27) *** 0.51 (2.81) *** 0.55 (2.94) *** -1.07 (-6.36) *** 0.29 (4.77) *** 
 LS,wk 0.22 (2.49) ** 0.04 (0.30) 0.26 (8.88) *** 0.28 (6.18) *** 0.65 (6.80) *** 0.70 (7.38) *** 0.66 (6.11) *** 0.69 (5.36) *** 
 HS,wk 0.35 (7.07) *** 0.47 (8.17) *** 0.51 (8.27) *** 0.77 (6.88) *** 0.26 (2.78) *** 0.25 (2.26) ** 0.15 (1.28) 0.01 (0.33) 
 LS,oehw 0.36 (3.31) *** 0.23 (2.22) ** 0.52 (5.43) *** 0.48 (5.30)  ***  1.11 (2.67) *** 0.76 (2.29) ** -0.29 (-1.22) -0.99 (-3.48) *** 
 HS,oehw -0.27 (-2.36) ** -0.19 (-1.61) 0.39 (3.26) *** 0.44 (4.65) *** -0.20 (-0.41) -0.62 (-1.64) -0.40 (-2.30) ** -0.87 (-4.38) *** 
 LS,eulw -0.74 (-6.05) *** -0.58 (-4.82) *** -0.38 (-3.89) *** -0.32 (-3.30) *** -0.84 (-1.99) ** -0.53 (-1.51) 0.04 (0.29) -0.09 (-0.63) 
 HS,eulw -0.23 (-2.17) ** -0.30 (-2.62) ** -0.88 (-5.51) *** -0.94 (-6.96) *** 0.38 (0.68) 0.76 (1.66) -0.26 (-1.89) * -0.14 (-0.83) 
 LS,nic 0.58 (6.12) *** 0.68 (5.61) *** -0.46 (-3.67) *** -0.19 (-1.94) * 0.45 (1.67) * 0.24 (1.21) 0.76 (2.80) *** -0.20 (-0.68) 
 HS,nic 0.79 (11.30) *** 0.83 (9.30) *** -0.03 (-0.20) 0.08 (0.61) -0.00 (-0.00) -0.24 (-0.98) 0.38 (1.95) * -0.13 (-0.51) 
 LS,rds 0.09 (1.09) -0.01 (-0.09) 0.19 (1.72) * 0.04 (0.39) -0.04 (-0.18) -0.20 (-1.08) 0.15 (0.54) 1.23 (3.85) *** 
 HS,rds -0.02 (-0.21) 0.08 (0.52) 0.38 (2.93) *** 0.38 (3.16) *** 0.16 (0.68) -0.01 (-0.06) 0.14 (0.63) 0.61 (2.45) ** 
 P-test 
 
GL vs. LGL 
1.64 * 
LGL vs. GL 
1.17 
GL vs. LGL 
1.30 
LGL vs. GL 
0.27 
GL vs. LGL 
-1.83 * 
LGL vs. GL 
1.15 
GL vs. LGL 
2.19 * 
GL vs. GL 
0.55 
                                                  Note: Elasticties are computed at the means of the respective variables and are derived from the demand equations, which result from differentiating the cost function. Standard errors   
                                                            have been computed with the ANALYZ procedure in TSP. The system of demand equations has been estimated with an iterative three-stage least squares procedure with lagged  
                                                           RHS variables as instruments. Country dummies have been included in all specifications. J-tests are pairwise non-nested hypothesis tests (Davidson and MacKinnon, 1981) of a  
                                                            traditional GL specification  with LGL specifications based  on the high-skilled labour demand equation.  *- **- *** denotes significance at respectively 10%- 5% and 1%.     
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There are indications of absolute capital-skill complementarity in two industries and of relative 
complementarity between capital and high-skilled labour in seven industries whereas low-
skilled labour appears to be a substitute for capital in eleven industries with a significant 
positive elasticity in nine industries.  
With respect to the relationship between high-skilled labour and capital, the GL and LGL 
specifications have a substantial different outcome, in a number of industries even contradictory 
conclusions (e.g. significant absolute complementarity between capital and high-skilled labour 
following a LGL specification but significant substitution following a rejected GL specification 
in ISIC 31). 
 
The geographical splicing of countries whereto production fragments are outsourced seems to 
matter in a substantial way. 
Foreign outsourcing towards high-skill abundant countries increased both the relative and 
absolute demand for low-skilled workers and decreased the demand for high-skilled workers in 
most industries in the five EU countries considered. 
Outsourcing towards the relatively low-wage EU countries decreased absolute demand for low-
skilled as well as demand for high-skilled workers in some industries.  
In most industries outsourcing towards the Newly Industrialised Countries increased the 
absolute demand for high-skilled workers and mostly reduced the relative demand for low-
skilled workers but only significantly reduced the absolute demand for low-skilled labour in 
one out of twelve industries, namely in electrical machinery, which is one of the sectors most 
mentioned when it comes to foreign outsourcing (UNCTAD 2002).  
The results show that foreign outsourcing does not unambiguously harm low-skilled workers 
and that the impact may depend on the difference in factor intensity in both the outsourcing 
country and the country whereto production fragments are outsourced, as suggested by some 
theoretical models (e.g. Deardorff 1998 b and Venables 1999).  
 
Although the estimates of own price elasticity and cross elasticity tend to differ rather 
substantially, according to which specification is considered, the main conclusions with respect 
to the impact of international trade on labour demand in the European Union appear to be rather 
robust, whereas the impact of R&D activities on the demand for labour is very industry-specific 
and does not show a general bias in favour of high-skilled labour. 
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Laurent generalized Leontief estimations, using the full panel of EU countries, considering 
import competition instead of foreign outsourcing, gives similar results, i.e. substantial 
differences in cross elasticity estimates between a GL and a LGL specification but rather robust 
results with respect to the impact of international trade on the demand for low-skilled and high-
skilled labour. 
 
 
5.4 First Differences Regressions 
 
In this chapter, the estimations so far have been performed on variables in levels. As already 
pointed out in chapter 4, panel unit roots tests indicate that none of the variables considered are 
stationary in the levels and even first differencing does not always result in stationarity. Baltagi 
and Kao (2000) concluded that there are still a number of unresolved issues with panel unit 
roots testing (e.g. low power) that should warn for trusting these results blindly. However, 
especially levels estimations could suffer from substantial spurious correlation due to the 
regression of non-stationary time series. I have therefore also performed estimations using first 
differences at the expense of losing valuable information.  
The econometric specification for labour demand (see equation 3.49 in section 3.2.6) derived 
from a translog cost function as used by e.g. Berman, Bound and Griliches (1993) and Feenstra 
and Hanson (2001) seems a straightforward way to proceed. 
They regressed changes in the wage bill share of low-skilled (high-skilled) workers on changes 
in output and capital intensity, on relative wages of high-skilled (low-skilled) workers and on a 
number of exogenous variables.   
Though a translog cost function results in a specification with the change in the wage bill share 
as dependent variable, Egger and Egger (2000) and Strauss-Kahn (2003) argued that for EU 
countries like France and Austria the wage bill shares hardly changed whereas employment 
shares did. They therefore argued to consider the employment share instead of the wage bill 
share, assuming wage stickiness. 
I have regressed the change in the employment share of low-skilled workers on the change in 
output (dlog Y), in capital intensity (dlog K/Y), in import competition distinguished by region 
of origin (doere-dlatin), in exports (dexp) and in R&D expenditures (dlrd) for the panel of EU 
countries in the period 1985-1995. 
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Exports are considered to account for the export demand effect, i.e. the relationship between an 
expansion of export demand and total employment, pointed out by e.g. Egger and Egger (2000) 
and Abraham and Brock (2003)39. 
The results are reported in table 5.7.  
 
Table 5.7: Determinants of the Employment Share of Low-Skilled Workers (1985-1995) 
 
Dependent variable: Change in employment share of low-skilled workers 
 FE WLS IV 
dlog Y -1.26 (-0.32) -0.34 (-0.06) 21.14 (2.58) *** 
dlog K/Y -3.13 (-0.85) 2.83 (0.54) 23.52 (3.28) *** 
Doere 0.57 (0.89) -0.33 (-0.39) 0.36 (0.39) 
Deuhw -0.32 (-0.26) -1.38 (-1.10) -0.03 (-0.02) 
Deulw 0.46 (0.61) 0.95 (1.08) 0.81 (0.85) 
Dasia -0.38 (-1.35) -0.90 (-2.37) ** -0.97 (-2.26) ** 
Dceec -1.19 (-3.05) *** -1.41 (-3.41) *** -1.94 (-4.20) *** 
Dlatin -0.15 (-0.54) -0.27 (-0.73) -0.27 (-0.64) 
Dexp 0.91 (0.66) -1.84 (-1.36) -3.78 (-2.31) ** 
Dlrd -2.22 (-1.29) -2.25 (-1.16) -0.54 (-0.25) 
    R2adjusted 0.06 0.11 0.12 
Note: The specification considered is 3.49 (section 3.2.6) but with the share of low-skilled workers in total sector employment as dependent 
variable. The first column presents the results of a plain fixed effects estimation, the second column presents the results of a fixed effects 
estimation with observations weighted by each sector’s share in total employment and the third column presents the results of a instrumental 
variables estimation. **- *** denotes significance at 5%- 1% respectively. 
 
The first column presents the results of a fixed effects estimation (FE). In the second column 
the results are shown for an estimation in which observations have been weighted by each 
sector’s share in total employment (WLS) and in the final column the results of an instrumental 
variables estimation (IV), accounting for the endogeneity of right-hand side variables (e.g. 
output) are reported. 
Given the use of first differences instead of levels, the R2 are understandably rather low and the 
coefficients are less significant than in the levels estimations. 
However, a robust finding is the negative impact of import competition of the three NIC 
groups40. 
                                                 
39 Including exports in the generalized Leontief estimation, using variables in levels, suggests that exports decreased the relative demand for 
high-skilled workers. 
40 This is also confirmed when the relative wages are not dropped from the equation. See section 3.2.6 for the argument of Berman, Bound 
and Griliches (1993) to drop wages from the econometric specification. 
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The impact of imports from the Central and Eastern European Countries (CEEC) is highly 
significant for the three alternative estimations and the import competition effect of the Asian 
NIC is significant for the last two alternative estimations  
For the un-weighted fixed effects estimation the significance of the Jarque-Bera and the LM 
heteroskedasticity test suggest misspecification. For the instrumental variables estimation, a test 
on over-identifying restrictions is rejected, suggesting poor validity of the instruments but I 
refer to the remarks with respect to this test (e.g. tendency to over-reject in small samples), 
mentioned above in section 5.2.  
The significant positive and suspiciously high coefficient of capital intensity is somewhat 
surprising though as this suggests strong complementarity between capital and low-skilled 
labour. 
The export demand effect is found to be negative for the last two estimations and significantly 
so for the instrumental variables estimation. 
Using a similar specification, Abraham and Brock (2003) found a positive impact of export 
demand on labour for a panel of ten EU countries and nine ISIC sectors in the period 1979-
1994 but they did not distinguish high-skilled from low-skilled labour. The negative effect 
could indicate the increase in skill intensity, argued by Feenstra and Hanson (1996), resulting 
from the outsourcing of low-skill intensive activities to NIC.  
For Austria, Egger and Egger (2000) found a significant positive impact of exports on the 
employment share of high-skilled workers, which is in line with the negative impact on the 
employment share of low-skilled workers. 
  
The negative sign of R&D expenditures indicates a skill bias in technological activities though 
the effect is not significant in any estimation. 
   
I have used data from STAN on domestic consumption at the sector level, to assess the possible 
impact of changes in consumer preferences, e.g. an increased preference for high-skill intensive 
goods41. It is not obvious to compute exogenous changes in consumer preferences. To preclude 
endogeneity I used lagged changes in each sector’s share in total domestic consumption of 
manufacturing goods. At first sight there appears to be little evidence for a high positive 
                                                 
41This alternative explanation for a decrease in the demand for low-skilled labour in high-skilled labour abundant countries, due to a decreased 
demand for low-skill intensive goods, has been pointed out to me by Wim Meeusen. As mentioned in section 3.1.1.2, Moutos (2000) reasoned 
that an increase in real income could increase the demand for high quality goods. 
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correlation between changes in the consumption shares and skill intensity. For some countries 
there is even a negative correlation. Including the changes in consumption shares does not 
provide a significant coefficient in any of the three estimations.     
 
I also regressed the wage bill share of low-skilled workers on the same right-hand side variables, 
i.e. the original specification that can be derived from a translog cost function. Surprisingly this 
provides more significant coefficients as shown in table 5.8.  
 
Table 5.8: Determinants of the Wage Bill Share of Low-Skilled Workers (1985-1995) 
 
Dependent variable: Change in the wage bill share of low-skilled workers 
 FE WLS IV 
dlog Y -0.32.10-2 (-0.08) -0.10 (-0.85) 0.42 (0.60) 
dlog K/Y -0.03 (-0.79) -0.08 (-0.75) 0.40 (0.73) 
doere 0.01 (1.88) * -0.38.10-2 (-0.33) 0.52.10-2 (0.35) 
deuhw -0.65.10-2 (-0.53) 0.05 (2.25) ** 0.04 (1.35) 
deulw 0.46.10-3 (0.07) 0.03 (2.66) *** 0.01 (1.00) 
dasia -0.46.10-2 (-1.65)* -0.02 (-3.66) *** -0.03 (-3.00) *** 
dceec -0.01 (-3.04) -0.04 (-7.43) *** -0.03 (-4.97) *** 
dlatin 0.13. 10-2 (0.45) -0.01 (-2.38) *** -0.01 (-2.15) ** 
dexp 0.02 (1.33) -0.11 (-3.95) *** -0.11 (-1.50) 
dlrd -0.02 (-1.38) -0.06 (-2.55) ** -0.83.10-2 (-0.22) 
    R2adjusted 0.04 0.66 0.59 
Note: The specification considered is 3.49 (section 3.2.6). The first column presents the results of a plain fixed effects estimation, the second 
column presents the results of a fixed effects estimation with observations weighted by each sector’s share in total employment and the third 
column presents the results of a instrumental variables estimation. **- *** denotes significance at 5%- 1% respectively. 
 
For the weighted least squares and the instrumental variables estimation the R2adjusted is rather 
high for a first differences estimation. 
For the plain fixed effects specification there are again indications of misspecification with 
respect to normality and homoskedasticity. The impact of imports from the NIC is found to be 
negative and significantly so for all three NIC groups in the last two estimations though the 
effects are smaller than in the employment share estimations. Exports as well as R&D activities 
have a negative impact on the wage bill share of low-skilled workers in the last two estimations 
and these effects are significant in the weighted least squares estimation. 
 
The results of the wage bill share estimation somewhat differentiate the previous results, which 
seemed to indicate that import competition affected employment rather than wages. The 
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mandated wage regressions considered the impact on wages within a Stolper-Samuelson 
framework. Within a foreign outsourcing framework import competition need not affect 
relative product prices in the way predicted by the Stolper-Samuelson theorem. 
The negative impact of the trade variables seem to confirm the prediction of Feenstra and 
Hanson (1996) that outsourcing will increase skill intensity in all sectors, contrary to what is 
expected in the Heckscher-Ohlin model.  
The previous estimates of labour demand elasticity seemed to provide evidence of a negative 
impact of North-South trade on the employment of low-skilled labour but the estimations in 
first differences show that wages may have been affected as well. However, the fact that the 
effects are estimated more accurately in the wage bill share equation but are substantially lower 
than the effects in the employment share equation could also indicate that a wage bill share 
specification is more appropriate as it is more closely linked to a translog cost function but that 
employment is more affected. Actually, if wages are sticky, changes in the employment share 
also imply changes in the wage bill share.  
 
 
5.5 Conclusions 
 
In previous empirical work the demand for low-skilled and high-skilled workers with regard to 
international trade and technological change has been estimated with demand equations that 
can be derived from flexible cost functions. The two most popular flexible functional forms are 
the translog (TL) and the generalized Leontief (GL).  Barnett (1985) and Barnett, Lee and Wolfe 
(1985) have shown that these functional forms are actually not very flexible and only 
appropriate under strict assumptions with respect to the elasticity of substitution between the 
production factors. They proposed minflex Laurent functional forms, which have better global 
properties. In this section the impact of international trade on the demand for low-skilled and 
high-skilled workers in the European Union in the period 1985-1996 has been estimated using 
a generalized Leontief (GL) cost function as well as a minflex Laurent generalized Leontief 
(LGL) cost function. 
Non-nested hypotheses tests show that in eight out of twelve industries the latter is clearly the 
preferred specification, whereas only in two industries a traditional GL specification is 
preferred. The fact that the traditional translog and generalized Leontief have often been 
rejected in favour of other functional forms and the sensitivity of results to the choice of 
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function specification should warn against the conclusions that are based on these popular 
functional forms.   
However, although the choice of functional form seems to affect the estimates of own and cross 
price elasticities of the production factors, conclusions with respect to the impact of 
international trade on the demand for low-skilled and high-skilled labour are rather robust to 
the choice of cost function specification.  
 
Overall, in most industries, international trade competition of high-skill abundant OECD 
countries decreased the relative demand for high-skilled workers whereas import competition 
of Newly Industrialised Countries appears to have decreased the relative demand for low-skilled 
workers. Labour demand seems to have been affected in most industries in a similar way, which 
seems to support a model of foreign outsourcing.    
 
Trusting in the results of the Laurent generalized Leontief specification there is some evidence 
of complementarity between capital and high-skilled labour. 
Estimations using variables in levels could suffer from spurious correlation, i.e. correlation 
driven by a common underlying trend in the time series even if there is no real long-run 
relationship between the variables considered. 
Panel unit roots tests indicate that none of the variables is stationary in levels and even in first 
differences stationarity does not seem to be guaranteed. However, there are a number of 
unresolved problems with panel unit root testing. 
First differences estimations provide less significant results, as can be expected, though a robust 
negative impact of NIC trade competition is found. Overall the results appear to support the 
view that international trade did have an impact on relative labour demand, which due to sticky 
wages might have resulted in unemployment rather than in wage changes. The results are 
however more in line with a model of foreign outsourcing than with a model of international 
trade in final goods.  
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6. International Trade and Union Bargaining Power 
 
 
“So, those offices which are by right the proper employment of the leisure class are noble; such 
are government, fighting, hunting, the care of arms and accoutrements, and the like, - in short, 
those which may be classed as ostensibly predatory employments. On the other hand, those 
employments which may properly fall to the industrious class are ignoble; such as handicraft 
or other productive labour, menial services, and the like.” 
 
-Thorstein Veblen The Theory of the Leisure Class. 
 
 
6.1 Introduction 
 
 
In this chapter three questions will be analysed: 
 
 Has international trade with the Newly Industrialised countries reduced the bargaining 
power of labour unions in the European Union? 
 What is, given the bargaining regime and union preferences with respect to wages the 
expected impact on wages and employment of a negative effect of international trade 
on union power? 
 Has international trade affected the bargaining position of low-skilled workers more 
substantially than the position of high-skilled workers? 
  
In section 3.1.6 collective bargaining was considered as a labour market institution that could 
hamper wage flexibility and as a result cause unemployment. 
OECD (2003 a) argued that changes in those institutional and policy factors, that affect wage 
setting but not the matching between labour supply and demand, like collective bargaining, 
were likely to explain the wage moderation that occurred in the 1990s in a number of EU 
countries. Factors like unemployment benefits and active labour market policies, which affect 
both the wage setting and the worker-job match were supposed to have played a less substantial 
role as matching did not seem to have improved. 
So wage moderation could be explained by a decrease in the bargaining power of labour unions 
and globalisation could be the driving force in the weakening of labour unions. 
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By corroding supernormal profits, increased import competition might have reduced the rents 
unions can bargain for. If, as argued by Bhagwati (1995), firms have a credible threat to relocate 
activities to low-wage countries, the bargaining strength of unions could also be affected.  
 
In the previous chapter the demand for labour was derived under the assumption that wages can 
be sticky. The European model proposed by Krugman (1995 b) is probably more appropriate 
for the European Union than the Heckscher-Ohlin model with its un-European assumption that 
labour markets are perfectly competitive. Though explicitly accounting for labour market 
rigidity, the model does not specify which labour market institutions could cause downward 
wage rigidity.   
In this chapter the impact of import competition of Newly Industrialised Countries on wages 
and employment is analysed within a union bargaining framework, accounting for the important 
role labour unions play in wage setting in most EU countries.  
Contrary to previous work, the nature of the bargaining regime and union preferences are 
determined simultaneously as they both condition the impact of bargaining power on wages 
and employment. 
 
The theoretical framework of bargaining between firms and unions has been outlined in section 
3.1.6 and some of the rare empirical studies with respect to the impact of international trade on 
union bargaining power have been discussed in section 3.2.6.   
As mentioned before, in a right-to-manage framework, where unions and employers only 
bargain for wages, a weakening of union bargaining power will result in falling wages whereas 
employment could be unaffected. On the other hand, in an efficient bargaining setting (both 
wages and employment are bargained for) a trade-off between wages and employment 
reduction could occur if a union values wages more than employment.   
 
If unions bargain for wages and employment, the impact on wages and employment depends 
on the nature of the bargaining process, the bargaining power of the union and union preferences 
with respect to wages and employment (McDonald and Solow 1981; Oswald 1985; Holmlund, 
Løfgren and Engstrøm 1989 and Mezzetti and Dinopoulos 1991). 
 
Data on labour bargaining power are not generally available at sector level. Union membership 
is not necessarily a good proxy for union bargaining power (Aidt and Tzannatos 2002) and data 
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on union membership are mostly only available at country level.  Lack of data on union 
bargaining power, a second best solution seems to estimate it. Bughin (1993, 1996) showed 
how labour bargaining power can be estimated within a production function framework.  This 
approach has the advantage that the validity of different models of union behaviour can be 
tested statistically and that risk neutrality (i.e. labour unions are pure rent maximizing 
organisations) does not have to be imposed.   
The model is however extended to allow for the simultaneous estimation, in a first step, of union 
bargaining power and union preferences. In a second step, the first step estimates of  union 
bargaining power are regressed on potential determinants to assess the impact of international 
trade competition on union bargaining power and to infer the impact on wages and employment 
from the first-step indications on the bargaining regime and union preferences. 
 
The theoretical framework and the empirical results in this section draw heavily upon Dumont, 
Rayp and Willemé (2004). 
 
In section 6.2, the theoretical framework is expounded and in section 6.3 the econometric 
estimation procedure and the estimation results are discussed.  
 
With respect to the literature, in addition to verifying the influence of international trade 
competition on the bargaining power of labour unions, three extensions are proposed.  First, 
using firm-level data, sector-level bargaining power is estimated for a panel of five EU 
countries: Belgium, France, Germany, Italy and the United Kingdom.  Second, the bargaining 
regime as well as union preferences is considered to infer how changes in bargaining power 
due to import competition could affect wages and employment.  Finally, the additional variance 
in the second step estimation, resulting from the fact that the dependent variable in the second 
step estimation is an estimated rather than a true variable is taken into account by correcting 
second step variances for the additional variance.   
I checked the robustness of the estimation results by computing rather than by estimating, union 
bargaining power, following the procedure proposed by Veugelers (1989). This procedure 
permits to differentiate between low-skilled and high-skilled workers, which seems appropriate 
given the empirical evidence that unions tend to recruit low-skilled workers far more than high-
skilled workers and the evidence that strong unions are successful in reducing wage inequality. 
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6.2 Theoretical Framework 
 
 
In a right-to-manage framework, where a union and a firm only bargain for wages, a trade-off 
between the wage level and employment follows straightforwardly. The employer unilaterally 
determines the employment level, which implies a negatively sloped labour demand curve (e.g. 
Oswald 1985 and Holmlund, Løfgren and Engstrøm 1989).  
Mezzetti and Dinopoulos (1991), Bughin (1993, 1996) and Gaston and Trefler (1995) showed 
what happens when unions bargain for both wages and employment. They assumed Cournot 
competition between a domestic and a foreign firm.  The domestic firm faces a decreasing 
inverse demand function: 
 
 yxpp      (6.1) 
x = x(l,i)        0


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x   (6.2) 
 
where x represents domestic output, which depends on labour l and other input factors i and y 
represents the exports of the foreign firm to the home market.  Profits of the domestic firm are 
given as: 
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where w indicates the (bargained) wage and pi the (competitively determined) price of other 
production factors i.  The marginal revenue per worker is given by:  
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The domestic firm and the labour union are assumed to bargain for the wage and the 
employment level, both taking the level of imports y as given.   
Union preferences are modelled by a Stone-Geary utility function42: 
 
     lwwl,wU  (6.4) 
 
where w  represents the outside wage option and γ reflects the union’s relative preference of 
employment over wages.  If γ < 1 (γ > 1), the union is wage- (employment-) oriented (Mezzetti 
and Dinopoulos 1991: p.82). γ = 1 applies for a risk neutral, i.e. pure rent- maximizing union.  
In the absence of an agreement, the domestic firm is assumed to produce nothing.  Union utility 
is zero in this case, whereas the profits of the domestic firm equal the cost of the capital engaged.  
The generalized Nash product of the bargaining process is: 
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where a (0  a  1) denotes the bargaining power of the union.   
Gaston (1998) considered a bargaining model in which firms have the ability to outsource their 
activities abroad. As in Mezzetti and Dinopoulos (1991) this is reflected in an outside option 
for the firm, which increases its bargaining power. The focus of Gaston is on the ability of firms 
to outsource rather than on the impact of internationalisation on product market rents 
 
Import competition can also reduce the (monopoly) rents firms and unions can bargain for. 
However, in this chapter the focus is on the impact of international trade on the bargaining 
power of unions. In the traditional representation of the bargaining game (Rubinstein 1982 and 
Binmore, Rubinstein and Wolinsky (1986) the bargaining power of both players is determined 
by the respective rates used to discount their payoffs if bargaining takes time and time is money. 
The more impatient a player is the lower the player’s bargaining strength and thus the lower the 
player’s share in the rent.  
                                                 
42 A Stone-Geary utility function models union preferences immediately at the level of the union, contrary to the utility function (3.18) in 
section 3.1.6, which is obtained by aggregating the utility of individual union members as modelled by (3.17). 
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However, Binmore, Rubinstein and Wolinsky consider an alternative interpretation of the 
bargaining strength. If there is an exogenous risk of breakdown bargaining power is determined 
by the probability of such a breakdown: “the higher is pary i’s estimate of the probability of 
breakdown, the lower is his bargaining power (Binmore, Rubinstein and Wolinsky 1986: p. 
187)”.  
McDonald and Suen (1992) link the perceived probability of breakdown to the state of the 
economy and therefore postulate an inverse relationship between union power and 
unemployment. 
Lindén (1995) and Teulings and Hartog (1998) defined the bargaining parameter a as a measure 
of labour market tightness. The tighter the labour market is the higher the bargaining power of 
the union will be. Import competition may affect the tightness of the labour market, e.g. by 
reducing domestic employment opportunities.  
Another interpretation could be that if due to increased import competition or the increased ease 
to outsource activities abroad the credibility of the threat of the firm increases the risk perceived 
by unions that firms will break down bargaining, reducing the bargaining strength of unions. 
As such the bargaining power parameter can be considered as a measure of the credibility of 
the respective outside options. Globalisation is likely to increase the credibility of a firm to 
break down bargaining and reduce the credibility of unions that alternative wage (e.g. lowest in 
the sector) can actually be obtained in sectors that witness strong competitive pressure from 
emerging economies.      
 
Under the assumption that G is strictly concave, a unique solution is given by the first-order 
conditions for maximization: 
 
       
 
   



 







 

 







w
l
VAawwa1
a1
l
1
ww
ipwlxp
a
0)l(
1a
lwwa1ipwlxpa
a
lww)l(aipwlxp)a1(0
w
G
k,li i
k,li ik,li i

 (6.6) 
 
                    
 
                                                                                               
                                                                                                                                           245 
   
     
 
 
    0wl
xm1p
wlVA
a1
l
a
0)wlVA(
l
a)w
l
xm1p)(a1(
01lww
1a
lwwa1ipwlxpa
a
lww)w
l
px(aipwlxp)a1(0
l
G
k,li i
k,li i



 











 


 













 (6.7) 
 
VA denotes value added:   kli iiwpxVA ,  
 
Substituting (6.6) in (6.7) and rearranging provides an expression for the contract curve (CC): 
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The slope of the contract curve depends on the value of  (see figure 3.13 in section 3.1.6).  If 
 < 1 ( > 1) the contract curve is negatively (positively) sloped.  = 1 implies that the contract 
curve is vertical at the (competitive labour market) full employment level.  Hence, the value of 
 determines whether in an efficient bargaining regime the wage and employment level are 
negatively or positively correlated. 
In addition to the contract curve, the Nash bargaining curve is derived from (6.7) in order to 
solve for the wage and the employment level in G.  Multiplying both terms by l and grouping 
all the terms in w gives: 
 
 
 
    l
xmp
aa
a
l
VA
aa
aw





 1
1
1
1 
  (6.9) 
 
Solving (6.8) and (6.9), the optimal wage and employment level, for a given level of imports y 
and labour bargaining power a, can be obtained.  In Appendix 1 it is shown that: 
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Supposing that labour union power is a negative function of foreign output on the domestic 
market: 
 
0
yd
ad)y(aa   (6.11) 
 
the wage and employment effect of an increase of foreign output on the domestic market can 
be obtained, applying the implicit function theorem: 
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From (6.10)-(6.13) the following proposition can be derived: 
 
Proposition 1 
  
In an efficient bargaining regime, if union bargaining power depends negatively on imports, 
the fall in domestic employment due to an increase in imports is mitigated (exacerbated) if the 
union is wage- (employment-) oriented.  A fall in wages due to an increase in imports is more 
likely, independently from the wage- or employment-orientation of the trade union. 
 
 
The evidence on bargaining regimes is far from conclusive though working conditions in 
addition to wages seem part of the bargaining framework (e.g. Ulph and Ulph 1990; Layard, 
Nickell and Jackman 1991 and Booth 1995). Dehez, de la Croix and Toulemonde (1999) argued 
that over-manning or under-utilisation of labour occurs frequently but is largely ignored in the 
bargaining literature. According to them ignoring the possibility of under-utilisation of labour, 
as e.g. in Mezzetti and Dinopoulos (1991) and Bughin (1993), could result in misleading 
conclusions.  
 
Based on Layard, Nickell and Jackman (1991), Haskel and Martin (1992) proposed a labour 
hoarding model with unions and employers bargaining for wages and work effort.  
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If unions are concerned about wages as well as work effort, utility can be modelled with the 
following function: 
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lO represents unproductive overhead labour and lP productive labour.  The ratio 
P
O
l
l  indicates the 
degree of over-manning (or crew size), which reflects the work effort (Haskel and Martin 1992).  
Whereas wages and overhead labour are bargained for, the employer unilaterally determines 
the level of productive labour, i.e. by equating the wage level to the marginal product: 
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As other assumptions remain unchanged the generalized Nash bargaining function becomes: 
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The maximization of G subject to (6.3’) implies: 
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 (6.14)            
 
 
Using (6.6) and the definition of l, (6.14) can be rearranged: 
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Equation (6.15) provides a first relationship between w and lO that can be used to solve (6.5’).  
Multiplying both sides of (6.3’) by 
px
lP and noting that by definition w
l
R
P


 , (6.3’) can be 
rearranged: 
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where 
Plx, represents output elasticity of (productive) labour. 
Combining (6.14) and (6.16) and rearranging, provides an expression for overhead labour ( 
Haskel and Martin 1992: p.617): 
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with sVA indicating the share of value added in total sales. 
 
Using (6.15) and (6.17) the optimal levels of w and lO, for given values of imports and 
bargaining power, can be determined. Considering the comparative statics (see appendix 2), the 
sign of most partial derivatives is indeterminate when γ > 1.  Hence, in the labour hoarding 
framework, when the union is effort-oriented, a priori expectations regarding the effect of 
import competition (or bargaining power) cannot be formulated unambiguously. 
 
For γ < 1 it can be shown (see appendix 2): 
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Under the assumption that bargaining power is reduced by import competition, a second 
proposition can be formulated: 
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Proposition 2. 
 
In a labour hoarding regime, if the union is wage-oriented and its bargaining power depends 
negatively on imports, the fall in overhead labour due to an increase in imports is intensified, 
and a fall in wages due to an increase in imports is more likely. 
 
Since only crew size is bargained for, the effect on productive employment has to be included 
in order to determine the total employment effect of bargaining.  From (6.3’) and w
l
R
P


  it 
follows that 0


w
lP .  Hence, in a labour hoarding model, a reduction of the bargaining power 
of a wage-oriented union has an undetermined effect on employment: crew size falls but 
productive labour may increase because of falling wages.  However, Layard, Nickell and 
Jackman (1991) showed that the leverage effect of labour bargaining power on effort would 
have to be unrealistically high for it to dominate the effect on productive labour.  This supports 
a trade-off between wages and employment in a labour hoarding regime with wage-oriented 
unions ( 1 ). 
 
 
6.3 Two-Step Union Bargaining Estimation Procedure 
 
  
  6.3.1 First Step: Estimation of Union Bargaining Power 
 
 
Data on union bargaining power at the sector level are hardly available.  
A two-step estimation procedure may be a second best approach: in a first step the bargaining 
power of unions at the sector level can be estimated within a production function framework, 
using firm level data. In a second step the estimated bargaining power can then be regressed on 
variables that are assumed to have an impact on union bargaining power.   
 
Bargaining power can be estimated as in Bughin (1993, 1996).  Within a labour hoarding 
framework, the labour share in revenues can be derived from (6.3’), (6.16) and (6.17): 
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with  

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ak

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1
. 
 
Within an efficient bargaining framework, multiplying the left- and right-hand side of (6.9) by 
xp
l  results in an expression for the labour share: 
 
  lxmkskls VA ,)1(1   (6.18’) 
 
The other (intermediate) inputs are assumed to be priced competitively. Profit maximization 
implies: 
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Specifying a functional form for x, k can be estimated from (6.18) and (6.20) for all production 
factors except one.  As in Bughin (1996) the price-cost margin m, as a proxy for firm product 
market power, is endogenous.  However, contrary to Bughin (1996), the estimated parameter k 
is not simply equated to union power a. As (A1.2) indicates, k is determined by two structural 
parameters (union preference and bargaining power) and equating k to a implicitly assumes 
1 .  To identify a and  , an additional equation can be considered: the first-order condition 
(6.6) for the maximization of the Nash bargaining function 0

w
G , given that (6.18) or 
(6.18’) is derived from 0

l
G .   
  
The bargaining regime (efficient bargaining, right-to-manage or labour hoarding), union 
preferences (wage-oriented, employment-oriented or effort-oriented) as well as the bargaining 
power itself can be estimated simultaneously using the system of equations (6.6), (6.18) and 
(6.20) testing whether a number of parameter restrictions can be imposed.  Following Bughin 
(1996), with 0kˆ  the estimate of k in (6.18) and 1kˆ  the estimate of   

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an efficient bargaining regime   01 10  kk  should hold as it implies 0Ol (absence of over-
manning). The rejection of the null hypothesis can be considered as an indication in favour of 
a labour hoarding model. Bughin (1996) considered the test 00 k  in order to discriminate an 
efficient bargaining/ labour hoarding model against a right-to-manage model.  However, from 
(A1.2) 00 k  could imply 0a  (i.e. a union without any power) as well as 0 .  Hence, the 
hypothesis 0  is tested to discriminate in favour of the right-to-manage framework. 
Union preference is determined from the estimation of   and the test 1  versus 1 . 
 
Firm level data are available for estimation at the ISIC two-digit sector level43 for five countries: 
Belgium, France, the United Kingdom, Italy and Germany.  For the three first countries data 
are used from Bureau van Dijk (respectively BELFIRST, DIANE and FAME) for the five years 
1994-1998.  For the same period data for Italy and Germany were taken from the AMADEUS 
database (Bureau van Dijk).   
Other countries were excluded from the analysis because of a too low number of company 
records available or the lack of data for the relevant variables44. 
 
Production technology is modelled with a translog function specification with three inputs: 
labour (L), capital (K) and raw materials and intermediary goods (M): 
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This permits the specification of (6.18) and (6.20). Output, capital stock and raw materials and 
intermediary goods are proxied by their current values at the firm level, deflated by the sector-
level value added price index for the first and the third, and by the gross fixed capital formation 
price index for capital.  The price deflators are computed from the current and constant value 
time series of value added and investment goods (OECD STAN database).  As outside wage 
option w , which is required to estimate (6.6), the lowest firm wage level in the sector is 
considered. 
 
                                                 
43 ISIC 38 is considered at the three-digit level (381-385). 
44 The number of records per sector ranged for Belgium from 137 to 1315, for France from 706 to 2300, for Germany from 127 to 703, for 
Italy from 742 to 3548 and for the United Kingdom from 55 to 1191. 
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Adding the usual error term to (6.6)45, (6.18), (6.20) -for raw materials and intermediary goods- 
and  (6.21)46, the system of equations is estimated with maximum likelihood, which warrants 
results that are invariant to which specific share equation is omitted (Greene 2000: p. 642).  The 
explanatory variables were lagged one period.  Estimations are performed at sector level using 
the pooled data set of 1994-1998. The main results are reported in table 6.1. 
 
For all sectors considered (see note to table 6.1) the labour bargaining parameter is significantly 
different from zero at the 1 per cent level.  There were not sufficient data for the Wood, cork 
and furniture (ISIC 33) industry in Germany. Both cross-sector and cross-country variation is 
substantial, with the first clearly dominating the latter. 
Union power estimates are the highest for France and Germany, of intermediate magnitude for 
Belgium and the lowest for Italy and the United Kingdom47.  
  
Concerning union preferences, insofar as employment is included in the bargain, unions seem 
to be strongly wage-oriented: in all but six sectors where   was found to differ significantly 
from zero, 1  is not rejected.  
German and French unions are apparently much more wage-oriented than their Belgian, Italian 
and UK counterparts though with few exceptions unions seem to be rather wage-oriented in all 
sectors and countries. The pooled estimation does not really permit to conclude that this result 
supports the view of Gaston (1998) that unions may become more wage-oriented when firms 
can more credibly threaten to outsource their activities abroad48. 
Regarding the bargaining regime, for most sectors and countries efficient bargaining as well as 
right-to-manage are rejected, in favour of a labour hoarding framework.
                                                 
45 Rearranged with w only in  the left-hand side term. 
46 Given the share restriction the capital equation can be dropped.  The translog production function is added to the system of equations to 
improve the efficiency of the estimates. 
47 According to Aidt and Tzannatos (2002: p. 82) France and Germany had a bargaining coverage (i.e. number of workers, unionised or not, 
that are covered by collective agreements) of 95 and 92 per cent respectively. For Belgium the coverage was 90 per cent and for Italy and the 
United Kingdom 82 and 47 per cent respectively.   
48 For a panel of Belgium, France, Germany and the United Kingdom the correlation between γ and the level of outsourcing in 1996 as well 
as the change between 1985 and 1996 at the sector level (see chapters 4 and 5) is positive, which seems to contradict that unions in sectors 
with a high level of outsourcing are more wage-oriented. 
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Table 6.1:  Estimation of Union Power, Union Preferences and the Bargaining Regime (1994-1998) 
 
 BELGIUM FRANCE GERMANY ITALY UK 
ISIC a γ BR a γ BR A γ BR a γ BR a γ BR 
31 0.38*** 0.78*** LH 0.63*** 0.27*** LH 0.50*** 0.07*** LH 0.29*** 0.35*** LH 0.49*** 0.06** LH 
32 0.50*** 0.77*** LH 0.79*** 0.24*** LH 0.56*** 0.34*** EB 0.25*** 0.50*** LH 0.44*** 0.30*** LH 
33 0.49*** 0.67*** LH 0.62*** 0.40*** EB    0.27*** 0.60*** LH 0.42*** 0.26*** LH 
34 0.58*** 0.74*** LH 0.75*** 0.93*** LH 0.63*** 0.22*** LH 0.22*** 0.64*** LH 0.43*** 0.44*** LH 
35 0.45** 0.68*** LH 0.65*** 0.44*** LH 0.55*** 0.32*** LH 0.31*** 0.56*** LH 0.48*** 0.12** LH 
36 0.34*** 1.78*** LH 0.76*** 0.17*** LH 0.59*** 0.13*** LH 0.28*** 0.54*** LH 0.41*** 0.77* RTM-
EB 
37 0.45*** 0.93*** LH 0.77*** 0.02 RTM 0.42*** 0.07* RTM-
EB 
0.31*** 0.57*** LH 0.65*** 0.22*** LH 
381 0.61*** 0.41*** LH 0.72*** 0.15*** LH 0.61*** 0.16** EB 0.30*** 0.55*** LH 0.56*** 0.30*** LH 
382 0.59*** 0.38*** LH 0.83*** 0.22*** LH 0.70*** 0.06*** EB 0.37*** 0.67*** LH 0.52*** 0.08** LH 
383 0.59*** 0.69** LH 0.77*** 0.32*** LH 0.64*** 0.25*** EB 0.37*** 0.59*** LH 0.44*** 0.16*** LH 
384 0.54*** 0.68*** LH 0.64*** 0.55*** LH 0.77*** 0.07*** EB 0.30*** 0.52*** LH 0.40*** 0.22*** LH 
385 0.59*** 0.57*** EB 0.77*** 0.79*** LH 0.60*** 0.08*** EB 0.25*** 0.94*** LH 0.26*** 0.18 RTM 
 
     Note: The a column reports the estimated labour bargaining power, γ reports the estimated union preference and the BR-column the test of the bargaining regime: efficient bargaining (EB) versus labour hoarding   
               (LH) and efficient bargaining/labour hoarding versus right-to-manage (RTM).  Estimations refer to all available data for the period 1994-1998.  * -  ** - *** denotes significance at respectively 10 % - 5 % -  
               1 %.The sectors are: Food, drink & tobacco (ISIC 31), Textiles, footwear & leather (ISIC 32), Wood, cork & furniture (ISIC 33), Paper, printing & publishing (ISIC 34), Chemicals (ISIC 35), Non-metallic   
               mineral products (ISIC 36), Basic Metal Industries (ISIC 37), Fabricated metal products (ISIC 381), Non-electrical machinery (ISIC 382), Electrical equipment (ISIC 383), Transport equipment (ISIC 384)                 
               and Precision instruments (ISIC 385). 
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For Germany efficient bargaining is not rejected in seven out of the eleven sectors considered.  
 
Following the second proposition, labour market bargaining in most sectors in four out of the 
five countries considered is consistent with a trade-off between wages and employment due to 
intensified import competition. 
 
 
 
6.3.2 Second Step: The Determinants of Union Power 
 
 
In this section the bargaining power of unions, estimated at sector level in the first step, is 
regressed on a number of possible determinants, with a focus on variables reflecting 
international trade competition.  Data on international trade are taken from the OECD 
International Trade by Commodities Statistics (ITCS) database (see section 4.2) to compute 
import volumes for each of the five EU countries with respect to two distinct groups of trade 
partners: the major Newly Industrialised Countries (NIC)49 from Central and Eastern Europe, 
(South-) East Asia and Latin America on the one hand and the EU countries and high-skill 
abundant OECD countries50 on the other hand. 
 
A number of potential (domestic) determinants of union bargaining power that have been used 
in previous empirical work are considered as control variables. 
Following Veugelers (1989) and Bughin (1991) the Herfindahl index51 is considered as a 
measure of industry concentration, i.e. a proxy of imperfect product market competition. 
Veugelers (1989) argued that market concentration allows management to shift increased costs 
on to consumers more easily. Therefore they may be inclined to be more easy-going on unions‘ 
wages demands. However, she added that as concentration reflects the power of firms, the effect 
on union bargaining power is not entirely unambiguous. Bughin (1991) a priori assumed a 
negative relationship between the Herfindahl index and union power, given that the more 
concentrated the industry the more powerful the industry competitors will be.  The Herfindahl 
index has been computed for each industry with the firm level data that were used to estimate 
union bargaining power at sector level. 
                                                 
49 Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland, Hong Kong, Indonesia, South- Korea, Malaysia, Philippines, Singapore, Thailand, Argentina, Brazil, 
Chile and Mexico. 
50 EU-15 plus Australia, Japan, New Zealand, Norway and the US. 
51 The Herfindahl Index measures industry concentration by summing the squared market shares of individual firms. 
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Bughin (1991), referring to Sneessens (1987), assumed that a low capacity utilization rate 
implies a low price-cost margin, which will make management more aggressive in negotiation.  
The relationship between capacity utilization and union power is therefore assumed to be 
positive.  Sector level capacity utilization rates are taken from the OECD Industrial Structure 
Statistics. 
 
Bughin (1991) used the ratio of R&D expenses to patent revenues to account for the combined 
effect of wages increasing with the R&D stock and optimal R&D investment, which may be 
deterred by wage rent seeking.  If there are no good instruments available for the R&D variable, 
the sign is ambiguous due to a possible simultaneity bias. Lack of data on data on patent 
revenues, R&D intensity is used.  The data on R&D stocks are described in section 4.2.   
 
Finally, the skill ratio, measured as the number of high-skilled workers relative to the number 
of low-skilled workers is also considered as a control variable. There is ample evidence that 
unions dominantly recruit low-skilled workers and are successful in reducing wage inequality 
(Freeman 1980; Blau and Kahn 1996; Aidt and Tzannatos 2002 and Card, Lemieux and Riddell 
2003). A negative correlation between the skill ratio and union power can be expected.  
 
Union bargaining power, estimated for each individual industry with pooled data over the years 
1994-1998 is used to construct a cross-section of five countries and twelve industries.  To 
preclude a simultaneity bias, the right-hand side variables are averaged over the period 1992-
1996 rather than over the period 1994-1998. To account for possible heterogeneity among the 
five EU countries, in addition to country-specific intercepts, country-specific slope effects are 
included by interacting the control variables with country dummies. 
A general-to-specific approach is adopted, starting from a general model with all relevant 
variables (trade variables52 and control variables), which is sequentially simplified as much as 
possible- that is as long as it does not result in misspecification or severe loss of fit- by deleting 
those variables that are not significant at the 5 per cent level. 
The most general model contains 38 variables (five country dummies (CDi), eleven sector 
dummies (SDj), two trade variables (MOECD, ij and MNIC, ij) and four control variables (skill ratio 
                                                 
52  To account for heterogeneity among trade partners initially six country groups were considered: high-wage EU countries, low-wage EU 
countries, high-wage OECD countries, (South-) East Asian NIC, Latin American NIC and NIC from Central and Eastern Europe. However, 
there were indications of multicollinearity (high R-squared and high joint but low individual significance of the variables) and therefore the 
first three country groups were joined in an OECD group and the three groups of Newly Industrialised Countries in a NIC group.   
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SRij, Herfindahl index HIij, capacity utilization CUij and R&D intensity RDIij) interacted with 
the five country dummies. 
 
As union bargaining power, estimated in the first step, lies within the [0,1] range, the following 
logit specification is used: 
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with aij union bargaining power in the j-th industry, in the i-th country, and εij the usual error 
term.  In table 6.2 the final step of the general-to-specific estimation is reported and the 
diagnostics of this specification are compared with the diagnostics of the most general model 
specification.  
 
Table 6.2: Estimation of the Impact of Determinants on Union Bargaining Power for the Panel 
of Five EU Countries (1994-1998) 
Dependent variable: 
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ij
a
a
1
ln  
MOECD  -0.98  (-8.74) ** 
MNIC  -4.25  (-4.63) ** 
SRUK  -0.58  (-2.03) * 
HIUK  -9.08  (-3.68) ** 
CUBE  -0.40   (-0.38)  
RDIFR  -2.20  (-2.13) * 
Diagnostics  
General model 
 
Specific model 
R2 adjusted  0.77 0.87 
LM test heteroskedasticity (p-value) 0.16 10-4  (0.99) 0.69 (0.41) 
Jarque-Bera normality test (p-value) 1.02 (0.60) 0.10 (0.97) 
RESET functional form test (p-value) 0.98 (0.34) 0.85 (0.36) 
F-test zero slopes (p-value)  5.94 (0.00) ** 35.9 (0.00) ** 
Note: The dependent variable (union bargaining power transformed for logit estimation) is taken from the first step estimation, pooled over  
           the years 1994-1998 at industry level. The M variables are the import shares of the respective country groups, averaged over the              
           period 1992-1996. The four control variables are defined in the text. The subscript reflects the interaction with the respective country  
           dummies. The t-values reported in brackets have been corrected to account for the generated regressand problem using the formula  
           derived in the statistical appendix.  * -  ** denotes significance at respectively 5 % - 1 %. 
 
 
As the dependent variable in the second step regression is estimated in the first step regression, 
additional variance has to be accounted for.  In the statistical appendix to this chapter a 
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correction procedure that results in a consistent estimation of the variances of the second-step 
parameters is given. Given the specific nature of the bargaining power estimation procedure 
(firm-level data in the first step, sector-level data in the second step and the use of a logit 
specification) the correction differs from the one derived for the two-step mandated wage 
regressions in chapter 4.  
 
The diagnostics show that the final specific model is well specified and explains a large part of 
variance in union power. The t-values, reported in brackets, have been corrected to account for 
the fact that the dependent variable is an estimated rather than a true variable, using the formula 
given in the statistical appendix to this chapter. 
 
Import competition from both OECD countries and the NIC group seems to have had a 
significant negative impact on the bargaining power of unions, in the five EU countries, in the 
period considered. The impact of import competition from the group of Newly Industrialised 
Countries is substantially (and significantly) higher than the impact of OECD countries53.   
 
Unreported country dummies are highly significant. Actually, dropping the country dummies 
from the final specific model dramatically reduces the adjusted R-squared to 0.17, suggesting 
substantial institutional differences between the five EU countries, which can be captured in 
the constant terms. 
 
Only four out of the twenty original control variables are significant and CUBE (i.e. capacity 
utilization interacted with a country dummy for Belgium) is no longer significant when 
correcting the t-values for the generated regressand problem54. In interaction with the UK 
dummy, the skill ratio and the Herfindahl index have a significant negative coefficient. 
Veugelers (1989) found, for 1978, a significant positive impact of the Herfindahl index on union 
bargaining power for Belgium, whereas Bughin (1991), also for Belgium, found a negative 
impact, albeit mostly not significant for the period 1979-1985. For France, R&D intensity has 
apparently had a significant negative impact on union power in the period considered55. The 
significance of country-specific variables underscores- as do the results of the first step 
estimation of union power and preferences- the need to account for heterogeneity across EU 
                                                 
53 If China is included in the NIC group the coefficient of imports from the NIC is –2.02.  
54  For Belgium, Bughin (1991) found a positive though mostly not significant coefficient for capacity utilization 
55 Bughin (1991) found a positive but rarely significant effect of the R&D variable for Belgium in the period 1979-1985. 
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countries. Institutional differences between EU countries apparently play a dominant role in 
determining the bargaining power of unions although a common negative impact of import 
competition is found.  
 
Including variables reflecting exports as Manasse, Stanca and Turrini (2004) did for Italy, 
results in a negative but highly insignificant coefficient. 
The usual alternative explanation for international trade, i.e. skill-biased technological change, 
was considered by Acemoglu, Aghion and Violante (2001) as a determinant of falling union 
membership in the United States. They argued that technological change raised the outside 
option for high-skilled workers, undermining the coalition between low-skilled and high-skilled 
workers, thereby reducing the bargaining power of unions, which are reported to be successful 
in reducing wage differences.  
 
To control for the possible impact of technological change, a general-to-specific estimation has 
been performed with total factor productivity as a proxy for technological change. The data 
used for TFP are discussed in section 4.2. Total factor productivity is interacted with the country 
dummies in the general model. 
 
To preclude multi-collinearity between TFP and the R&D variable, the latter is not included in 
the estimation56.  
The results of the specific model with TFP, reported in table 6.3, confirm the earlier findings. 
Both imports from OECD and NIC had a significant negative impact on the bargaining power 
of unions, with the latter again significantly dominating the first. 
The skill ratio and Herfindahl index for the United Kingdom are again found to be significant 
and negative. However, for this estimation, the Herfindahl index is also significant and negative 
for Belgium and France. The coefficient of total factor productivity is negative, as expected, 
and significant for Belgium and Germany but only at the 10 per cent level for the latter.  
 
 
 
Table 6. 3: Estimation of the Determinants of Union Bargaining Power with TFP as Proxy for 
Technological Change 
 
                                                 
56 Including R&D intensity gives similar results. 
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                             Note: See table 6.2. 
 
When interacting total factor productivity with the trade variables, the coefficient of total factor 
productivity is no longer significant for Germany and only significant at the 10 per cent level 
for Belgium, whereas the coefficients of the trade variables remain highly significant. The 
coefficient of TFP, interacted with imports from OECD countries, is significant for Belgium 
and the coefficient of TFP interacted with imports from the NIC is significant for Germany 
(both at the 10 per cent level). The results of the estimation with TFP, interacted with imports, 
suggest that import competition may have induced technological change, as TFP is only 
significant in interaction with variables reflecting import competition.   
 
Veugelers (1989) computed the bargaining power of blue-collar and white-collar workers 
separately, for a cross-section of Belgian manufacturing industries. Her results suggested that 
both categories of workers should be treated as different groups. Blue-collar workers had a 
higher bargaining power than white-collar workers. 
Veugelers considered an efficient bargaining framework but contrary to the framework 
presented in this section, she pegged down the parameter reflecting risk preference of the union 
(γ) at one, implying risk-neutrality. From the wage equation, obtained by differentiating the 
Nash product with respect to wages, she derived the following expression (Veugelers 1989: p. 
176): 
 
Dependent variable:  





 ij
ij
a
a
1
ln  
MOECD -0.93  (-3.05)*** 
MNIC -3.92  (-3.96) *** 
SRUK -0.48  (-1.72) * 
HIFR -6.57 (-2.28) ** 
HIBE -6.44 (-1.95)* 
HIUK -9.20  (-3.72)*** 
TFPDE -1.33   (-1.89)*  
TFPBE -0.77  (-2.24)** 
Diagnostics Specific model 
R2 adjusted     0.88 
LM test heteroskedasticity (p-value) 0.15 (0.70) 
Jarque-Bera normality test (p-value) 1.15 (0.56) 
RESET functional form test (p-value) 0.40 (0.53) 
F-test zero slopes (p-value)  27.6 (0.00)*** 
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

1PCM
R
WP.L
                                                                                                                     (6.22) 
 
with L denoting employment, WP the wage premium, R revenue, τ the bargaining power of the 
union and PCM the price cost margin (i.e. value added minus labour costs divided by sales). 
Rather than estimating bargaining power, she derived the sector-level bargaining strength of 
unions from the difference between the sector wage level and the competitive wage level (i.e. 
WP).  
Lack of information on marginal labour productivity, she assumed the competitive wage level 
to be constant across industries and equated it to the lowest wage level in manufacturing 
industries. She adjusted the wage premium to avoid differences due to characteristics of workers 
in each industry, like the percentage of female workers, average seniority and the percentage of 
skilled workers or management executives. 
Assuming workers can swiftly shift from one industry to another, which the common threat 
point for all industries in WP implies, seems more heroic than assuming a common threat point 
across firms in the same industry, as the estimation within a production function framework 
using firm level data implies. The procedure of computing bargaining power also implies that 
unions in the sector with the lowest wage level have no bargaining power at all.  
However, the advantage of the approach by Veugelers (1989) is that low-skilled workers can 
be differentiated from high-skilled workers, which is less feasible at the firm level, a level at 
which data on employment broken down by skills are not readily available. 
Apart from the results of Veugelers, indicating substantial differences in the bargaining power 
of the two skill groups, as mentioned above, there are clear indications that unions represent 
low-skilled workers to a larger extent than high-skilled workers. Moreover, in a number of 
industries, high-skilled workers have their own unions. Differentiating both groups therefore 
seems appropriate as import competition and other determinants may affect both groups to a 
different extent.   
For the panel of five EU countries, union bargaining power has been computed following the 
procedure by Veugelers (1989), using the sector data on manual and non-manual workers (see 
section 4.2). Unfortunately there were no data available on the characteristics Veugelers used 
(e.g. average seniority) so unadjusted wage premia are used.      
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Bargaining power has been computed for each sector, for the years 1993-1996, and the average 
over these years is taken as the dependent variable. 
Computing bargaining power for all workers combined results in lower estimates than with the 
estimation procedure using firm level data. Average bargaining power for the panel of five EU 
countries, estimated with the latter procedure, is 0.52, whereas following the Veugelers 
procedure it is 0.47. For Belgium, Veugelers found union bargaining power below 0.50 for most 
manufacturing industries in 1978, whereas the estimates for union bargaining power, in table 
6.1, are well above 0.50 in most industries and countries. 
The assumption of risk-neutrality (γ = 1), implied in the Veugelers procedure, is clearly rejected 
for most industries, as can also bee seen in table 6.1.   
The bargaining power of low-skilled (blue-collar) workers is, as in Veugelers (1989), with an 
average of 0.29, found to exceed the bargaining power of high-skilled (white-collar) workers, 
with an average of 0.17. 
 
Table 6.4: Estimation of the Impact of Determinants on the Union Bargaining Power of Low-
Skilled and High-Skilled Workers (Panel of Five EU Countries) 
          Low-skilled workers            High-skilled workers 
Dependent variable: 
 
 








 ij
ij
a
a
1
ln  
  








 ij
ij
a
a
1
ln  
MOECD  -1.84  (-7.52) ***  -1.63 (-6.77) *** 
MNIC  -9.64  (-4.80) ***  -8.69 (-4.04) *** 
SRDE  -0.47  (-2.97) ***   
SRFR  0.58  (2.62) **  0.91(2.86) *** 
HIDE  3.15   (1.77) *  4.37 (3.58) *** 
CUBE   0.02  (6.02) ***   
RDIBE    50.1 (2.75) *** 
Diagnostics  
General model 
 
Specific model 
 
General model 
 
Specific model 
R2 adjusted         0.65          0.80            0.76         0.83 
LM test heteroskedasticity 
 (p-value) 0.58 10
-2  (0.02) ** 4.66 (0.03) ** 0.41 (0.52) 0.59 10-2 (0.94)  
Jarque-Bera normality test 
(p-value) 0.79 (0.68) 0.81 (0.67) 1.08 (0.58) 2.10 (0.35) 
RESET functional form test 
(p-value) 1.33 (0.27) 0.63 (0.43) 0.30 (0.60) 0.335 (0.57) 
F-test zero slopes  
(p-value)  3.66 (0.00) *** 17.8 (0.00) *** 5.36 (0.00) *** 23.0 (0.00) *** 
Note: The dependent variable (union bargaining power transformed for logit estimation) is computed at sector level with the formula (6.22) 
proposed by Veugelers (1989), averaged over the years 1993-1996. As the bargaining power is not estimated but computed the t-values are 
not corrected, as in table 6.2, but are White heteroskedastic-consistent.   * -  **-*** denotes significance at respectively 10%- 5 % - 1 %. 
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Results of a general-to-specific estimation of the determinants of union bargaining power for 
the group of low-skilled workers and the group of high-skilled workers are reported in table 
6.4. 
The general as well as the final specification for low-skilled workers seems to suffer from 
heteroskedasticity, but the reported t-values are, following the procedure by White (1980), 
consistent for the presence of unknown heteroskedasticity.  
Imports competition of OECD countries and the NIC is found to have had a significant negative 
impact on the bargaining power of both low-skilled and high-skilled workers. Again, the impact 
of the NIC dominates the impact of OECD countries. The impact of imports, especially of the 
NIC, is higher for low-skilled workers than for high-skilled workers, though the difference is 
not statistically significant. R&D intensity has a very high and significant positive impact on 
the bargaining power of high-skilled workers for Belgium. This could indicate that substantial 
R&D activities strengthen the bargaining position of highly qualified workers. 
 
Alternative estimations, e.g. with total factor productivity as a control variable, change the 
remaining significant control variables in the final specification57 but consistently confirm the 
significant impact of import penetration, especially with respect to the Newly Industrialised 
Countries. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
57 For Belgium, the impact of TFP on the bargaining power of high-skilled workers is positive and significant, in line with the substantial 
impact of R&D intensity. 
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6.4 Conclusions 
 
 
In this section a two-step procedure has been proposed to estimate the impact of international 
trade and other potential determinants on union bargaining power, for a panel of five EU 
countries in the period 1994-1998. The procedure permits to estimate simultaneously the 
bargaining power and preferences of unions with respect to wages and work effort, as well as 
to assess the bargaining regime (efficient bargaining, right-to-manage or labour hoarding). In a 
first step, bargaining power and union preferences are estimated, whereas the bargaining regime 
is inferred from tests on restrictions. Results suggest that unions are powerful in Germany and 
France and relatively weak in Italy and the United Kingdom.  Overall, unions in the five 
countries considered show a persistent pattern of wage-oriented behaviour. Given the cross-
section nature of the analysis, it is not possibly to say whether this confirms the argument of 
Gaston (1998) that increased international competition will result in unions becoming more 
wage-oriented as they will more aggressively bargain for the interests of the median union 
member, at the expense of the more marginal members. 
Employment or working conditions are in general part of the bargaining framework, 
predominately identified as a labour hoarding framework, with exception of seven out of eleven 
sectors considered for Germany, for which the results suggest efficient bargaining. The first 
step estimation indicates that pegging down the risk parameter of unions may bias the results. 
 
A very robust finding of the second step estimation of the determinants of union power is that 
import penetration, especially from Newly Industrialised Countries, reduced the bargaining 
power of unions. 
Following the proposition derived for a labour hoarding bargaining regime this suggests that, 
in contrast with the results of the two-step mandated wage regressions, North-South trade 
actually depressed wages in the panel of the five EU countries considered, whereas employment 
may actually have increased as a result of falling wages. 
 
Computing bargaining power as in Veugelers (1989), rather than estimating it, provides lower 
estimates of union power, suggesting a negative bias due to the pegging down of the risk 
parameter, which as suggested by the first step estimation differs substantially from one (i.e. 
the value for risk-neutrality). 
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However, as pointed out by Veugelers (1989) and as supported by studies on union membership 
it may be important to differentiate between low-skilled and high-skilled workers. The 
procedure proposed by Veugelers, using sector level data, permits such a distinction, which due 
to a lack of data on the skill mix at firm level is not feasible within a production function 
estimation of union power.   
The results for the period 1993-1996 confirm the finding of Veugelers (1989) that the 
bargaining power of low-skilled workers is higher than the bargaining power of high-skilled 
workers, in line with previous findings that unions tend to recruit low-skilled workers to a larger 
extent than high-skilled workers. 
Estimation of the determinants of (computed) union bargaining power confirms the significant 
negative impact of imports competition, especially of Newly Industrialised Countries. This 
impact seems to be higher for low-skilled workers. This would, within a labour hoarding 
regime, support increased wage inequality, as also found by OECD (2003 a) in the European 
Union in the 1990s, especially, considering the panel of five EU countries, for Germany and 
Italy.  
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Appendix 1: Efficient Bargaining 
 
 
In order to determine the wage and employment effect of increased imports within an efficient 
bargaining framework, (6.8) and (6.9) are differentiated with respect to y, resulting in the 
following system of equations: 
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The determinant of the coefficient matrix of this system is: 
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it follows that D < 0. 
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Applying Cramer’s rule [Given a system AX = B, if A is invertible the unique solution of the 
system is given by 
Adet
)Adet(x ii  , with xi the i-th element of vector X. The matrix Ai is obtained 
by replacing the i-th column of A by B]: 
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of which the sign is indeterminate. 
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The wage and employment effects of union bargaining power is obtained by totally 
differentiating (6.8) and (6.9): 
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Applying Cramer’s Rule: 
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Since 0


a
k  and 
l
R
l
VA

  (from (6.9), i.e. the fact that the wage in efficient bargaining exceeds 
the marginal labour revenue) the sign of the last expression is always positive.  An increase in 
union bargaining power results in a higher wage level.  However, the output and employment 
implications of an increase of bargaining power depend on the preference structure of the union: 
 < 1 ( > 1) implies 


  00
ad
ld
ad
ld .  Hence, an increase in the bargaining power of a wage- 
(employment-) oriented union implies a fall (an increase) in output and employment. 
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Appendix 2: Labour Hoarding  
 
The impact of increased imports on wages and overhead employment, within a labour hoarding 
framework, is derived from (6.15) and (6.17).  The latter can be simplified using (6.16): 
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Taking the differential with respect to y: 
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(A 2.1) 
 
Where as before  
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The system can be rearranged: 
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with: 
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Regarding the signs: 
 
 K1 > 0  
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Given εlp, w < 0 the first and the last term are positive and the second is negative. If 
1
w,lP
  K2 > 0. 
 
 K3 < 0 if γ < 1 and of indeterminate sign if γ > 1.  
 
 K4 > 0 as the sum of the first three terms is positive (from (6.15) and the fact that 
the wage is a positive mark-up of the outside option), and the last term is of a 
lower order compared to the two positive terms γ and 
P
O
l
l  (like the first negative 
term). 
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 i.e. profits per 
(productive) worker that fall from an increase in import competition (at constant 
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wages). Assume 0
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The matrix notation of (A 2.2) is: 
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The determinant of the coefficient matrix: 
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is positive if γ < 1 and of indeterminate sign if γ > 1.  Applying Cramer’s rule, it follows that: 
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Since K1T2 > 0 and K3T1 >0 (if γ < 1), 
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  can either be positive and negative.  The sign of D, 
K3 and T2 is ambiguous when γ > 1, hence the sign of 
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that situation. 
Proceeding analogously as regards the differential of the system with respect to a, we obtain: 
 
0
'
43
121










a
wK
a
lK
T
a
wK
a
lK
O
O
 (A 2.9) 
 
where: 
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The sign of the partial derivatives of the two endogenous variables are: 
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when γ < 1 and of ambiguous sign if γ > 1. 
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Statistical Appendix  
 
The procedure to correct the standard errors of the coefficients in the second step, of two-step 
estimations with generated regessands, has already been discussed in the statistical appendix to 
chapter 4. The derivation in this chapter differs from the standard results, however58. The vector 
of ‘observations’ in the second step consists of a set of estimated coefficients, each of which is 
estimated in a separate first step model. Consequently, the associated first step variances need 
not be homogeneous, a complication that has to be taken into account in the correction of the 
second step variances. 
Moreover, the dimension of the first step estimation (i.e. number of firms in each individual 
sector respectively) differs from the dimension in the second step (i.e. number of industries). 
 
First step  (I.C sets of equations, one for each industry i and country c): 
 
CcIinjXW icicjicicjicj ,...,1;,...,1;,...,1,,,    
 
where  nic  is the number of firms in the ith industry of country c.  
 
Second step  (one equation, with I.C estimated parameters as the vector of ‘observations’ of 
the dependent variable): 
 
icicic Z  *  
 
where given the logit specification:  
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The moment conditions to estimate this model are: 
 
      CcIiXWXEXgE icicicicicicic ,...,1;,...,10,    
 
                                                 
58 This appendix is borrowed from Dumont, Rayp and Willemé (2004). 
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(assuming independence between sectors and countries implies that Gα is a block-diagonal 
matrix). 
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a consistent estimator of the asymptotic covariance matrix of  β is obtained from F-1 V F-1’  
(Hansen 1982): 
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The square matrices F and V have been partitioned as in Newey (1984). Applying these results 
to the present model, assuming independence between residuals from first and second step 
equations (implying that Vgh = Vhg = 0) yields: 
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Inserting the appropriate sub-matrices into F-1 V F-1’ yields the covariance matrix of the second 
step regression: 
 
        111121   ZZAZGVGAZZZZZ gg    
 
The first term in this expression is simply the estimated covariance of the second step (i.e. the 
conditional covariance) while the second term is the additional variance introduced as a result 
of the inherent uncertainty of the first step estimator. 
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7. General Conclusions 
 
 
“There’s always free cheddar in a mousetrap“ 
-Tom Waits God’s away on business. 
 
 
7.1 Deterioration of the Labour Market Position of Low-Skilled Workers 
 
Most studies on the labour market impact of trade with Newly Industrialised Countries (NIC) 
focused on the United States where in the 1980s the position of low-skilled workers started to 
deteriorate dramatically, both in terms of rising wage inequality and decreased relative 
employment. 
For the European Union the evidence is mixed. Whereas in some EU countries (e.g. United 
Kingdom) wage inequality increased substantially and in some EU countries (e.g. Germany) 
relative employment of low-skilled workers dropped considerably, a joint decrease in relative 
wages and employment does not seem to have occurred in the European Union. Stylised facts 
for the European Union clearly reveal the heterogeneity within the European Union. Both 
asymmetric shocks and asymmetric effects of common shocks (e.g. due to institutional 
differences) should be accounted for.  
 
The fact that imports from NIC, especially from the Asian Tigers and Pussycats, swelled up at 
about the same time did not go unnoticed and international trade was soon rounded up as a 
usual suspect for the deteriorated labour market position of low-skilled workers. 
The public prosecutor could invoke the Stolper-Samuelson theorem, i.e. one of the four core 
theorems of the textbook Heckscher-Ohlin model, predicting that if a high-skill abundant 
country opens up to trade with a relatively more low-skill abundant country, the wages of its 
low-skilled workers (being relatively scarce) are likely to fall as a result of a fall in the relative 
price of low-skill intensive goods. 
The Stolper-Samuelson theorem makes it clear that even though countries may mutually derive 
net gains from international trade, trade liberalisation is not neutral in terms of income 
distribution.  
Free trade advocates took up the defence of international trade, pointing out the rather strict 
assumptions underlying the Heckscher-Ohlin framework. Relative factor endowment in 
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developed countries and NIC can diverge to the extent that both fully specialize in different 
goods. If so, there would be no competition and free trade would create a tide that lifts all boats, 
i.e. benefit everyone everywhere. Early empirical work did not seem to provide much evidence 
that Stolper-Samuelson effects played a substantial role in labour market developments in high-
skill abundant countries and skill-biased technological change was increasingly considered as 
a more likely culprit. 
This was pretty much the consensus view in the mid-1990s. 
 
However, in the second half of the 1990s a number of prominent economists started to question 
this consensus and argued that international trade might have been exonerated too soon. 
Some fundamental limitations in previous empirical work, providing circumstantial rather than 
decisive evidence, were exposed. New empirical methodologies with a closer link to the 
Stolper-Samuelson theorem were proposed (e.g. the mandated wage regression procedure) and 
some non-Heckscher-Ohlin mechanisms were considered that allowed for an impact of 
international trade on wages and employment, irrespective of the changes in relative product 
prices or the fall in skill intensity predicted by the Heckscher-Ohlin model.   
 
Moreover, the previous apparent dichotomy between international trade and technological 
change was abandoned for a more realistic analysis accounting for the interlinkage. 
 
Although in some recent estimations indications were found of more considerable labour 
market effects of North-South trade, with very few exceptions these studies did not provide 
evidence that international trade has been a dominant explanation for changes in the wages and 
employment of low-skilled workers. Other factors like exogenous technological change but 
also, if not predominately, institutional characteristics clearly come into play.  
 
Differences in labour market institutions are often brought forward to explain the diverging 
labour market performance of a moneyless jobs United States and a jobless money Europe. 
Though some degree of trade-off between equity and efficiency seems likely to exist, the 
evidence is not overwhelming. On the one hand, some economists claim that in most EU 
countries labour markets are more flexible than generally believed and on the other hand a 
number of scholars even argue that some labour market rigidities could be beneficial. 
However, if labour markets in the European Union are indeed less flexible than in the United 
States, international trade could affect employment rather than wages and theoretical models 
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and empirical estimations accounting for imperfect labour markets are probably more 
appropriate than perfect competition models like the Heckscher-Ohlin framework.  
As most of the empirical work considered the United States and for Europe studies mostly only 
cover a single country, conclusions cannot simply be carried over to the whole European Union, 
given the substantial (intra-EU) differences in trade flows, specialisation patterns, country size 
and labour market institutions. 
 
7.2 Data Issues 
 
In this thesis, after reporting, in chapter 2, some stylised facts with respect to wages, 
employment and international trade and reviewing the theoretical and empirical literature in 
chapter 3, I reported the results of own estimations carried out for a panel of EU countries, 
covering the 1980s and 1990s.  
 
Cuyvers, Dumont, Rayp, Stevens and Van den Bulcke (2001 a) constructed a panel of EU 
countries to estimate the impact of trade with Newly Industrialised Countries on wages and 
employment in the European Union. The work was instructed by the European Commission to 
provide information on the possible labour market impact of the further anlargement of the 
European Union, in preparation to the accession of new member states.  
 
The distinction between high-skilled and low-skilled workers was considered as an important 
issue, which posed an additional data problem as information broken down by skill level is not 
readily available. 
The division operatives/ non-operatives or manuals/ non-manuals was used to proxy low-
skilled/ high-skilled workers as the intrinsically more accurate Labour Force Survey data by 
occupation only provided information on employment from 1993 onwards and no data on 
wages. Moreover the reliability of the data can be questioned. 
If anything, the availability and quality of data with respect to different skill or educational 
categories for EU countries appears to be deteriorating, which is problematic for future 
empirical research and research-based policies.  
 
Gathering comparable data on as many EU countries as possible and for a sufficiently large 
time period turned out to be a real ordeal. Different data sources had to be used, missing values 
had to be intra- or extrapolated when necessary and structural breaks, due to different data 
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sources for different years, had to be smoothed. Even then, some EU countries could not be 
considered, given a lack of sufficient data. 
Eventually, a panel of the following ten countries was constructed for the period 1985-1998: 
Belgium, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Italy, Portugal, Spain, Sweden and the United 
Kingdom. 
For each country, the data cover twelve ISIC manufacturing industries. The two-digit level, 
except for Manufacture of Fabricated Metal Products, Machinery and Equipment (ISIC 38) 
which is considered at the three-digit level, is rather high and undoubtedly conceals substantial 
intra-industry heterogeneity but the data did not allow for a more detailed level of aggregation 
for most EU countries. 
 
At the end of the review of the literature, I argued for the use of some specific methodologies 
for the empirical assessment of the labour market impact of trade with the NIC. 
The main premise for own empirical work was a distinct preference for multiple panel data 
regressions as they allow to test, within a well-defined theoretical framework, a number of 
hypotheses.   
Panel data estimations provide a convenient way to estimate effects for a group of countries, 
accounting and testing for the degree of cross-country heterogeneity. 
Heterogeneity could be captured by country-specific intercepts, reflecting e.g. institutional 
differences, allowing for common slope effects across countries. If heterogeneity were more 
substantial, the hypothesis of common slopes would be rejected.  
In addition to possible intra-EU heterogeneity, trade partners are classified into distinct groups 
of countries, assumed to be relatively homogenous in terms of relative factor endowment, 
technological level and geographical location. With respect to the Newly Industrialised 
Countries, (South-) East Asian countries, transition countries from Central and Eastern Europe 
and Latin American emerging economies are distinguished as separate NIC groups.  
 
 
 
 
7.3 Results of the Two-Step Mandated Wage Regressions 
 
In chapter 4, I discussed the results of two-step mandated wage regressions. The mandated wage 
regression procedure, proposed by Leamer (1996 a) and further elaborated by Feenstra and 
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Hanson (1999) and Haskel and Slaughter (2001), is as closely linked to the correlation version 
of the Stolper-Samuelson theorem (i.e. the version that applies to a model with many factors 
and many goods) as possible. In addition, the procedure permits to disentangle the impact of 
international trade from the impact of factor-augmenting technological change, which is the 
main alternative explanation put forward to explain rising wage inequality. Trade-induced 
technological change, i.e. the indirect impact of international trade pointed out by Wood (1994), 
can also be accounted for. 
Contrary to previous mandated wage estimations, import-weighted foreign R&D stocks have 
been computed to consider trade-related international R&D spillovers.  
Grossman and Helpman (1991) argued that international trade is an important spillover 
mechanism. In their theoretical model the outcome of technology and trade policies depends on 
whether spillovers are global or local in scope. 
Coe and Helpman (1995) found indications of significant import-related R&D spillovers 
between OECD countries and Coe, Helpman and Hoffmaister (1995) found evidence of 
significant North-South R&D spillovers. 
North-South spillovers may permit developing countries to close the technology gap, whereas 
North-North spillovers support technological activities in the developed countries. 
 
In the first step of the mandated wage estimation, changes in domestic product prices and total 
factor productivity (proxy for technological change) are regressed on a number of external 
determinants. 
I also considered foreign outsourcing, i.e. the fragmentation of the production process and the 
contracting out of labour-intensive fragments to low-wage countries. Many perceive foreign 
outsourcing as an increasingly important phenomenon of nowadays globalisation. 
In the second step of the mandated wage estimation, the respective contributions of the external 
determinants, estimated in the first step, are regressed on the shares of the production factors 
(low-skilled and high-skilled labour). The estimated coefficients of the factor shares can then 
be considered as the changes in the rewards of the respective factor, mandated by the changes 
in the given external determinant, in order for the long-run perfect competition zero profits 
condition to hold. 
As the dependent variables in the second step are generated rather than true variables, the 
standard errors of the second step estimates have to be corrected for additional variance. 
Dumont, Rayp, Thas and Willemé (2003) have shown that the correction procedure proposed 
by Feenstra and Hanson (1997), as applied by Feenstra and Hanson (1999) and Haskel and 
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Slaughter (2001, 2002), suffers from a negative bias, to the extent that the procedure does not 
guarantee positive variances. They proposed an unbiased correction procedure that guarantees 
positive variances. This procedure has been applied.    
None of the alternative mandated wage regressions for the panel of EU countries provides 
strong evidence in favour of Stolper-Samuelson effects.  
In line with previous estimations, international R&D spillovers are found to be significant. 
There are some indications that import competition of the Asian Tigers induced skill-biased 
technological change but this finding is not very robust. 
 
7.4 Sticky Wages and Labour Demand Elasticity 
 
The assumption of perfectly competitive labour markets is essential for the Stolper-Samuelson 
theorem to hold. Within the Heckscher-Ohlin model, full employment of all production factors 
is assumed. Factor rewards are flexible and therefore absorb the impact of international trade. 
If wages are however to some extent sticky, as they probably are in most countries, changes in 
relative factor demand could imply unemployment of some production factors. 
Blanchflower, Oswald and Sanfey (1992) showed that even for the United States the assumption 
that wages are fully flexible is not supported by the data.  
Given the general perception that labour markets are relatively rigid in most EU countries, e.g. 
due to minimum wages, collective bargaining and unemployment benefits, Krugman (1995 b) 
proposed a European model that accounts for downward wage rigidity. International trade will 
affect employment, i.e. induce unemployment of the relatively scarce factor.  
 
In chapter 5, relaxing the Heckscher-Ohlin assumption of perfect labour market competition, 
extended flexible cost functions are used to derive the demand for production factors and to 
assess the impact of external determinants on factor demand. 
Flexible cost functions impose as little restrictions (e.g. returns to scale, substitution between 
factors) as possible. The translog (TL) and the generalized Leontief (GL) functions, second-
order Taylor expansions of respectively a Cobb-Douglas and a Leontief specification, are the 
two most popular flexible cost functions.   
Morrison and Siegel (1997) proposed an extension of a generalized Leontief cost function, 
incorporating external determinants that could affect the demand for production factors. 
The demand for production factors and the elasticity of factor demand with respect to the 
external determinants can rather straightforwardly be derived from a GL cost function.  
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Considering variables reflecting import competition permits to estimate the impact of 
international trade on the demand for low-skilled and high-skilled workers. 
Estimation of factor demand elasticity for a panel of ten EU countries, within an extended GL 
cost function framework, provides results that are generally in line with prior expectations. 
Import competition of OECD countries with similar or higher relative skill endowment seems 
to have decreased the relative demand for high-skilled workers in most of the twelve 
manufacturing industries considered. Imports from the group of Southern EU countries 
(Greece, Portugal and Spain) apparently decreased overall demand for labour in the period 
1985-1996, i.e. the period of their integration into the European Union. 
These results suggest that the relative catch-up of Portugal and Spain could partially have been 
due to a demand shift in favour of these countries. 
Import competition from the NIC increased the relative demand for high-skilled workers in 
most sectors and significantly decreased absolute demand for low-skilled workers in some 
sectors (e.g. textiles, footwear and leather). 
These results seem in line with the predictions of a sticky wage model. However, overall the 
demand for production factors does not appear to have fallen more spectacularly in some sectors 
than in others. The fact that changes appear to occur as much within as between industries but 
that these changes can be explained by international trade rather than by technological factors 
provides some evidence for foreign outsourcing models, which predict substantial within-
industry changes though the high level of industry aggregation undoubtedly conceals intra-
industry heterogeneity. 
 
Aggregating the estimated changes in factor demand over twelve manufacturing industries 
provides an estimate of a 3.6 percent fall in the relative demand for low-skilled workers in the 
European Union in the period 1985-1996, as a result of trade with Newly Industrialised 
Countries.     
 
Barnett (1985) and Barnett, Lee and Wolfe (1985) showed that the translog and the generalized 
Leontief cost function are, contrary to the general belief, not very flexible and rather often 
violate regularity conditions. The translog cost function has good regional properties if the 
elasticity of substitution is close to one and the generalized Leontief cost function if the 
elasticity of substitution is close to zero. As shown by Caves and Christensen (1980) the 
performance of both functional forms deteriorates rapidly as elasticity moves away from 
respectively one and zero. 
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Barnett, Lee and Wolfe (1985) have proposed Laurent minflex translog and generalized 
Leontief functional forms, which use second-order Laurent expansions rather than second-order 
Taylor expansions of respectively a Cobb-Douglas and a Leontief function. Monte Carlo 
simulations show the superior quality, especially when using time series, of these Laurent 
specifications. 
 
I have considered an extended Laurent minflex generalized Leontief (LGL) cost function to 
estimate the elasticity of factor demand with respect to international trade variables and 
compared the results with the estimates of a traditional GL specification. So-called J-tests, 
proposed by Davidson and MacKinnon (1981), permit to compare both specifications in terms 
of goodness of fit. 
These tests show that in eight out of twelve industries a LGL is preferred to a traditional GL 
specification. 
Moreover, the estimated elasticities differ considerably between both functional forms, 
especially with respect to the degree of substitution between the production factors. 
There are some indications of capital-skill complementarity and of substitution between low-
skilled and high-skilled workers. 
The results with respect to the impact of international trade on labour demand seem less 
sensitive to the functional form and LGL estimations confirm the main conclusions of the GL 
estimations. 
 
As estimations using the levels of variables could suffer from spurious correlation, i.e. 
correlation driven by a common underlying trend in the time series rather than by a true 
underlying relationship, I also performed estimations using translog specification in first 
differences, as Berman, Bound and Griliches (1993) and Feenstra and Hanson (2001). 
These estimations provide less significant results, as can be expected, but confirm the negative 
impact of NIC trade on the demand for low-skilled workers, especially concerning trade with 
the CEEC and Asian Tigers and Pussycats. 
There are some indications that wages are affected as well as employment but the employment 
effects are more substantial, albeit estimated less accurately. 
 
  
7.5 International Trade and Union Bargaining Power 
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Finally, in chapter 6, a bargaining framework is proposed to infer the impact of international 
trade on wages and employment, accounting for a labour market institution that is often 
considered to play an important role in EU countries, i.e. collective bargaining. 
If unions have some bargaining power due to a monopoly position in representing workers, they 
can bargain for wages, employment or working conditions. Wages resulting from the 
bargaining process may exceed the marginal product level and lead firms to employ fewer 
workers than they would at the efficient wage level. Strong unions are often blamed for the high 
average unemployment rates in the European Union, due to excessive wages demands. As 
unions, which recruit low-skilled workers more than high-skilled workers, are found to be 
successful in confining the skill premium they are especially blamed for the high unemployment 
rates of low-skilled workers.  
 
Lawrence and Lawrence (1985) were among the first to consider the impact of international 
trade on union bargaining power. If union power is reduced due to increased import competition 
this will have an impact on wages and employment. 
   
Lack of data on union bargaining power, a theoretical framework has been proposed that 
permits to estimate union power and at the same time to test for the bargaining regime (efficient 
bargaining, right-to-manage or labour hoarding) and the extent of wage-orientation of unions. 
The bargaining regime and union preferences are crucial for inferring the effects of changes in 
union power on wages and employment, as shown in chapter 6.  
In addition to an efficient bargaining framework, in which unions and firms are assumed to 
bargain for wages and employment, a labour hoarding framework is considered. In the latter 
regime, unions are assumed to bargain for wages and work effort. A number of empirical studies 
indicate that working conditions are part of the bargaining between employers and employees. 
   
Available firm level data allowed estimation for five EU countries (Belgium, France, Germany, 
Italy and the United Kingdom) and twelve ISIC manufacturing industries in the period 1994-
1998. 
The results show that efficient bargaining (EB) and right-to-manage bargaining (RTM) regimes 
are rejected in favour of a labour hoarding (LH) regime, except for Germany for which in some 
industries an efficient bargaining regime is favoured over the others. This seems in line with 
previous overall poor empirical evidence for EB and RTM. 
  285
Contrary to most previous studies, union preferences are not pegged down at a given level but 
are estimated. Results clearly indicate that unions are wage-oriented. 
 
In a second step, the union bargaining power, estimated in the first step for each individual 
country-sector combination, averaged over the period 1994-1998, is regressed on potential 
determinants like international trade, industry concentration, capacity utilization and R&D 
activities. 
Import competition of OECD countries and Newly Industrialised Countries had a significant 
negative impact on union power, with the impact of the NIC group being considerably higher 
than the impact of the OECD group.  
 
In a labour hoarding regime with wage-oriented unions, i.e. the case supported by the first step 
estimation, wages will probably fall if union bargaining power drops as a result of increased 
import competition. Crew size will fall (and thus effort increase) as well, but productive labour 
could increase, with the latter effect probably dominating the fall in unproductive labour. This 
seems to imply a trade-off between wages and employment for most countries and industries.  
At first thought this finding clashes with the results of the mandated wage regressions, which 
suggested no significant impact on wages in the European Union. 
However, the mandated wage regressions focused on the period 1985-1996, as for the last years 
of the 1990s necessary data were rather unreliable or not available. 
The mandated wage regressions fit within a Heckscher-Ohlin framework, with its assumption 
of perfectly competitive labour markets, whereas the bargaining framework used in chapter 6 
clearly sets off with imperfect labour markets, characterized by labour unions that have some 
power to bargain for wages, employment and/ or working conditions. 
Moreover the estimation of the determinants of union bargaining power cover the period 1994-
1998. 
As mentioned in chapter 2, OECD (2003 a) found indications of a structural improvement in 
employment performance in most EU countries, in the late 1990s, in contrast with the sluggish 
growth in the 1970s and the 1980s, when total labour costs outpaced productivity growth. In 
the 1990s, labour costs lagged productivity growth. The OECD viewed wage moderation as the 
main explanation for the improved employment record and also mentioned that wage inequality 
increased substantially in some EU countries in the 1990s, especially in the United Kingdom. 
They considered falling union power as a likely explanation for wage moderation and increased 
wage inequality. 
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There are also some indications of worsening working conditions (OECD 2003 a: pp. 40-48).  
These stylised facts seem to fit well with the results for five EU countries in the period 1994-
1998, which suggest a fall in wages, an increase in work effort and an increase in productive 
labour. 
 
As unions are known to represent low-skilled workers more than high-skilled workers, it seems 
appropriate to distinguish both skill categories. 
However, firm level data do not allow for such a distinction. 
I have therefore followed the procedure proposed by Veugelers (1989), who computed union 
bargaining power at industry level, as the difference between the sector wage level and the 
competitive wage level, proxied by the lowest wage level across industries. 
Using wage data for manual and non-manual workers, the bargaining power of both groups was 
estimated for the period 1993-1996. The bargaining power of low-skilled (manual) workers is, 
as in Veugelers (1989), found to exceed the bargaining power of high-skilled workers.    
In line with the previous estimations, import competition has a significant negative impact on 
the bargaining power of low-skilled as well as high-skilled workers, with the impact of NIC 
again being more considerable than the impact of OECD countries. The impact of NIC 
competition is also higher for low-skilled workers than for high-skilled workers. 
 
 
 
7.6 General Results 
 
Overall the results of own empirical work on a panel of EU countries for the 1980s and 1990s, 
presented in this thesis, confirm the conclusions of previous recent empirical studies on the 
impact of North-South trade on the position of low-skilled workers in developed countries. 
Trade with Newly Industrialised Countries had a significant impact. Accounting for the 
interdependence of trade and technological change provides estimates of an additional (often 
significant) indirect impact that has been ignored in most of the early studies, resulting in an 
underestimation of the effects of international trade. 
With respect to the European Union, employment seems to have been affected more than wages. 
This finding is in line with stylised facts, showing that except for the United Kingdom, wage 
inequality did not rise as dramatically in most EU countries as it did in the United States.  
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The Stolper-Samuelson theorem, with its assumption of perfect labour market competition, is 
probably too restrictive a framework to assess the labour market impact of international trade, 
given the importance of labour unions, minimum wages and unemployment benefits in most 
EU countries 
Labour market institutions and the intra-EU heterogeneity with respect to these institutions 
should be acknowledged.  
However, heterogeneity across EU countries is often captured by the country-specific intercepts 
in the panel estimations, whereas the hypothesis of common slopes is mostly not rejected, 
suggesting a relatively similar impact of international trade in the European Union.  
In the 1990s there were indications of wage effects, with wage moderation resulting in an 
improved employment performance in the European Union (OECD 2003 a). 
This seems to be confirmed by the results of chapter 6, indicating that international trade 
reduced the bargaining power of unions in the last half of the 1990s, which given the assessment 
of the bargaining regime and wage-orientation of unions suggests a fall in wages and an increase 
in productive labour. 
 
If trade with the Newly Industrialised Countries appears to have had a significant impact, it 
seems only fair to grant that, even accounting for its indirect impact through technological 
change, it has not been the dominant explanation for labour market developments in the 
European Union. 
Autonomous technological change, i.e. independent of international trade, undoubtedly 
played a significant role too. Technology policy and domestic R&D activities are in New 
Growth theories perceived as important determinants of economic performance and the 
chances are that most technological activities are not neutral in terms of factor intensity.   
 
Summarizing the results I would like to quote Deardorff (1998 a: p. 24):” “It seems likely that 
both trade and technology have contributed to the increased skill differential, both in 
substantial amounts, with technology probably contributing a bit more than trade. I am 
sceptical of other causes having contributed to it at all, but my range of uncertainty around 
each of these statements is very large”. 
 
The range of my uncertainty follows from the fact that despite substantial contributions in terms 
of new theoretical modelling and empirical methodologies, the question what the exact role of 
trade with NIC has been in the deteriorated position of low-skilled workers cannot yet be 
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answered conclusively. Especially the interaction between international trade and technological 
change, both with respect to induced technological change in developed countries and the 
possible technological catch-up through North-South spillovers in emerging economies has to 
be scrutinized further. New Growth scholars reason that the gains from international trade are 
probably more ambiguous than in traditional trade theories and that the rationale of trade and 
technology policies depends on the scope of knowledge spillovers. 
However, in my view there is far more need for qualitative and internationally comparable data 
for a further assessment of this issue than there is for more theoretical modelling, though both 
are obviously not substitutes.  
Finding that with respect to data for EU countries, especially data broken down by skill or 
educational category, quality and comparability seems to be deteriorating, does not make hopes 
running high.    
 
The fact that international trade with NIC so far did not have a dominant impact on labour 
markets in developed countries does not imply that it may not in the future, if countries with 
large supplies of workers- eager to learn and eager to earn- like China, India and some of the 
new EU member states further integrate in the world markets and would succeed in closing the 
technology gap. 
The relatively small share of manufacturing industries in most industrialised economies is often 
evoked to downplay the impact of international trade on developed economies as the services 
sector is mostly viewed as a non-tradables sector, a view that seems at odds with the reported 
outsourcing of many services (administrative work, call centres, software development) to low-
wage countries and the perceived relevance of a General Agreement of Trade in Services 
(GATS). 
A further reduction of trade barriers in services is negotiated in the recent WTO Development 
Round and could spread the range for trade competition.    
The rising of some Newly Industrialised Countries could severely pressure the social benefit 
system of countries with an ageing population, in addition to the fact that footloose capital 
increasingly slips from the tax base in most nation states, though the economic growth of the 
Newly Industrialised Countries obviously offers trade opportunities for the industrialised 
countries as well. 
 
7.7 Does the Cause matter for the Cure, does the Cure affect the Cause? 
 
  289
Deardorff (1998 c, 1999) wondered whether knowing that the main cause of rising income 
inequality has been international trade or skill-biased technological change really matters for 
the appropriate policy response to increasing income inequality. He gathers it doesn’t matter.  
As most (trade) economists he did not consider restricting international trade as a reasonable 
policy instrument to reduce income inequality, irrespective of the impact trade has (had) on 
income distribution. He argued that taxing imports of low-skill intensive goods has the same 
effect on production as taxing high-skilled workers and subsidising low-skilled workers or 
taxing high-skill intensive production and subsidising low-skill intensive production, but in 
addition distorts demand. 
Production taxes are less optimal than taxes on production factors as they, in addition to 
affecting relative wages and factor supply, reduce the output of the most valuable goods.  
Deardorff showed that the optimal policy to cure rising income inequality probably does not 
depend on the cause of the rise, be it international trade or skill-biased technological change.   
 
Chusseau (2002) pointed out that a policy to increase the average educational level of workers, 
forges the objectives of full employment, modest wage inequality and rapid technological 
progress but takes at least 10 to 20 years to pay off. Imposing minimum wages has a more direct 
impact. Minimum wages could rather quickly increase R&D activities and thereby long-term 
economic growth, although there may be a temporary increase in the unemployment rate of 
workers with a low level of education.   
However, in the model she proposed, subsidising researchers to confine the cost of R&D 
activities and redistributing part of the gains to low-skilled workers is superior to a minimum 
wage policy (Chusseau 2002: p. 266). 
 
Cline (1997) viewed tax credits and loans for higher education as a way to increase the relative 
supply of high-skilled workers. This relative supply apparently increased in the United States 
since the 1960s. However, whereas in the 1960s and 1970s this increase resulted in a declining 
skill premium as the outward shift in demand was smaller than the increase in supply, in the 
1980s and the 1990s the increase in the relative demand exceeded the increase in the relative 
supply, explaining the dramatic rising income inequality in the United States.    
Cline also pleaded to consider a policy shift in US immigration policy, focusing on the attraction 
of high-skilled immigrants. Coppel, Dumont and Visco (2001) raised the difficulty to fine-tune 
the skill level of migration flows. 
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Looking at the relative mismatch between labour supply and vacancies in most EU countries, 
there is an apparent need for education and training.  
Some might wonder whether the unrestrained free choice of education is tenable, knowing that 
many EU countries witness a substantial shortage of engineers and scientists whereas 
psychology, criminology and political sciences classes are deluged.   
Obviously there are limits to an education and training policy. It seems improbable (not to 
mention undesirable) to turn every 18-year old into a rocket engineer or to convert every 50- 
year old laid-off shift worker into a tax lawyer.  
 
Deardorff (1999) argued that policies that attempt to reduce the skill premium could affect the 
relative labour supply if the incentive of people to acquire skills depends on the skill premium. 
Acquiring skills implies giving up own time (and money). If someone decides not to pursue 
higher education he or she could start working and earn a pay right away.   
If the ability to acquire skills is unevenly distributed among the population, the return to 
education may be lower for some than for others.  
Taxing high-skilled workers and subsidising low-skilled workers could reduce the incentive to 
acquire skills and as result the relative endowment with high-skilled workers would drop. 
Deardorff therefore reasoned that such a policy implies a lower national income than when 
imposing a non-distorting tax though he subjoined that the latter policy is close to impossible 
in the real world, in which case taxing and subsidising production factors, production taxes and 
trade restrictions are, in decreasing order of efficiency, the appropriate policy instruments to 
reduce income inequality.    
 
Martins and Pereira (2004) found evidence for 16 developed countries in the mid-1990s that 
the returns to schooling are higher for high-skilled persons than for low-skilled workers. Within 
the group of high-skilled workers wage inequality is substantial. The authors believe that this 
could reflect over-education, i.e. high-skilled persons taking a job that does not require many 
skills, and warn that a policy aiming to reduce wage inequality by simply investing in increasing 
higher schooling levels will not necessarily be successful as even if all workers would be high-
skilled wage inequality could be considerable.   
 
Cline (1997) believed that cuts in social charges for low-skilled workers, especially when 
financed by environmental levies, could improve job creation in the European Union but 
warned to think twice before dismantling a social system and wage policies that in his view 
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have been instrumental in a growth of total wage receipts in the European Union that exceeded 
the growth in the United States, despite the fact that labour supply increased more in the United 
States than in Europe.   
 
All said and done, I hope this thesis has been a meaningful contribution to the empirical 
assessment of trade with Newly Industrialised Countries on wages and employment of low-
skilled and high-skilled workers in the European Union.    
I think it would be unfair to consider international trade as the villain portrayed by some public 
prosecutors.  By and large, empirical evidence shows that if international trade has had a 
significant role in labour market developments it has not been the dominant determinant. 
Globalisation is a mot du jour that is all too often used by many national policy-makers to shake 
off own responsibilities. 
Though economic integration obviously complicates the formulation of sound policies, in my 
view, domestic institutions and domestic policies are still the dominant determinants of the 
economic performance of countries. 
 
If the increase in real wages should preferably not exceed productivity growth and wage 
moderation is important vis-à-vis a country’s main trade partners, I believe the obsession with 
wages and labour costs is for the greater part beside the mark in the debate on the impact of 
North-South economic integration. The Factor Price Equalization theorem is by far the 
unworldliest theorem of the Heckscher-Ohlin framework. Differences in wages across countries 
can be sustained due to differences in technological (productivity) level. In endogenous growth 
theories, contrary to the neoclassical growth theory, hysteresis effects are accounted for, which 
can explain why, with few leap-frogging exceptions, developed countries do not seem to 
succeed in closing the technology gap.  
Investment in innovative activities and knowledge creation at large should ensure that in an 
integrated world economy, job creation in developed countries counterbalances the jobs that 
are lost due to the comparative advantage of developing countries in labour-intensive activties. 
Artificially sustaining a comparative advantage by reducing real wages is not necessarily 
welfare-improving and could moreover reduce the incentive to innovate. 
Judging by the relocation and outsourcing of relatively skill-intensive activities to low-wage 
countries, maintaining a competitive advantage in skill-intensive activities is not only necessary 
to ensure well-paid jobs for low-skilled workers but increasingly also to ensure well-paid jobs 
for all workers, irrespective of their skill level 
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Maintaining a comparative advantage in high-skill intensive products requires substantial and 
incessant investment in R&D activities and technological innovation. 
As argued by Jaffe (1996) and Dumont and Tsakanikas (2001) policy support for R&D 
activities should be determined by the size of the spillover gap (difference between private and 
social benefits) of R&D and not so much by the magnitude of spillovers, as projects with large 
spillovers as such may very well be projects with large private benefits and thus have a high 
probability that they will be carried out irrespective of public support. 
An assessment of the social benefits of R&D activities and innovation implies that technology 
and innovation policy should link up with a broader policy view, incorporating issues related 
to the labour market (e.g. low employment rates of the low-skilled), international trade 
(dynamic comparative advantage) and the environment.  
 
If I do not view international trade as a villain, I do not consider it as the benefactor portrayed 
by some free trade advocates either. 
When accounting for the endogeneity of technological change or the high unemployment rates 
in many industrialised countries, the mutual gains from international trade are more ambiguous 
than suggested by traditional trade theories.  
Moreover, trade liberalisation is not neutral. Even if the net effect is positive for most countries, 
the lives and works of many could be affected drastically. Shifts in comparative advantage and 
specialisation patterns do not occur instantaneously and imply re-orientation and the closing 
down of factories. 
Policy-makers would do well to hear out those that are actually affected by international trade 
and consider the most effective and efficient policy instruments to distribute the gains from 
international trade, if they want to promote international trade as a mechanism to reduce poverty 
in developing countries as well as to guard against a dual economy in developed countries. 
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